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SUMMARY 
The use of small-satellites as platforms for fast-access to space with relatively low cost has 
increased in the last years. In particular, many universities in the world have now permanent 
hands-on education programs based on CubeSats. These small and cheap platforms are 
becoming more and more attractive also for other-than-educational missions, such as for 
example technology demonstration, science application, and Earth observation. This new 
objectives require the development of adequate technology to increase CubeSat 
performances. Furthermore, it is necessary to improve mission reliability. 
The research aims at studying methods for dependability analysis conducted by small 
satellites. The attention is focused on the reliability, as main attribute of the dependability, of 
CubeSats and CubeSats missions. 
The work has been structured in three main blocks. The first part of the work has been 
dedicated to the general study of dependability from the theoretical point of view. It has been 
studied the dependability attributes, the threads that can affect the dependability of a system, 
the techniques that are used to mitigate the threads, parameters to measure dependability, 
and models and techniques for dependability modelling. 
The second part contains a study of failures occurred during CubeSats missions in the last 
ten years and their observed reliability evaluation have been conducted. In order to perform 
this analysis a database has been created. This database contents information of all CubeSats 
launched until December 2013. The information has been gathered from public sources (i.e. 
CubeSat projects webs, publications on international journals, etc.) and contains general 
information (e.g. launch date, objectives) and data regarding possible failures. All this 
information is then used to conduct a quantitative reliability analysis of these missions by 
means of non-parametric and parametric methods, demonstrating that these failures follow a 
Weibull distribution. 
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In the third section different methods, based on the concept of fault prevention, removal 
and tolerance, have been proposed in order to evaluate and increase dependability, and 
concretely reliability, of CubeSats and their missions. Concretely, three different methods have 
been developed: 1) after an analysis of the activities conducted by CubeSat’s developers 
during whole CubeSat life-cycle, it has been proposed a wide range of activities to be 
conducted during all phases of satellite’s life-cycle to increase mission rate of success, 2) 
increase reliability through CubeSats verification, mainly tailoring international ECSS standards 
to be applied to a CubeSat project, 3) reliability rising at mission level by means of 
implementing distributed mission architectures instead of classical monolithic architectures. 
All these methods developed in the present PhD research have been applied to a real 
space projects under development at Politecnico di Torino within e-st@r program. The e-st@r 
program is being conducted by the CubeSat Team of the Mechanical and AeroSpace 
Engineering Department. Concretely, e-st@r-I, e-st@r-II, and 3STAR CubeSats have been used 
as test cases for the proposed methods. 
Moreover, part of the present research has been conducted within an internship at the 
European Space research and Technology Centre (ESTEC) of the European Space Agency (ESA) 
at Noordwijk (The Netherlands). In particular, the partially realisation of the CubeSats 
database, the analysis of activities conducted by CubeSat developers and statement of 
activities for mission rate of success increase have been conducted during the internship. 
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SOMMARIO 
L’utilizzo di piccoli satelliti come piattaforme che acconsentono a un rapido accesso allo 
spazio a costo contenuto è cresciuto negli ultimi anni. In particolare, molte università hanno 
stabilito, negli ultimi anni, programmi educativi basati su CubeSats. Tuttavia, queste piccole ed 
economiche piattaforme stanno diventando attraente per missioni diverse da quelle con 
obiettivi puramente educativi, come ad esempio dimostrazione tecnologica, applicazioni 
scientifiche e di osservazione della Terra. Questi nuovi obiettivi richiedono lo sviluppo di 
un’adeguata tecnologia per incrementare le prestazioni dei CubeSats. Inoltre, è necessario 
migliorare l’affidabilità di questi satelliti e delle loro missioni. 
L’obiettivo principale di questa tesi è identificare i possibili metodi per valutare e 
migliorare gli attributi di dependability (affidabilità, disponibilità, manutenibilità e sicurezza) 
dei piccoli satelliti e le loro missioni, e in particolare da CubeSats. 
Il lavoro è strutturato in tre blocchi principali. La prima parte del lavoro è stata dedicata 
allo studio generale della dependability da un punto di vista teorica, analizzando gli attributi 
che la compongono, le minacce che possono violare la dependability di un sistema, le tecniche 
utilizzate per tentare di ovviare a tali minacce, i suoi parametri di misura e i modelli e tecniche 
di modellizzazione della dependability. 
La seconda parte si focalizza nello studio dei guasti avvenuti sui CubeSat lanciati 
nell’ultimo decennio e dell’affidabilità osservata in questi sistemi. Per condurre quest’analisi è 
stato creato un database con tutti i CubeSat lanciati fino dicembre 2013. L’informazione, 
ricavata da fonti pubbliche (internet, pubblicazioni in riviste internazionali, etc.), riguarda sia 
argomenti generali (data di lancio, obiettivo, etc.) sia dati su relativi guasti. Quest’ultima 
informazione è dopo usata per realizzare una valutazione quantitativa dell’affidabilità di 
queste missioni tramite analisi non-parametrici e parametrici, dimostrando che i guasti 
seguono una distribuzione di Weibull. 
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Nella terza sezione diversi metodi, basati sui concetti di fault prevention, removal e 
tolerance, sono proposti per incrementare la dependability, e in particolare l’affidabilità, di 
CubeSat e le loro missioni. In particolare, tre diversi metodi sono stati sviluppati: 1) dopo 
un’analisi delle attività realizzate durante i cicli di vita dei CubeSat da parte degli sviluppatori, 
si propongono delle attività da implementare durante tutte le fasi di progetto per aumentare 
la possibilità di un successo della missione, 2) aumentare l’affidabilità tramite la verifica dei 
CubeSat, adattando la normativa internazionale ECSS per essere applicata ai CubeSat, 3) 
aumentare l’affidabilità a livello di missione tramite l’implementazione di architetture 
distribuite rispetto alle classiche monolitiche. 
I diversi metodi sviluppati in questa tesi di dottorato sono stati applicati a progetti reali in 
sviluppo al Politecnico di Torino dentro l’ambito del programma e-st@r condotto dal CubeSat 
Team del Dipartimento di Ingegneria Meccanica e AeroSpaziale. In particolare, i CubeSat e-
st@r-I, e-st@r-II e 3STAR sono stati usati come test case dei tre diversi metodi proposti. 
Inoltre, parte della ricerca presentata in questa tesi è stata condotta nell’ambito di un 
periodo di ricerca presso l’European Space Research and Technology Centre dell’Agenzia 
Spaziale Europea in Noordwijk (Paesi Bassi). Concretamente, è stato completato il database sui 
CubeSat lanciati, l’analisi delle attività condotte dagli sviluppatori di CubeSat e l’individuazione 
delle possibili azioni da implementare durante il ciclo di vita di questi satelliti per aumentare il 
tasso di successo delle loro missioni. 
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 1 
1  
INTRODUCTION 
Space missions are evolving continuous and rapidly. Traditional high mass and cost 
spacecraft are being overpassed by new small-satellite missions. Actually, the main objective is 
to create smaller, lower-cost, more responsive systems capable of doing more and doing it 
more quickly and at lower cost. This concept led to assure that it is necessary to reinvent space 
as described by James R. Wertz in Space Mission Engineering: The New SMAD. He defined 
“reinventing space” as the use of modern technology and old-fashioned drive, determination, 
and some willingness to accept risk to do much more, much faster, with fewer resources. 
Gathering this concept, new missions conducted with small-satellites are being developed 
all around the World. The use of this type of spacecraft gives different advantages: 
 Reduce cost 
 Reduce mission risk (i.e. risk as the product of reliability and the cost of failure. 
Reducing cost of failure, the mission risk is reduced) 
 Possibility to develop different mission architectures that are not feasible with 
traditional satellites 
 Use state-of-the-art technologies for future applications 
 Faster responsive missions 
The boost on fast-delivery and low-cost projects requirements shall be combined with the 
achievement of certain level of performances to correctly conduct the designed missions. 
Traditionally, the use of small and relatively simply satellites has been adopted to reduce 
project costs and schedule. However, it is said that this type of satellites, and particularly for 
CubeSats, are characterised to be affected by a low reliability and hence, an unacceptable 
mission rate of success. The cause to be the origin of these events has been usually assumed to 
be the academic field (and hence, education as main objective) where this type of spacecraft 
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are being developed, focusing the attention on the nominal design without considering 
possible non-nominal mission. However, in the last years the interest on CubeSats for other-
than-educational objectives led the need to increase their dependability to achieve an 
acceptable mission rate of success. 
Nevertheless, all these evaluations are being made from general observation of small-
satellite missions but no precise study on CubeSat’s failures, reliability analysis and methods to 
increase their dependability is present in literature. 
Hence, the objective of the present study is to fill this gap in the study of dependability 
and its attributes, and identify different methods to increase them for missions developed with 
small-satellites and, in particular, by CubeSats. The present research framework is included in 
the activity of the CubeSat Team of the Politecnico di Torino within the ASSET group. The 
AeroSpace Systems Engineering Team group of the Mechanical and AeroSpace Engineering 
Department (DIMEAS) deals with design and manufacturing of small-satellites since many 
years. Within this group, the CubeSat Team is in charge of design and develop CubeSats as well 
as new methodologies in support of these activities. 
1.1 Thesis lay-out 
As previously stated, the objective of the present research study is to establish methods 
for dependability analysis to be applied to small-satellite missions. The final goal is to use the 
studied methods to improve small-satellite (and in particular CubeSat) missions dependability 
to assure an acceptable mission rate of success. Concretely, the efforts are concentrated in 
three main fields: 1) increase satellite’s reliability by conducting good practices during the 
whole life-cycle, 2) increase satellite’s reliability by applying tailored international standards, 
and 3) increase reliability from the mission point of view. Table 1 shows a block diagram of the 
thesis lay-out. 
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Figure 1: Thesis lay-out block diagram 
In Chapter 2 basics on dependability are detailed. The concept of dependability is 
presented together with its attributes from which it is evaluated, the events that affect the 
system reducing its dependability (i.e. threads) and the way to make a system more 
dependable (i.e. means). Moreover, measurements to assess dependability attributes are also 
explained. Finally, dependability models and techniques are discussed in order to obtain a 
wide background for further steps conducted in the next chapters. 
The evolution of space systems is assessed in Chapter 3. The constant evolution of space 
sector, requiring better results while keeping contained costs, led to think on small-satellites as 
a key-systems to develop today the future’s missions. A general overview is provided regarding 
the constant miniaturisation observed during the last decades. Going in-deep to this aspect, a 
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survey and assessment of all on-orbit CubeSats is conducted and detailed. The chapter is 
concluded with an analysis of observed failures and their main causes. 
In Chapter 4 we conducted an analysis of CubeSat missions’ reliability. The target is to 
obtain the reliability of CubeSats that are already on-orbit. We used two different methods: 
non-parametric and parametric. To conduct non-parametric analysis, Kaplan-Meier estimator 
is used, taking into account censoring data with staggered entries. Parametric analysis has 
been conducted by means of Weibull plot and Maximum Likelihood Estimation techniques. 
Finally, we conducted a comparison among the methods results. 
An analysis of CubeSat’s life-cycle is conducted in Chapter 5. This assessment is used to 
identify the main three ways to increase reliability of CubeSats and related missions. 
Moreover, we provide an explanation of space systems life-cycle phases and related activities. 
Focusing the attention on verification phase, we explain the different verification methods 
commonly used for requirements verification. 
In Chapter 6 we analyse the activities conducted by CubeSat developers during their 
CubeSat’s life-cycle. The gathered inputs were used to establish good practices to be applied 
during development, manufacturing, verification and operations of CubeSats to increase their 
mission rate of success. This activity was conducted within an internship in the Education 
Office of ESA/ESTEC under supervision of dependability section expert. 
Verification phase activities of space system life-cycle are analysed and assessed in 
Chapter 7. The study proposes the implementation and tailoring of international standards to 
fit CubeSat projects requirements. In particular, tailoring of ECSS is proposed to address fast-
delivery and low-cost CubeSats verification campaign in order to increase its reliability. E-st@r-
II CubeSat is then used as case study for the present analysis. 
New approach to assure acceptable reliability is stated in Chapter 8. In particular, the 
possibility to increase mission rate of success by increasing reliability at mission level instead of 
at system level. Different mission architectures are evaluated in terms of reliability and mean-
time-to-failure. The proposed method is thus applied to 3STAR CubeSat as part of 
HumSat/GEOID program as a case study. 
 1.1 Thesis lay-out 
5 
Chapter 9 presents the conclusions of the present research, were contributions of this 
thesis and obtained results are summarised. 
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BASICS ON DEPENDABILITY 
Dependability of a system is its ability to deliver its intended specified level of services to 
the end users so that they can justifiably relay on and trust the services provided by the 
system. 
Practically, the concept of dependability is an integration of attributes (which evaluation 
represents a way to assess the dependability of a system), threats (i.e., events that affect in 
someway the dependability of a system) and means (i.e., the way in which the dependability of 
a system is increased). 
The origin of dependability concept is set during the first generation of electronic 
computers (late 1940’s to mid-50) where practical techniques were employed to improve their 
reliability to cope with components unreliability. The increase of interest on fault tolerance 
and systems reliability during 1960’s and 1970’s led to the study of dependability of an 
encompassment, not only of reliability, but also other attributes. In 1980’s Jean-Claude Laprie 
started to use dependability as a concept for study of fault tolerance and systems reliability 
without the need to extend the concept of reliability. The work was synthesized by the same 
author in 1992 in the book Dependability: Basic Concepts and Terminology 
2.1 Dependability attributes 
As already specified above, the dependability is evaluated with the assessment of 
different attributes (see Table 1). These attributes are: reliability, availability, maintainability, 
safety (i.e., the so called RAMS), integrity and confidentiality, which are usually referred to 
computing systems but they could be extend to space systems (as detailed later on). The 
concurrent existence of availability, integrity and confidentiality is represented by the security 
attribute. 
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Table 1: Dependability and security attributes tree and definitions 
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Reliability Reliability R(t) of a system at time t is the probability 
that the system operates without a failure in the 
interval [0,t], given that the system was performing 
correctly at time 0. Thus, reliability is a measure of 
the continuous delivery of correct service 
Availability Availability A(t) of a system at time t is the 
probability that the system is functioning correctly at 
the instant of time t 
Maintainability Maintainability M(t) of a system is a measure of the 
ability of the system to undergo maintenance or to 
return to normal operation after a failure 
Safety Safety S(t) of a system at time t is the probability that 
the system either performs its function correctly or 
discontinues its operation in a fail-safe manner in the 
interval [0,t], given that the system was operating 
correctly at time 0. Thus, safety can be considered as 
an extension of reliability, namely reliability with 
respect to failures that may create safety hazards 
Integrity Integrity of a system is the probability that errors or 
attacks will not lead to damages to the state of the 
system, including data, code, etc. 
Confidentiality Confidentiality of a system is a measure of the 
degree to which the system can ensure that an 
unauthorized user will not be able to understand 
protected information in the system 
2.2 Dependability threads 
Threads are events that affect the system reducing its dependability. This dependability 
impairment is usually defined in terms of faults, errors, or failures. A common feature of the 
three terms is that they give us a warning that something in the system is going wrong. The 
differences among the three threads it that, in the case of a fault, the problem occurred on the 
physical level; in the case of an error, the problem occurred on the computational level; in the 
case of a failure, the problem occurred on a system level. The definitions of these threads are: 
 A fault is a physical defect, imperfection, or flaw that occurs in some hardware or 
software component. For example, a short circuit between two adjacent 
interconnects or a broken pin. 
Se
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 An error is a deviation from correctness or accuracy in computation, which occurs as 
a result of a fault. Errors are usually associated with incorrect values in the system 
state. For example, a circuit or a program computed an incorrect value, or incorrect 
information was received while transmitting data. 
 A failure is a non-performance of some action which is due or expected. A system is 
said to have a failure if the service it delivers to the user deviates from compliance 
with the system specification for a specified period of time. A system may fail either 
because it does not act in accordance with the specification, or because the 
specification did not adequately describe its function. 
2.3 Dependability means 
Generally, there are two ways to approach to obtain a dependable product. The easiest 
approach consists in first designing the system, and then making it as much dependable as 
required. This approach is expensive and ineffective; if dependability is taken into account only 
in the latest phases of designing, any design modification will lead to a cost increase and time 
delay. 
Nowadays an evaluation of system dependability is performed early in the design process. 
Thus, if the result is not acceptable, changes are introduced in the first design phases before 
manufacturing process. 
Different techniques are available for designing dependable systems: i.e., dependability 
means: the methods and techniques enabling the development of a dependable system. 
Normally, they are classified in 4 complementary categories: 
 Fault prevention 
 Fault removal 
 Fault tolerance 
 Fault forecasting 
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2.3.1 Fault prevention 
Fault prevention is a set of techniques attempting to prevent the introduction or 
occurrence of faults in the system in the first place. Fault prevention is achieved by quality 
control techniques during the specification, implementation, and fabrication stages of the 
design process. For hardware, this includes design reviews, component screening, and testing. 
For software, this includes structural programming, modularization, and formal verification 
techniques. 
A rigorous design review may eliminate many specification faults. If a design is efficiently 
tested, many of its faults and component defects can be avoided. Faults introduced by external 
disturbances, such as lightning or radiation, are prevented by shielding, radiation hardening, 
etc. User and operation faults are avoided by training and regular procedures for maintenance. 
Deliberate malicious faults caused by viruses or hackers are reduced by firewalls or similar 
security means. 
2.3.2 Fault removal 
Fault removal is a set of techniques targeting the reduction of the number of faults which 
are present in the system. Fault removal is performed during the development and operations 
phases of system life cycle. Three activities are conducted during fault removal at development 
phase: verification, diagnosis, and correction. Verification is the process of checking whether 
the system fulfils requirements established during design phase. Diagnosis is the activity 
conducted, if verification of certain requirements is not achieved, to identify the fault that 
leads to the unfulfillment of the requirements. Once the fault(s) is(are) identified, they are 
corrected. 
Fault removal during operations consists of corrective and preventive maintenance. 
Preventive maintenance is conducted before fault occurs, proceeding with parts replacement. 
Corrective maintenance is conducted after fault takes place in order to return the system into 
its operational conditions. 
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2.3.3 Fault forecasting 
Fault forecasting is a set of techniques used to estimate the number of faults present in a 
system, their possible future occurrence, and their consequences on the system. Fault 
forecasting is conducted by performing an evaluation of the system behaviour with respect to 
fault occurrences or activation. They evaluation can be conducted in qualitative and/or 
quantitative way. Qualitative evaluation aims at assessing the failure modes or events 
combinations that lead to system failure. Quantitative evaluation aims at assessing in terms of 
probabilities at which extend a dependability attribute is satisfied. 
2.3.4 Fault tolerance 
Fault tolerance targets the development of a system that correctly operates in the 
presence of a fault. Thus, fault tolerant techniques assume that faults may arise anyway, and 
aim at reducing their effects (i.e., the misbehaviours). These techniques are typically based on 
redundancy. Redundancy design techniques are classified in three groups: hardware 
redundancy, information redundancy and time redundancy. 
2.3.4.1 Hardware redundancy 
The system is implemented using more hardware than that needed for implementing the 
system functionalities. The redundant hardware is used for dealing with faults and can be 
classified in three groups: passive redundancy, active redundancy and hybrid redundancy. 
Passive redundancy 
Passive redundancy is usually based on fault masking, the process of assuring that only 
correct values, in the case of electronics, or more generally the correct functionalities get 
passed to the system output in spite of the presence of a fault. Concretely, the hardware 
needed to implement the system is replicated more than two times, fed with the same input. 
Each domain produces its own output and then, a majority voter decides the output to be 
committed to the user on the basis of the outputs coming from the different domains. 
Obviously, the voter must be fault-free; otherwise, failures may happen. Moreover, if the same 
fault exists in all the modules, the passive redundancy architecture fails. 
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Active redundancy 
Active redundancy is an alternative to passive redundancy. It implements fault detection, 
i.e., the process of determining that a fault has occurred within a system. Moreover, it may 
also possibly implement fault location, fault containment and fault recovery. Fault location is 
the process of determining where a fault has occurred in the system. Fault containment is the 
process of isolating a fault and preventing the propagation of its effect throughout the system. 
Fault recovery applies a reconfiguration of the system to isolate the faulty component from 
the rest of the system and regain operational status. 
Hybrid redundancy 
As it names states, hybrid redundancy is a combination of passive and active redundancy. 
In this case, N primary modules are used plus M are spares. A switch selects a certain number 
of modules out of N primary outputs to be voted by the voter. A configuration module detects 
the primary modules whose outputs differ from the voter output. Each faulty primary module 
is replaced by a spare one. 
2.3.4.2 Information redundancy 
Information redundancy is based on the store of more data than those needed by the 
application. The redundant data added to the original data is used to detect and possibly 
correct errors affecting the original data. Information redundancy is usually applied to 
computer field. Some examples of information redundancy are: parity codes and hamming 
codes. 
2.3.4.3 Time redundancy 
Time redundancy is also commonly used in computer field. It is based in using more time 
needed for an input processing. The additional time is devoted to detect and possibly correct 
errors occurred during the processing. 
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2.4 Dependability attributes measurements 
Different measurements are assessed to evaluate and quantify dependability attributes. 
The most used (i.e., failure rate, mean-time-to-failure, mean-time-to-repair and mean-time-
between-failure) are detailed in the present section. 
2.4.1 Failure rate 
Failure rate, expressed with Greek-letter λ, is the expected number of failures per unit 
time. For example, if a component fails, on average, once every 10000 hours, then it has a 
failure rate λ=1/10000 failures/hour. The failure rate is highly useful in estimating the time to 
failure (or time between failures), repair crew size for a given repair policy, the availability of 
the system, and in estimating the warranty cost. It can also be used to study the behaviour of 
the system’s failure with time. 
The failure rate is a function of time. This evolution over a system’s life-time is usually 
characterised, for hardware, by the bathtub-shaped function showed in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 reads as follow: assume a population of N identical components functioning at 
time T=0. They experience a high failure rate at the beginning of the operation time due to 
weak or substandard components, manufacturing imperfections, design errors, and 
installation defects. As the failed components are removed, the time between failures 
increases which results in a reduction of failure rate. This Early Life Region with a decreasing 
failure rate is known as infant mortality region. Time T1 represents the end of the early failure-
rate region. 
2 BASICS ON DEPENDABILITY  
14 
 
Figure 2: General evolution of failure rate over a life-time of a hardware system (i.e., bathtub-shaped function) 
At the end of the early life region, the failure rate will eventually reach a constant value. 
In this region (i.e., between T1 and T2), the failures do not follow a predictable pattern, but 
they occur randomly. The third region, after T2, is known as Wear Out Region. It is noticed 
when the failure rate starts to increase significantly more than the constant failure-rate value, 
and the failures are no longer attributed to randomness but are due to the age and wear of the 
components. In this region, a boost of the failure rate is observed due to the fact that 
components reach their designed life. 
Obviously, not all components follow the bathtub-shape trend. Most electronic and 
electrical components do not exhibit wear out region. Some mechanical components may 
show a gradual transition between first and third regions, without facing a constant failure 
rate. Moreover, the length of each region depends on each component. 
Different failure-time distributions are present in literature. Since the goal of the present 
research thesis is to deal with small-satellites missions’ dependability, only failure-time 
distributions that fit with analysed data will be described in the required section. 
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2.4.2 Mean-Time-To-Failure 
Mean-Time-To-Failure (i.e., MTTF) is one of the most widely used measurements of 
reliability, mainly applied for non-repairable systems. It is defined as the expected of the 
occurrence of the first failure. Hence, 
 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 = ∫ 𝑡𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 (2.1) 
 
The MTTF may be expressed directly in terms of the system reliability by substituting the 
following expression in equation (2.1): 
 
𝑓(𝑡) = −
𝑑𝑅(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 (2.2) 
 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 = − ∫ 𝑡
𝑑𝑅(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑡
∞
0
= −𝑡𝑅(𝑡)|0
∞ + ∫ 𝑅(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 (2.3) 
 
Since 𝑡𝑅(𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → 0 and 𝑡𝑅(𝑡) → 0 as 𝑡 → ∞, then equation (2.3) can be written as: 
 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 = ∫ 𝑅(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 (2.4) 
 
In general, MTTF is meaningful only for systems that operate without repair until the first 
failure occurs. For most of the systems, this statement is not valid because maintenance is 
conducted before the next mission, repairing possible failures and restoring fully operational 
conditions to the system. In case of space systems, this assertion is usually not applicable and 
the pure definition of mean-time-to-failure applies. 
2.4.3 Mean-Time-To-Repair 
Mean-Time-To-Repair (i.e., MTTR) of a system is the average time required to repair the 
system divided by the sum of the individual failure rates. It depends on multiple variables: fault 
recovery mechanism used in the system, location of the system, location of space modules 
(on-site versus off-site), maintenance schedule, etc. 
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The MTTR mathematical expression is: 
 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 =
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑡𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡
 (2.5) 
Where: 
 λi = i-th failure rate 
 λtot = sum of the individual failure rates 
Obviously, for a space system is almost impossible to apply classical repairmen (e.g. as 
repair conducted on the Hubble space telescope). In section XX, the concept of MTTR is 
approached from the mission point of view. 
If in a system occurs n failures during its lifetime, the total time that the system is 
operational is then n·MTTF. Similarly, the total time the system is being repaired is n·MTTR. 
Then, the availability is given by: 
 
𝐴(∞) =
𝑛 · 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹
𝑛 · 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 + 𝑛 · 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
=
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
 (2.6) 
 
2.4.4 Mean-Time-Between-Failure 
Mean-Time-Between-Failure (i.e., MTBF) of a system is the average time between failures 
of the system. Usually, it is computed for repairable systems. Indeed, if a system is repairable 
and that repair makes the system perfect, then the relationship between MTBF and MTTF is 
established as defined in Eq. (2.7). 
 
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 = 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 (2.7) 
2.5 Dependability models and techniques 
A wide number of models are nowadays used to evaluate systems dependability. The 
present section aims at depicting a general overview and description of most common models 
and techniques to evaluate dependability. Techniques used for further studies in the present 
thesis will be further explained in future sections. 
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2.5.1 Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) 
Reliability Bloc Diagrams show the logical connections between components of a system, 
and thus, also the failure logic of the system. RBD performs the system reliability and 
availability analyses on large and complex systems using block diagrams to show network 
relationship. It is worth to remark that RBD is not necessarily the same as a block schematic 
diagram of the system’s functional layout. Indeed, for systems involving complex interactions 
construction of the RBD can be quite difficult, and a different RBD will be necessary for 
different definitions of what constitutes a system failure. 
It is usually conducting a reduction of reliability block diagram to obtain a simple system 
which can then be analysed using the formulae for series and parallel arrangements. 
Generally, a system can contain a series, parallel, or combination of series and parallel 
connections to make up the network. 
Some properties of the modelling diagram are: 
 Arranging several components along a path means connecting them by an “and” 
operation 
 Arranging several components in parallel paths represents an “or” operation 
 If a component appears in several expressions of the Boolean system function, it 
must be put in a corresponding number of parallel paths of the reliability diagram 
Thus, in the system function of a non-redundant system, all components are connected by 
an “and” operation. All components must be faultless to forma  faultless system. 
Generally speaking, successful operational systems require at least one maintained path 
between the system input and the system output. Hence, a fault case is a combination of the 
possible values of the binary random variables indicating which components are faultless and 
which are not. Boolean algebra expressions are used to describe the minimum combination of 
failures required to cause a system failure. Minimal cut-sets represent the minimal number of 
failures that can cause the system to fail. 
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2.5.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a reliability/safety design analysis technique which starts from 
consideration of system failure effects (i.e., the top event). The analysis is conducted assessing 
what failure or event (or their combination) in the next lower level is/are required to produce 
the top failure. Thus, this technique shows the logical connection between failure events in 
relation to defined top events. Moreover, it is used to quantify the top event probabilities, in 
the same way as in block diagram analysis. Failure probabilities are usually calculated based on 
failure rates of each basic event. Note that each FTA is conducted for a unique and well 
defined undesirable event and hence, the construction of different fault trees is required to 
study each top event. 
FTA is useful in order to identify the causes of a failure or other weaknesses that can 
result in a system failure, including human errors. Then, it will allow to identify upgrades for 
the system in order to avoid failures or decrease their probability to occur. To conduct the FTA, 
specific steps are followed, as depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: FTA definition steps 
Generally, steps are conducted sequentially. However, steps 2 (define FTA scope), 3 
(define FTA resolution) and 4 (define FTA ground rules), can be conducted in parallel. 
Moreover, steps 3 and 4 can be iteratively modified after steps 5 (construct Fault Tree) and 6 
(evaluate Fault Tree) are being carried out. 
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In particular, the steps are the following: 
1. Univocally define the top event 
2. Define the FTA scope: identify what failures and events will be taken into account 
and what will not be considered, taken also into account the mission phase for 
which the FTA is being conducted 
3. Define the FTA solution: identify the lowest level of detail at which the FTA will be 
developed 
4. Define the FTA ground rules: define the procedure and the nomenclature for the 
events, gates, etc. 
5. Construct the Fault Tree 
6. Evaluate the Fault Tree: qualitative and quantitative assessment of top event 
probability of occurrence 
7. Interpretation and presentation of results 
2.5.3 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Event Tree Analysis is an inductive technique conducted to identify and evaluate all 
accidental sequences from the occurrence of an initiating event. It utilises a visual logic tree 
structure, the Event Tree. The objective of the Event Tree Analysis is to determine whether the 
initiating event will develop into a serious mishap or if the event is sufficiently controlled by 
the safety systems and procedures implemented in the system design. Then, an Event Tree 
Analysis can result in many different possible outcomes from a single initiating event, and it 
provides the capability to obtain a probability for each outcome. 
The ETA technique is based on the following definitions: 
 Accident scenario: series of events that ultimately result in an accident. The 
sequence of events begins with an initiating event and normally is followed by one 
or more pivotal events that lead to the undesired end state. 
 Initiating event (IE): failure or undesired event that initiates the start of an accident 
sequence. The IE may result in a mishap, depending upon successful operation of 
the hazard countermeasure methods designed into the system. 
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 Pivotal events: intermediary events between the IE and the final mishap. These are 
the failure/success events of the design safety methods established to prevent the 
IE from resulting in a mishap. If a pivotal event works successfully, it stops the 
accident scenario and is referred as a mitigating event. If a pivotal event fails to 
work, then the accident scenario is allowed to progress and is referred as an 
aggravating event. 
 Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA): comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis 
method for identifying and evaluating risk in a complex technological system. The 
detailed identification and assessment of accident scenarios, with a quantitative 
analysis, is the PRA goal. 
 Event Tree (ET): graphical model of an accident scenario that yields multiple 
outcomes and outcome probabilities. ETs are one of the most used tools in a PRA. 
An ET distils the pivotal event scenario definitions and presents this information in a tree 
structure that is used to help classify scenarios according to their consequences. The accident 
scenario concept (i.e. how mishap is reached) is shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Accident scenario concept 
 
The headings of the ET are the IE, the pivotal events, and the end states. The tree 
structure below these headings shows the possible scenarios ensuring from the IE, in terms of 
the occurrence or non-occurrence of the pivotal events. Each different path through the tree is 
a distinct scenario. According to a widespread but informal convention, where pivotal events 
are used to specify system success or failure, the “down” branch is considered to be “failure”. 
Figure 5 displays the event tree concept. 
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Figure 5: Event tree concept 
2.5.4 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is probably the most widely used 
and most effective design reliability analysis method. It is a systematic analysis of all possible 
ways in which a component may fail, considering each failure mode as different voice. The 
FMECA highlights single point failures requiring corrective action; aids in developing test 
methods and troubleshooting techniques; provides estimates for system critical failure rates; 
provide a quantitative ranking of system and/or subsystem failure modes relative to mission 
importance; and identify parts & systems most likely to fail. 
Therefore, the development of a FMECA during the design phases of a space system, the 
overall costs will be minimised by identifying single point failures and other areas of concern 
prior the manufacturing. The FMECA also provides a baseline or a tool for troubleshooting to 
be used for identifying corrective actions for a given failure. 
Usually, the FMECA is conducted by performing, first a FMEA and then the CA. The FMEA 
will be sued as the foundation of the Criticality Analysis. At the end, a common scheme for the 
FMECA is used, as shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: FMECA scheme (FMECA for C4ISR facilities, Headquarters, Department of the Army) 
2.5.5 Markov analysis 
Markov analysis is a steady-state technique that takes into account, on the contrary of 
previous methods, the interaction of components failures. Moreover, the present method 
allows to take into account the dynamics of the system, i.e., to take into account when the 
system is repaired. Assuming that a system can be in one of two states (e.g. failed, non-failed), 
the probability of being in one or other at a future time can be valuated using state-space 
analysis (e.g., Markov analysis). 
Markov analysis is a special class of stochastic process. The basic assumption is that the 
behaviour of the system in each state is memoryless. The transition from one state of the 
system is determined only by this state and not by the previous state or the time at which it 
reached the present state. 
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Two major constraints shall be considered prior applying Markov analysis: 
 The process must be homogeneous (i.e., probabilities to change from one 
state to another shall be constant). Hence, it is possible to use the method 
only when the failure rate is constant. 
 Future states of the system are independent of all past states except the 
immediately preceding one. As stated above, the system in each state is 
memoryless, and it does not take into account historical events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 25 
3  
SHRINKING SPACE 
3.1 Small Satellites description 
Historically, the evolution of satellites technologies led to achieve mission objectives 
through small number of reliable, high capable and complex satellites. The reliability was 
usually reached applying redundancies on high reliable, expensive components. Generally 
speaking, big satellite projects are characterised by wide number of requirements to comply 
with constraints from different potential users and payloads. 
However, in the last decades the use of new architectures based on small satellites arose. 
In particular, it was stated the idea to complement classical mission architectures based on 
conventional monolithic spacecraft with small satellites. Small satellites are simpler than 
conventional satellites; they usually have a single payload with limited capabilities. Despite 
that, the increase during these last years of technology miniaturisation while increasing 
capabilities led to an achievement of better performances on small satellites. 
Moreover, these type of spacecraft are characterised by a shorter life-cycle and hence, 
developed in shorter time. Usually they are designed by a small team at a moderate cost. Due 
to the low budget and then, minimum cost, small satellites are equipped with fewer 
components and are characterised by less complexity. These characteristics led more freedom 
to engineers to use newer and less expensive technologies, such as state-of-the-art 
electronics. Definitively, most of the small satellite projects objectives are a compromise 
between what the designer would like and what it can be afforded with the satellite, what is 
called trading on requirement. 
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The main advantage of miniaturising spacecraft, as already stated, is the reduction of cost 
and development time. These key drivers allow different institutions, which sometimes cannot 
affords the cost and/or design time of conventional satellites, to undertake the development 
of space projects. The modest on-orbit capabilities of this type of spacecraft led to most simple 
architectures and hence, reduced mass. These characteristics gave other advantages to small 
satellite developers. First of all, the reduced mass and volume of the spacecraft permit to fill 
small empty spaces on large launchers, allowing the insertion in-orbit of small satellites as 
piggy-back payload. Secondly, the physical characteristics of small satellites facilitate on-
ground transportation. Indeed, they can be carried in a car or in an airplane seat, for example. 
The advantages of small satellites have been gathered by different institutions. Military 
space projects usually foresaw larger spacecraft that were vulnerable from enemies’ 
aggressive attacks. They address this weakness mainly with reliable components and defensive 
countermeasures that contributes to mass and cost increase. Using many small satellites will 
allow to reduce potential aggressive attacks by using more vulnerable systems, with similar 
capabilities, but becoming more difficult target. Educational institutions, at this turn, envisage 
a perfect opportunity to provide hands-on experience projects to space engineering students. 
The reduction of cost and size allow this type of institutions to afford practical space projects 
driven by educational, technological and scientific purposes. Moreover, these different key 
drivers of educational space projects led to possible collaborations between educational 
institutions and space agencies and companies. 
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Typically, a small satellite is a spacecraft with a mass lower than 500 Kg. With the 
evolution of these satellites, a more precise definition and classification of them was needed. 
Actually, the most widely adopted terminology and classification of satellites is the following: 
 
Table 2: Satellites classification by mass 
General classification Detailed classification Mass 
Big satellites - More than 500 Kg. 
Small satellites Mini-Satellites 100 to 500 Kg. 
Micro-Satellites 10 to 100 Kg. 
Nano-Satellites 1 to 10 Kg. 
Pico-Satellites 0.1 to 1 Kg. 
Femto-Satellites 10 to 100 gr. 
3.2 Historical evolution of small satellites 
Small satellites are not an innovative evolution of spacecraft. First artificial satellites were 
characterised to be small and simple with respect to actual conventional satellites. Anyhow, 
they were innovative systems at that time. These first satellites, which nowadays can be 
classified as small satellites, were small because the limitations of maximum launch capabilities 
of available launchers. 
Space Age began with Sputnik-1, the first artificial satellite orbiting Earth, launched on 4th 
October 1957. It had a spherical-shaped structure of 58 cm. diameter and 83.6 Kg. mass. It was 
only equipped with two frequency radios for on-ground tracking. America’s Vanguard project 
represents also the beginning of space conquest. Vanguard-3 satellite also had a spherical-
shaped structure of 50.8 cm. diameter and 22.7 Kg. mass. Its experiments allowed scientific 
community to define the low edge of Van Allen Belt. 
Radio-amateur community quickly envisaged the possibility to use these small satellites 
for communications and educational purposes. Indeed, already in the ‘60 they started to 
develop OSCAR (Orbiting Satellite Carrying Amateur Radio) satellites with the objective of 
facilitate communications between amateur radio stations. The first one, OSCAR-1, was 
launched in 1961 and to date over 70 OSCARs have been launched. 
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During the ’60s, ’70s and mid-80s, the nations with space-technology capabilities focused 
their attention to develop more and more sophisticated spacecraft to achieve higher on-orbit 
performances. Moreover, the increase of interest on human spaceflights, including the lunar 
landings, led to an evolution on boosters’ technology obtaining larger rockets. These new 
launchers allowed the on-orbit insertion of larger satellites in different orbits, including higher 
orbits not possible to reach before. Then, the evolution of launchers performances, together 
with the need of larger, more capable and more complex satellites led to growth of satellites in 
terms of mass and size. 
Nonetheless, small satellites continued to be developed without much attention either 
from public or aerospace engineering interest. Thank to continuity on small satellites 
development, simple and less expensive technologies continued to be tested on-orbit. 
Moreover, during this period many countries started to develop their own space-technology 
capabilities reaching space through launches of small satellites. For example, Spain’s first 
satellite was IntaSat, a small satellite launched as a secondary payload on a Delta launcher in 
1974. The satellite, with an expected operational life of two years, was equipped with an 
ionospheric beacon for ionospheric irregularities and scintillations studies. Another example is 
the ANS (Astronomische Nederlandse Satelliet), the first satellite from The Netherlands, 
launched also in 1974. The objective of the mission was to observe celestial objects in UV and 
X-ray sources. 
Despite the continuous increasing trend of satellites mass, since mid-80s, space agencies 
and private companies reconsidered the use of small satellites, as can be observed in Figure 7. 
For example, radio-amateur community demonstrated, thanks to OSCAR project, the use of 
small satellites for global mail services applying store and forward communications. 
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Figure 7: Satellites mass evolution 
The emerging interest on these satellites led to establish some initiatives to increase 
development of small satellites. NASA’s Small, Self-Contained Payloads program offered 
individuals or groups opportunities to fly small experiments aboard the Space Shuttle. The 
main three categories of users were educational, foreign and commercial, and U.S. 
government. The experiment was launched through a container installed in the Space Shuttle 
payload bay. In the European side, possibility to launch small-satellites was also provided. 
ASAP (Ariane Structure for Attached Payloads) were developed to allow up to 6 satellites of 50 
Kg. maximum each on Arian V launcher. Due to the popularity and success of the ASAP 
program, it was expanded to accommodate larger payloads with a mass of up to 100 Kg. 
Summarising, various circumstances required the reassessment of the role of 
conventional and small satellites, and boost the development of the later. In particular: 
 Multipurpose missions require high technology development base with high 
investments on space research and industry. Moreover, this could limit space access 
for some nations. 
 Increase society pressure to cost-constrained budgets for space activities 
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 Technology miniaturisation that allows reduction of satellite mass while maintaining 
similar technical performances 
 New initiatives of space agencies to allow the launch of small satellites 
During the last two decades some conventional multi-payload high-mass satellites have 
yet been developed. Well-known examples of this type of satellites could be SPOT-3 or EnviSat. 
The first one is a 1800Kg. satellite launched in 1993 with two identical visible high-resolution 
optical instruments for Earth observation. EnviSat was an Earth observation mission of ESA 
devoted to study and monitor Earth’s environment on various scales, from local through 
regional to global. Its mass at launch, which took place in 2002, was 8140 Kg. Although new 
conventional satellites have been developed, the boost of the interest on small satellites 
design considerably increased from the beginning XXI century. 
3.2.1.1 CubeSat Standard 
Following the trend of cost-reduction and fast-delivery, the CubeSat standard was defined 
in 1999 by Prof. Bob Twiggs from Stanford University and Prof. Jordi Puig-Suari from Cal Poly. 
The standard was stated to allow people with little or no experience in space missions and 
systems design to start with an open mind to incorporate new ideas and concepts into designs 
and missions that have no historical restrictions. 
The physical standard was then based on a 10x10x10 cm. cube (i.e. a cube of 1lt. volume) 
of 1.33 Kg. as maximum mass (first the standard established a maximum mass of 1Kg. but 
NASA and CalPoly have recently adopted this new mass limit). The basic 10x10x10 cm. cube is 
the basic unit of a CubeSat and it is called “1U” CubeSat, as shown in Figure 8. It is scalable in 
different U-basis, being 2U and 3U the most common developed CubeSats. 
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Figure 8: CubeSat Design Specification (CDS rev.13, CalPoly, 2014) 
From educational point of view, the CubeSat philosophy was to give a common standard 
to university students to allow them the design of a small satellite in a reduced period of time 
(e.g. around 2 years) and launch it at a low cost. The reasonable cost of this type of satellite 
was fixed at $100000. The standard mission of a CubeSat was defined to be: 1) technology 
demonstration to allow increase of technology readiness level of certain technology providing 
flight heritage, or 2) accommodate a scientific instrument as primary mission payload. 
As far as engineering point of view regards, the standard gives a common mechanical 
interface with launch by means of standard orbital deployers. The first deployer, called Poly-
PicoSatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD), was developed by Cal Poly. It is possible to 
accommodate in it up to three 1U CubeSats or different combinations of units resulting in a 
total of 3U. The increase of number of designed CubeSats due to its advantages in terms of 
cost and time-development made that different commercial companies provide launch 
opportunities using self-developed deployers. 
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3.3 Survey and Analysis of 10 years of CubeSats 
A survey of launched CubeSats in the last 10 years has been conducted as well as an 
analysis of failures occurred in CubeSats based on the gathered information. All these data is 
detailed in the present section. First of all, a database has been created by the author. Data 
from public sources (i.e. websites, articles from international journals, etc.) have been used to 
create it. The information included on the database encompasses all general data regarding 
launched CubeSats, launch information, failures occurred, if any. The complete list of database 
contents is detailed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Database contents 
General data Launch information Failures information 
CubeSat name Launch date Status 
CubeSat type Launch site Year of failure 
Type of institution Launch vehicle Failure mode 
Developer Deployer Failure cause 
Country  Failure effect 
Objective  Restoring action 
This section is divided in two parts. In the first one, general analysis of the database is 
conducted. This analysis encompasses the evaluation of the launched CubeSats evolution by 
type and year, their geographical distribution, the development institutions, the launch 
evolution by type and institution, and the evaluation of the objectives. The second part of the 
analysis, an assessment of CubeSat failures is conducted, focusing the attention on the 
contribution of each subsystem to the total number of failures. The identification of possible 
causes is also conducted. 
  
 3.3 Survey and Analysis of 10 years of CubeSats 
33 
3.3.1 General analysis 
The first multiple launch CubeSat mission, involving 6 CubeSats as a secondary payload 
took place on June 30th, 2003. The insertion in-orbit was conducted with a Rockot KS launcher 
of Eurockot Launch Services form the launch site in Plesetsk, Russia. Ten years later, at the end 
of 2013, 175 CubeSats have been launched and it is evident that there is a considerable boost 
of developed CubeSats during the last years, as shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Number of launched CubeSats per class and year 
In previous figure it can be clearly identified a considerably increase of launched CubeSats 
in the period 2010-2013. In particular, a peak is observed in 2013 when almost 45% of the total 
CubeSats were launched. This growth can be traced back to several reasons: 
 Interest of universities to establish hands-on experience approach projects to 
students and applied research activities 
 The nature of this type of satellites allures industries the interest on CubeSats 
development as a way of cost-reduction, fast-response to accomplish different 
objective as for example in-orbit technology demonstration 
 Technological progress (e.g. technology miniaturisation) allowed the 
implementation of new systems and mission architectures; constellation/swarm 
3 SHRINKING SPACE  
34 
mission architectures, instead of classical monolithic configuration, are being 
developed, like Flock-1 constellation 
 The support of space agencies on CubeSat development and launch. For example 
ESA Education Office’s CubeSats on VEGA Maiden flight project and Fly Your 
Satellite! Programme (which call for proposals took place on 2008 and 2013 
respectively) and NASA’s ELaNa (which first call for proposals was in 2010) 
 Availability of shared launches due to the fact that these small satellites can fill 
empty spaces on big launchers as piggy-back payloads 
The increase of CubeSats created a high demand of promptly availability of low-cost 
launches. To cope with this need, new launch provider companies came into the market. An in-
depth analysis of the data shows a clear contribution of 1U CubeSats to the total amount. In 
detail, a total of 103 1U platforms have been launched, which represents over 60% of the total 
number of launched CubeSats. Nonetheless, during the last half of the last decade, significant 
boost on number of developed 3U CubeSats is observed. 1.5U and 2U platforms have also 
been launched, but they represent less than 10% of the total. Usually, universities starts their 
space projects developing 1U CubeSats, mainly to keep the design simple using the most 
popular configuration, and to limit the cost investment. For example, the CubeSat Team at 
Politecnico di Torino developed its first 1U CubeSat, e-st@r-I, which was launched in 2012; 
thanks to the experience gained by that project, a 3U CubeSat, 3STAR, is under development 
now. In some cases, university teams continue to develop 1U CubeSats or started first space 
project working on a 3U. New mission objectives (e.g. technology demonstration, Earth 
observation or scientific purposes) also require to allocate greater volume and mass of the 
CubeSat for the payload. Moreover, to conduct certain type of missions, bus performances 
(e.g. attitude determination and pointing accuracy) shall be better and could require higher 
mass and/or volume. All these factors led to the need to enlarge mass and volume of 
CubeSats. 
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Figure 10: CubeSats geographical distribution 
Geographical distribution shows a clear predomination of America (mainly North America) 
and Europe as regions where most of the CubeSat projects have been run; Asia and Africa 
follow while no CubeSats developed in Oceania have been launched. In particular, over 60% of 
CubeSats have been developed in the United States of America. The following country is Japan, 
with 7% of CubeSats. The other CubeSats have been developed in 25 different countries, with 
Germany (9 CubeSats), Norway and Denmark (4 CubeSats each) on highest-ranking, as 
illustrated in Figure 10 and Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: CubeSat geographical distribution on a map 
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The geographical distribution of CubeSat projects is strongly correlated to national 
budgets for space activities. USA is the country with highest percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) invested in space activities and, indeed, is the country where major part of 
CubeSats have been developed. Most of the developed CubeSats are distributed by countries 
following the order of the space activities budget. However, two unexpected observation arise: 
first, the fourth country by number of developed CubeSats, Denmark, has one of the lowest 
space activities budget with respect to most of the European and North American countries; 
second, no CubeSats have been developed in Russia Federation and Popular Republic of China, 
respectively the second and third country by percentage of GDP invested in space field. 
Next analysis covers the evaluation of developed CubeSats by type of institution. To 
conduct this, only the main institution is considered (i.e. if a university is developing a CubeSat 
within a collaboration with a research institution, the former has been considered as the 
developer institution). On the whole, it has been observed that most of the CubeSats have 
been developed within universities, as it is shown in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12: CubeSats distribution by development institution 
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However, the ability of a rapid design and a development of a low-cost spacecraft, and 
hence a quicker and cheaper access to space, woke-up the interest in CubeSats development 
by governments and private companies. To date, more than the 35% of CubeSats have been 
designed and manufactured by these types of organizations. 
CubeSats have been developed within universities since the very beginning of the 21st 
century and, in general, the number of them inserted into orbit continues to increase, as can 
be seen in Figure 13. On the other hand, governmental organisations and private institutions 
have not started to launch CubeSats until mid-2000s. But the number of CubeSats developed 
by governmental organisations has increased considerably in the last five years while private 
institutions started in mid-2000 to develop this type of satellites, with a boost in 2013. 
 
Figure 13: Launched CubeSats by development institution and launch year 
The strong relation between CubeSats and universities is quite evident and consequently 
most CubeSat programs have an educational objective, as illustrated in Figure 14. However, 
the mission objectives of the CubeSats are moving gradually from pure educational purpose to 
technological and scientific objectives. Moreover, most of the educational CubeSats have a 
secondary objective, usually technology demonstration. Earth observation and scientific 
purposes are also popular mission objectives of some of these CubeSats. 
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CubeSats missions beyond Low Earth Orbit are being studied, and one CubeSat for 
technology demonstration for future missions to the Moon has already been launched. 
Furthermore, members in the CubeSat community are also starting to propose the use of 
CubeSats for interplanetary missions. 
 
Figure 14: CubeSats primary objective 
3.3.2 CubeSats failures, causes and effects 
The desired evolution of CubeSats from pure educational systems to commercial/scientific 
satellites requires an improvement of their rate of success. The rate of success of previous 
missions is evaluated in the present section. 
The CubeSats, as stated above, born in the universities and hence, the challenge is to find 
solutions that achieve the desired objectives at lower possible cost. However, this handicap 
will led to a reduction of mission success as detailed up ahead. 
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The failure of a Dnepr launcher in 2006 led to the destruction of 14 CubeSats 
(representing up to 11% of the total launched CubeSats, as depicted in Figure 15) and became 
the worst tragedy within the CubeSats community. Almost 30% of CubeSats experimented a 
failure on orbit. On the other hand, a substantial 49% of the developers declared the 
achievement of mission objectives, as illustrated in Figure 16. 
  
Figure 15: CubeSats failures Figure 16: CubeSats failures excluding launch failures 
CubeSats mission success is unknown for over 24% of the total number of satellites. 
However, a considerably high number of developers updates their webpage until launch. 
Sometimes they are reticent to inform about possible failures and usually the information are 
updated only when mission success is achieved. Nonetheless, the authors often verified that, 
when a CubeSat developer updates the “unknown” information, usually a failure was 
observed. Hence, most of unknown mission success have high chances to be declared as 
failure. Assuming this premise, the failure rate increases over 50% of the mission success. 
Figure 17 depicts failure subdivision by subsystems where they were observed. 
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Figure 17: CubeSats failures by subsystem where failure has been individuated 
The process of tracing back subsystems failures contribution to satellite loss is complex. 
Identifying the top event that caused each failure would require the implementation of specific 
techniques (e.g. root cause analysis) for each event. This analysis has not been done because it 
would overstep the goal of this paper, the statistical evaluation of failures based on CubeSat 
developers’ public declarations. For example, failures on communication subsystem have been 
allocated to this subsystem when declared by the developer, even if no communication link 
have never been established, and hence, it could be caused by a failure on another subsystem 
(e.g. on the EPS). 
Communication subsystem, electrical power subsystem and on-board computer are the 
subsystems on which the majority of the failures have been observed, as shown in Figure 17. 
On the other hand, up to 16% of failures could not be allocated to any subsystem and were 
classified as unknown. 
It is then evident that major contributions to satellite failures are due to communication 
subsystem failures, as expected, which represent almost 50% of the total failures. Failures on 
this subsystem were divided between CubeSats for which no link had ever been established, 
and those from which a signal has been received and then lost. Low signal-to-noise ratio and 
impact of radiations on the communication subsystems were identified as main causes on 
communication subsystem in the second case. The low signal-to-noise ratio led to the 
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impossibility to decode or download telemetry. Radiations effects on communication 
subsystem led to stop communications instead. However, some failures produced by 
radiations have been solved after a power drain that cleared radiations effect. In case no 
communication occurs after insertion into orbit, nothing can be inferred about the failure 
cause. The failure itself can be traced back to subsystems other than the COMSYS, as said 
before. Several causes are proposed by some CubeSat teams, such as that the antenna could 
not be deployed correctly, or that the entire satellite remained in the deployer. 
Failures in the electrical power subsystem represent 19% of the total failures. In 
particular, batteries and solar panels are the single components where most failures were 
observed. Batteries are usually the most critical components of the EPS. They usually have a 
tight operative range of temperature with respect to the other EPS components (i.e. 
electronics and solar panels) and hence, if temperature rises over designed temperature 
values, batteries could be permanently damaged leading to the partially or completely loss of 
the mission. In effect, batteries failure led to the possibility to have (in the better case) an 
active satellite during sunlight, when the solar panels produce energy to switch-on the 
CubeSat. Most of the failures on the EPS are detected just after the CubeSat insertion into 
orbit or just after a few months from the deployment, and all of them caused by a failure on 
the batteries or power converter systems. Some failures occurred on solar panels, but they 
were less critical as they led to degradation, and not the loss, of the power generation. 
Besides, On-Board Computer failures represent around 7% of the total failures, mainly 
due to radiation effects (e.g. single event latch-up) and design weakness (e.g. permanent 
damage when writing on the memory due to an erroneous write process on the memory chip). 
Failures have been observed also in other subsystems, but their number is negligible with 
respect to the above detailed failures. Failures on structures & mechanisms, Attitude 
Determination and Control Subsystem and due to deployer failure represent 2% of the total.  
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CUBESATS MISSIONS RELIABILITY 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 has been individuated that CubeSat missions are considerably affected by 
failures. In particular, considering the assumptions given in section 3.3.2, failures took place on 
the 50% of CubeSats inserted in-orbit. In the present chapter an analysis of CubeSats missions’ 
reliability is conducted. The study is divided in two sections: the first one contains reliability 
analysis using non-parametric approach while the second section details the conducted 
parametric analysis 
4.2 Considerations prior analyses 
Prior any analysis is conducted on the data contained in the database; it is worth to 
remark the following considerations and assumptions taken into account for the analyses: 
 Analysed data has been gathered from public sources and contained in a database 
(explained in section 2). Hence, the reliability on the information lies also on the 
trustworthiness of the public available information. 
 The analysis is based on real data. Hence, it take into account that the CubeSats and, 
by extension, all their components have been subjected to real environment (i.e., 
not simulated). Then, the operation conditions are be different among all satellites. 
 The satellites from which no information about the mission success is available have 
been excluded from the analyses. Then, a total amount of 113 satellites have been 
taken into account to conduct the analyses. 
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 It is necessary to highlight that, obviously, all CubeSats have been developed with 
different approaches, methods, procedures, etc. Then, each unit under 
consideration is different from the others. 
4.3 Non-parametric analysis of CubeSats missions reliability 
In a non-parametric analysis no probability distribution is assumed a priori and hence, it is 
used to infer the probability distribution that the analysed data follows. Indeed, this type of 
analysis is also called model-free. This kind of analysis is characterised to take into account 
very few assumptions. In particular, the advantages that no-parametric methods have over 
parametric methods are: 
 They can be used to test population parameters when the variable is not normally 
distributed. 
 They can be used when the data are nominal or ordinal. 
 They can be used to test hypotheses that do not involve population parameters. 
 In most cases, the computations are easier than those for the parametric 
counterparts. 
 They are easy to understand. 
However, there are also drawbacks in using non-parametric analyses with respect to 
parametric analyses. In particular: 
 They are less sensitive than their parametric counterparts when the assumptions of 
the parametric methods are met. Therefore, larger differences are needed before 
the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
 They tend to use less information than the parametric tests. For example, the sign 
test requires the researcher to determine only whether the data values are above or 
below the median, not how much above or below the median each value is. 
 They are less efficient than their parametric counterparts when the assumptions of 
the parametric methods are met. That is, larger sample sizes are needed to 
overcome the loss of information. 
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In our case it has been used the Kaplan-Meier estimator due to the fact that we deal with 
right-censored data, as explained later on. To conduct the reliability analysis, pre-processing 
on the database has been conducted. In particular, it has been individuated launch date and 
failure date (if failure occurred). Then, it has been established the observation window and 
assessed if any observed satellite data is censored or not. In the next sections each of these 
concepts as well as the procedures and obtained results of the analysis are detailed. 
4.3.1 Censored data 
In some circumstances, mainly when a study deals with real data, missing observations 
occur. This event can take place for many reasons: for example, during a test of high reliable 
components, it is usual that not all of them fail by the end of the time allotted for the test. In 
some engineering studies, some of the units on test may be withdrawn from the test for 
various reasons or may fail due to a cause that is not under study. Such incomplete data 
observations in reliability studies are called censored items. Although the failure time 
information on such an item is incomplete, there is usually still some information in the time 
data that is available in the item and so the censoring time should always be recorded in a 
study. 
So data can be classified as complete data and censored data. In case of censoring, its 
classification is stated according to type and order. Hence, we have the following data 
classification: 
 Complete: in this case the value of each sample unit is observed or known. 
 Right censored: also referred as suspended data, it is the most common case of 
censoring. In the case of life data, these data sets are composed of units that did not 
fail. The term right censored implies that the event of interest (i.e., the time-to-
failure) is to the right of our data point (i.e., end of observation window). Hence, if 
the units were to keep on operating, the failure would occur at some time after our 
data point. 
 Interval censored: also called inspection data by some authors, it reflects 
uncertainty as to the exact times the units failed within an interval. This type of data 
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frequently comes from tests or situations where the objects of interest are no 
constantly monitored. 
 Left censored: in this case, a failure time is only known to be before a certain time 
but the exact time is unknown. This is identical to interval censored data in which 
the starting time for the interval is zero. 
In our case, we have right censored data because we exactly know the insertion time that 
corresponds to the moment in which each satellite starts to operate (i.e. date of insertion into 
orbit), but we do not know all failure times. Indeed, some CubeSats have reached their end-of-
life or continue to be active after the observation window that has been established between 
the date of the first CubeSat launch (i.e. 30th June 2003) and 31st December 2013. 
Furthermore, for obvious reasons, dates of enter into operations for each CubeSat do not 
coincide. Hence, we have to face with staggered entry. Both points, right censoring and 
staggered entry, will be addressed in section 4.3.3, where application of Kaplan-Meier 
estimator for CubeSats Reliability analysis is detailed. The abovementioned characteristics (i.e., 
right censoring with staggered entry) are represented in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: Representation of right censored generic data with staggered entries 
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4.3.2 Kaplan-Meier estimator 
The Kaplan-Maier estimator was proposed by Edward L. Kaplan and Paul Meier in a paper 
published in 1958, being one of the most cited works in science. The reason for this 
achievement is that they provide a simple solution to evaluate the true survival function of a 
certain population of dataset with incomplete measurements of all members of a random 
sample. 
Different presentations of Kaplan-Maier estimator are proposed in literature. In this 
thesis, we provide a simple notation according to application suggested by Meeker and 
Escobar. 
Supposing that n units start operating at time zero, if a unit does not fail in interval I, it is 
either censored at the end of interval I or it continues to operate into interval i+1. Information 
is available on the status of the unit at the end of each interval. First, all failure times shall be 
collected and arranged in ascending order. Assuming that censoring takes place, only m failure 
times (with m<n) are observed. It is necessary to define the size of risk set, the number of units 
that are alive at the beginning of interval i (i.e., those at risk to failure), because each t(i) can 
represent either failure or censoring time. The size of risk set is: 
 
𝑛𝑖 = 𝑛 − ∑ 𝑑𝑗 − ∑ 𝑟𝑗
𝑖−1
𝑗=0
𝑖−1
𝑗=0
          𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 (4.1) 
Where: 
 n denote the number of operational units right before tj 
 dj denote the number of units that failed in the j-th interval (tj-1,tj] 
 rj denote the number of units that survive interval j and are right-censored at tj 
 m is the number of intervals (i.e., number of observed failures) 
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Kaplan and Meier denoted that 
 
?̂?𝑖 =
𝑛𝑖 − 1
𝑛𝑖
          𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 (4.2) 
 
is the estimator of the conditional probability of failing in interval i, given that a unit enters this 
interval. More precisely: 
 
?̂?𝑖  estimate of 𝑃(𝑇𝐹 > 𝑡(𝑖) + 𝛿𝑡|𝑇𝐹 > 𝑡(𝑖)) (4.3) 
The other major contribution of Kaplan and Meier was to notice that: 
𝑃(𝑇𝐹 > 𝑡(𝑖)) = 𝑃(𝑇𝐹 > 𝛿𝑡) x 𝑃(𝑇𝐹 > 𝑡1 + 𝛿𝑡|𝑇𝐹 > 𝑡(1)) 
x 𝑃(𝑇𝐹 > 𝑡2 + 𝛿𝑡|𝑇𝐹 > 𝑡(2)) x … x 𝑃(𝑇𝐹 > 𝑡(𝑖) + 𝛿𝑡|𝑇𝐹 > 𝑡(𝑖)) 
(4.4) 
 
Substituting equation (3.2) on the right-hand side of equation (3.4) and recalling the 
definition of Reliability, we derive the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the reliability function for 
censored data: 
 
𝑅(𝑡) ≡ 𝑃(𝑇𝐹 > 𝑡) (4.5) 
?̂?(𝑡) = ∏ ?̂?𝑖
∀𝑖|𝑡(𝑖)≤𝑡
= ∏
𝑛𝑖 − 1
𝑛𝑖
∀𝑖|𝑡8𝑖)≤𝑡
 (4.6) 
 
It is necessary then to take into account possible special cases on dataset. In particular, 
two cases can be faced and they are handled as following: 
 If more than one failure takes place at the same time ti, we observe multiplicity of m 
(i.e., mi units failing at the same time). In this case, equation 4.2 is replaced by: 
 
?̂?𝑖 =
𝑛𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖
𝑛𝑖
 (4.7) 
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 If censoring time is exactly equal to a failure time ti, then it is assumed that 
censoring time takes place immediately after the failure, because it is considered 
that a unit that is censored at a given time can survive an infinitely small period of 
time. 
4.3.3 Kaplan-Meier plot for CubeSats Reliability 
We apply the Kaplan-Meier estimator previously defined to the dataset from the 
CubeSats database. We have a sample of 113 CubeSats corresponding to all launched CubeSats 
until December 2013 from which data about failures is available. In the sample, 36 CubeSats 
have been affected by a failure. The ordered number of failure and censoring times in days of 
all these satellites is provided in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Failure and censoring times and quantity of launched CubeSats between June 2003 and December 2013 
Time [days] Nº failures Nº censored Time [days] Nº failures Nº censored 
0 15 8 665 0 1 
30 5 17 670 2 0 
25 0 2 790 0 4 
60 2 0 820 0 1 
90 3 0 880 0 1 
95 1 0 940 0 1 
120 3 0 1095 0 5 
125 1 0 1125 0 2 
155 0 1 1245 0 1 
185 2 0 1430 0 1 
210 1 1 1550 0 2 
215 1 0 1670 0 1 
140 0 5 3065 0 4 
300 0 1 2430 0 4 
455 0 7 2555 0 1 
515 0 3 2980 0 1 
545 0 1 3830 0 1 
The first point to be addressed before proceeding with reliability evaluation is to deal with 
staggered entry of all data. Obviously, CubeSats have not been inserted into orbit at the same 
time. Hence, for the reliability assessment the insertion of all CubeSats have been set at the 
same t=0 in the time scale, as if all of them were launched and inserted into orbit at the same 
instant of time. In this way, it has been possible to analyse the data with the same time 
reference. Using data gathered in Table 4 in equation 4.6 and equation 4.7, the CubeSats’ 
mission reliability evaluation is conducted. 
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The Kaplan-Meier plot of CubeSats reliability is shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19: Kaplan-Meier plot of CubeSats reliability 
Figure 19 reads as follow: for example, after a successful launch, CubeSats reliability drops 
down to approximately 69% after six months. In particular: 
 
R(t) = 0.69497  for t=185 days 
 
After one and a half year, the CubeSats observed reliability drop down to 64%. Exact 
results for each time value detailed in Table 4 are provided in Table 5. 
Table 5: CubeSats observed reliability 
Time [days] Reliability Time [days] Reliability Time [days] Reliability 
0 0.867257 140 0.644182 1125 0.603921 
30 0.819076 300 0.644182 1245 0.603921 
25 0.819076 455 0.644182 1430 0.603921 
60 0.794255 515 0.644182 1550 0.603921 
90 0.757025 545 0.644182 1670 0.603921 
95 0.744614 665 0.644182 3065 0.603921 
120 0.707384 670 0.603921 2430 0.603921 
125 0.694973 790 0.603921 2555 0.603921 
155 0.64973 820 0.603921 2980 0.603921 
185 0.669702 880 0.603921 3830 0.603921 
210 0.657066 940 0.603921 - - 
215 0.644182 1095 0.603921 - - 
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Remarkable outputs are obtained from the previous analysis. First of all, the observed 
reliability of CubeSats suddenly decreases down to 86% just at the beginning of the mission. 
This decrease of the reliability is due to the fact that a remarkable number of CubeSats failed 
just after insertion into orbit (hence, they are probably affected by infant mortality). As can be 
observed, 15 of 36 failures took place just after the expulsion from the deployer. Secondly, 
reliability drop stabilises after certain time of about 3 years. Two main reasons are the possible 
causes for this event: 1) most of the failures took place on CubeSats during the first years of 
operations and 2) CubeSats missions are usually designed for a 1-2 years mission life and thus, 
most of them arrived at the end of the mission within 3 years. 
4.3.4 Confidence intervals 
A point estimate (in our case Kaplan-Meier estimator), by itself, can be misleading, as it 
may or may not be close to the quantity being estimated. Indeed, it gives the maximum 
likelihood of reliability but no information regarding the dispersion around ?̂?(𝑡). Then, 
confidence intervals are one of the most useful ways of quantifying uncertainty due to 
“sampling error” arising from limited sample sizes. Confidence intervals have a specified “level 
of confidence”, typically 90% or 95%, expressing one’s confidence that a specific interval 
contains the quantity of interest. 
To calculate the confidence intervals, the calculation of variance or standard deviation to 
derive upper and lower bounds is required. In particular, as suggested by Meeker and Escobar 
[1], we use Greenwood’s Formula to evaluate the Kaplan-Meier estimator variance. The 
Greenwood’s Formula states as: 
𝑉𝑎?̂?
[?̂?𝑡(𝑖)
]
= [?̂?(𝑡(𝑖))]
2
∑
?̂?𝑗
𝑛𝑗(1 − ?̂?𝑗)
𝑖
𝑗=1
 (4.8) 
 
Then, the 95% confidence interval is determined by the following equation: 
 
𝑅95%(𝑡𝑖)
= ?̂?(𝑡𝑖) ± 1.96𝑉𝑎?̂?[?̂?𝑡(𝑖)]
 (4.9) 
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Equations (4.8) and (4.9) have been applied to the dataset of CubeSats failures together 
with Kaplan-Maier estimated CubeSats reliability. The obtained 95% confidence interval curves 
are shown in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20: CubeSats reliability estimation with 95% confidence interval 
Figure 20 reads as follow: after, for example, six months the observed CubeSats reliability 
is between 57.3% and 76.6% with a 95% of likelihood. These two values are the lower and 
upper 95% confidence levels. Moreover, the most likely estimation of observed CubeSats 
reliability for t=6months is 69.5% approximately. 
As can be observed in Figure 20, the dispersion of reliability around ?̂?(𝑡) increase with 
time increasing. This event can be observed by the gap growing between both upper and 
lower bounds of confidence interval. The dispersion assessment is reported in Figure 21, as 
percentage of gap between both limits as time increases. The value is calculated with equation 
(4.10). 
 
𝐷(𝑡𝑖) = [𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑅95%(𝑡𝑖)
] − [𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑅95%(𝑡𝑖)
]= 
     = 3.92√𝑉𝑎?̂?[?̂?𝑡(𝑖)]
= 3.92 [?̂?95%(𝑡𝑖)
] √∑
𝑚𝑗
𝑛𝑗(𝑛𝑗−𝑚𝑗)
𝑗≤𝑖  
(4.10) 
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Figure 21: Dispersion of 95% confidence interval of observed CubeSats reliability 
It is shown that the higher the time after on-orbit insertion, the higher the dispersion 
around ?̂?(𝑡). This fact is mainly due to relatively reduced amount of data. Unfortunately, this 
drawback cannot be faced until more data will be available. 
4.4 Parametric analysis of CubeSats missions reliability 
Non-parametric analysis is a powerful tool because no probability distribution of the 
studied dataset shall be predefined before the analysis. However, some weaknesses arise 
when using this type of analysis, as stated in section 4.3. To cope with these drawbacks, a 
parametric analysis of CubeSats data is conducted and detailed in this section. 
Previous non-parametric analysis suggested that observed CubeSat reliability follows a 
Weibull distribution. To verify this statement and, if confirmed, calculate the two parameters 
of basic Weibull distribution, two techniques have been used: first, Weibull plot and then 
Maximum Likelihood Estimator. Before addressing these two points, a recall of Weibull 
distribution is reported. 
4.4.1 Weibull distribution 
Weibull distribution is one of the most widely used lifetime distributions in engineering. It 
is used when data cannot be represented linearly with time. Moreover, it gives high flexibility 
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and, with an appropriate selection of shape parameter 𝛾 (as it will be shown later), it can take 
on the characteristics of other type of distributions. More precisely, the Weibull distribution 
can model an increasing failure rate, a decreasing failure rate (infant mortality), and constant 
failure rate (i.e., an exponential distribution). 
Weibull distribution is characterised by two parameters, the shape parameter 𝛾, 
dimensionless, and the characteristic life 𝜃, expressed in unit of time (usually years). For this 
type of distribution, the failure rate, p.d.f. and reliability adopt the following expressions: 
𝜆(𝑡) =
𝛾
𝜃
(
𝑡
𝜃
)
𝛾−1
 (4.11) 
                𝑓(𝑡) =
𝛾
𝜃
(
𝑡
𝜃
)
𝛾−1
𝑒−(
𝑡
𝜃
)
𝛾
      𝑡 > 0 
(4.12) 
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒
−(
𝑡
𝜃)
𝛾
 
(4.13) 
The variation of shape parameter 𝛾 is detailed in Table 6, which points out the flexibility 
of this distribution: 
Table 6: Weibull distribution characteristics with respect to different β values 
γ value Model characteristics Representation 
0<γ<1 As t0, f(t)∞ 
As t∞, f(t)0 
f(t) decreases monotonically 
Infant mortality 
γ=1 Exponential distribution 
1<γ<2 f(t)=0 at t=0 
f(t) increases until certain time when starts 
decreasing 
Increasing concave λ 
γ=2 Rayleigh distribution 
γ>2 Increasing convex λ 
2.6<γ<3.7 Normal distribution 
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A graphical representation of Weibull distribution for different shape parameter 𝛾 with 
fixed characteristic life 𝜃 = 1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 can be observed in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22: Weibull distribution for different 𝜸 values with fixed 𝜽 = 𝟏 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 
4.4.2 Weibull plot 
The Weibull plot is a graphical technique widely used to assess if dataset follows Weibull 
distribution. The concept which states on the basis of the Weibull plot is the following: after 
appropriate operation on reliability expression of Weibull distribution (as explained later on 
this section), if the data follows a linear trend, then this data follows a Weibull distribution. 
Applying the natural logarithm in both sides of reliability expression for Weibull 
distribution (i.e., eq. (4.13)): 
𝑙𝑛(𝑅(𝑡)) = − (
𝑡
𝜃
)
𝛾
 
(4.14) 
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Then, taking again the natural logarithm of the negative of the two sides of the previous 
equation (4.14), we obtain: 
 
𝑙𝑛[−𝑙𝑛(𝑅(𝑡))] = 𝛾𝑙𝑛(𝑡) − 𝛾𝑙𝑛(𝜃) (4.15) 
 
At this point, a change of variable is applied at equation (4.15): 
 
{
𝑦 = 𝑙𝑛[−𝑙𝑛(𝑅(𝑡))]
𝑥 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑡)                 
 (4.16) 
 
The obtained expression is the equation of a line with the slope equal to the shape 
parameter 𝛾: 
 
𝑦 = 𝛾𝑥 − 𝛾𝑙𝑛(𝜃) (4.17) 
 
The obtained equation (4.17) is equivalent to equation (4.14). These operations are useful 
from the moment when we would like to determine if the dataset we are working with follows 
a Weibull distribution. Through non-parametric analysis it has been obtained the estimation of 
observed CubeSats mission reliability ?̂?(𝑡𝑖). We therefore can plot 𝑦 = 𝑙𝑛[−𝑙𝑛(?̂?(𝑡𝑖))] 
individuated in expression (4.16) as a function of natural logarithm of the time from into orbit 
insertion (i.e., 𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑖)). If these discrete points, which are the observed failure times gathered in 
the database, follows a linear or quasi-linear trend, then it can be affirmed that the data we 
are dealing with follows a Weibull distribution. 
Then, from the expression of the regression line of the plotted data it could be possible to 
obtain shape parameter 𝛾 from the slope of the curve and characteristic life 𝜃 as the 
intersection of the line with the 𝑦 axis. Hence, least-square fit is used to provide an 
approximation of the line’s equation and evaluate both Weibull parameters. The Weibull plot 
of our data with regression line and line’s equation is shown in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23: Weibull plot of Kaplan-Meier observed CubeSats Reliability 
As it can be observed, failures occurred at t=0 (i.e., the CubeSat have been never 
operated) were withdrawn from the study. This action was conducted because the insertion of 
these satellites in the plot would biased the results because ln(0)∞ with the assumption that 
the CubeSats were functionally operative before the deployment. However, these CubeSats 
were never started to operate; then, they failed already before starting the operative phase 
and hence, the failure took place before the insertion into orbit. 
The results drawn in Figure 23 are well aligned, and a regression analysis provides the 
following results: 
 
𝑦 = 0.2853𝑥 − 2.51   with 𝑅2 = 0.8716 
 
These results provide good indication that analysed data follows Weibull distribution. At 
the beginning of this section it has been stated that, from non-parametric analysis, it seemed 
that observed CubeSats reliability follows a Weibull distribution. After the present evaluation, 
this statement can be effectively affirmed. 
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As a result of the previous analysis, shape parameter and characteristic life has been 
obtained. Concretely: 
 
𝛾 = 0.2853   𝜃 = 6619.4 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 
 
First result observed is, as expected, a shape parameter quite lower than 1. This indicates 
an important role of infant mortality on CubeSats reliability. A comparison between observed 
CubeSat reliability calculated with Kaplan-Meier estimator and plot of Weibull distribution with 
obtained shape parameter and characteristic life by means of Weibull plot is shown in Figure 
24. 
 
 
Figure 24: Kaplan-Meier estimated observed CubeSats reliability and Weibull distribution 
The comparison shown in Figure 24 points out that CubeSats reliability follows Weibull 
distribution during first two years after insertion into orbit. After this period, the lack of data 
(i.e., only few CubeSats still remain operative and then, the sample size is extremely small) 
causes a divergence between observed reliability calculated with non-parametric analysis and 
Weibull distribution. These results are also confirmed by the coefficient of determination 
obtained from the regression line obtained in the Weibull plot (i.e., 𝑅2 = 0.8716), which 
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indicates that data can be quietly approximated by the Weibull distribution, even if the value is 
not quite near to the unit. 
Then, the interest of the models remains within the years and a half, as shown in , where 
Weibull model follows the observed reliability. Indeed, during this period, as can be observed, 
this value of Weibull model remains within 4 percentage points of the observed reliability. 
 
 
Figure 25: Kaplan-Meier estimated observed CubeSat reliability and Weibull distribution (1.5 years) 
4.4.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) for Weibull distribution 
The Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) is a method for estimating the parameters of a 
probability distribution based on the likelihood function. The likelihood function is the joint 
probability of an observed sample as a function of the unknown parameters. The MLE is based 
on the concept that the values of the parameters that maximise the likelihood function are the 
“best” estimates. 
Thus, the objective is then to determine the best estimates of the parameters using the 
likelihood function. This is accomplished by developing the likelihood function for the 
observations and obtaining its logarithmic expression. Then, this logarithmic expression is 
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differentiated with respect to the unknown parameters and set the expressions equal to zero. 
These expressions are then solved simultaneously to obtain the best estimates of the 
parameters that maximise the likelihood function. 
In section 4.4.1 probability distribution function and reliability function of Weibull 
distribution was presented as: 
𝜆(𝑡) =
𝛾
𝜃
(
𝑡
𝜃
)
𝛾−1
 (4.18) 
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒
−(
𝑡
𝜃)
𝛾
 
(4.19) 
Where 𝛾 is the shape parameter and 𝜃 is the characteristic life. 
In previous sections it has been demonstrated that the data under evaluation follows 
Weibull distribution. New, the MLE method is used to estimate both parameters. The 
likelihood function of Weibull distribution for data subjected to right-censoring is: 
 
𝐿(𝛾,𝜃,𝑡) = ∏ [
𝛾
𝜃
(
𝑡𝑖
𝜃
)
𝛾−1
𝑒−(
𝑡𝑖
𝜃⁄ )
𝛾
] ∏ [𝑒
−(
𝑡𝑖
𝜃⁄ )
𝛾
]
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (4.11) 
 
Where 𝑛 is the total number of observed failures, and 𝑚 is the total number of censored 
CubeSats. To fit the parameters that maximise the likelihood function, the derivatives of the 
logarithmic function (i.e., 𝑙(𝛾,𝜃,𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛(𝐿(𝛾,𝜃,𝑡))) of equation (4.11) with respect to 𝛾 and 𝜃. This 
procedure results in the following equations, where 𝛾 and 𝜃 are the estimated shape 
parameter and characteristic life, respectively: 
 
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝛾
=
𝑛𝜃𝛾
𝛾
(
1
𝜃𝛾
−
𝛾𝑙𝑛(𝜃)
𝜃𝛾
) + ∑ [𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑖) − (
𝑡𝑖
𝜃
)
𝛾
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑡𝑖
𝜃
)]
𝑛
𝑖=1
− ∑ [(
𝑡𝑗
𝜃
)
𝛾
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑡𝑗
𝜃
)]
𝑚
𝑗=1
 (4.12) 
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝜃
= −
𝑛𝛾
𝜃
+ ∑
𝛾𝑡𝑖
𝜃𝛾+1
+ ∑
𝛾𝑡𝑗
𝜃𝛾+1
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (4.13) 
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The MLE is obtained by solving previous equations simultaneously. In particular, equation 
(4.13) is set equal to zero and the obtained expression of 𝜃 is substituted in equation (4.12). 
This equation is then solved using Newton-Raphson method to obtain 𝛾. Once the estimated 
value of the shape parameter is known, the estimated value of the characteristic life is then 
calculated substituting 𝛾 in equation (4.13) and solving for 
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝜃
= 0. Newton-Raphson method is 
described in Appendix A. In order to allow a more readable thesis. The estimated shape 
parameter and characteristics life using Maximum Likelihood Estimator confirmed the results 
from the Weibull plot. 
4.5 CubeSats vs. all-satellites missions reliability 
Saleh and Castet assessed the observed reliability of all satellites launched between 1990 
and October 2008. The purpose of the present section is to evaluate the reliability difference 
between CubeSats and all type of satellites in order to give a comparison based on spacecraft 
mass. 
The information used by Saleh and Castet was obtained from SpaceTrak database and 
used for the study purpose. In the study, Weibull parameters have been estimated for all 
satellites. These parameters are: 
 
𝜃 = 8316 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 and 𝛾 = 0.3875 
 
A graphical comparison of estimated reliability of satellites classified by divided by mass is 
shown in Figure 26. 
               4.4 Parametric analysis of CubeSats missions reliability 
63 
 
Figure 26: Estimated reliability of spacecraft assessed by Weibull fit (all satellites vs. CubeSats) 
It is clearly evident that the reliability of CubeSats is considerably lower than those for all 
satellites. Thus, it is imperative to adopt actions to increase CubeSat’s reliability and CubeSat’s 
mission rate of success. 
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5  
SPACE SYSTEMS LIFE-CYCLE AND 
RELIABILITY INCREASE 
5.1 Identification of activities for reliability increase 
The analysis of CubeSats missions highlighted a considerable number of failures occurred 
on this type of satellites. Thus, it is absolutely necessary to increase missions’ rate of success. 
An analysis of differences between conventional satellites and CubeSats was conducted to 
determine where the attention should be focused to increase CubeSats reliability and their 
mission rate of success. 
Conventional satellites usually have a low tolerance against risk. Hence, as shown in 
Figure 27, this characteristic led to an increase of reliability mainly achieved with high number 
of redundancies. As a consequence, the complexity of the satellite increases and as a 
consequence, design complexity increases too. Therefore, a boost of testing complexity is 
observed in order to verify all stated requirements. Altogether, these characteristics led to an 
overall mass and cost rise. Due to all this high parameters (i.e. high reliability, redundancies, 
complexity, mass and cost), a low risk is tolerated for this type of projects. 
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Figure 27: Consequences on conventional satellites life-cycle due to their low risk tolerance 
On the other hand, as can be observed in Figure 28, traditionally small-satellites, and in 
particular CubeSats, are characterised to be projects that tolerate higher risk with respect to 
conventional satellites. 
 
Figure 28: Consequences on CubeSats life-cycle due to their high risk tolerance 
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Hence, lower reliability is observed, as described in chapter 4. One reason of the lower 
reliability is due to low number of redundancies that, at their time, led to a reduction of 
system complexity. Appropriate testing shall be then conducted for this type of satellites in 
order to verify the stated requirements, but maintaining the cost down. All these characteristic 
led to lower mass and cost spacecraft and the circle is closed accepting higher risk with respect 
to conventional satellites projects. 
 
Figure 29: Three methods for CubeSat’s reliability and mission rate of success increase 
Considering the differences between these two types of spacecraft, three methods have 
been individuated to increase CubeSat’s reliability and mission rate of success, as shown in 
Figure 29. These methods are applied at different stages of the CubeSats life-cycle, which is 
explained in following sections. In particular the activities are: 
 Guidelines for CubeSats life-cycle activities: based on the fault prevention technique 
concept (i.e. reduce and prevent the possible failures and hence, increase mission 
rate of success), the objective of these activities is to assess actions to be conducted 
5 SPACE SYSTEMS LIFE-CYCLE AND RELIABILITY INCREASE  
68 
by CubeSat developers during all phases of the project (i.e., design, manufacturing, 
verifications and operations). Best practices to be conducted during CubeSats life-
cycle phases are identified and stated. 
 Reliability increase through verification – standards tailoring: in this case fault 
removal technique applies. The use of standards to conduct verification activities is 
crucial to carry out them in a systematic way. However, most of them are difficult to 
be applied on small-satellites projects, and specially to CubeSat projects. Standards 
key-points for verification activities have been identified and ECSS standards have 
been adapted to fit CubeSats projects taking into account their main drivers (i.e., 
low cost and fast delivery). 
 Mission-oriented reliability – redundancies at system level: based on fault tolerance 
technique concept, the research is based on the study of reliability at mission level 
applying redundancy techniques at system level. New mission architectures (e.g. 
swarm-like constellations) are individuated as architectures that can lead to achieve 
mission objectives even if reliability of each system (i.e. CubeSat) of the 
constellation remains lower than conventional satellites. 
 
5.2 Space system life-cycle 
Life-cycle activities of space projects are conducted in a system engineering approach 
driven by well-established phases and milestones. Depending on the organisation that is taken 
into account, the phases that broke down space projects are slightly different in the 
nomenclature, but are mostly identical in the content and milestones. A comparison between 
ESA and NASA space program development phases and milestones from is detailed in Figure 
30. 
 
Figure 30: Space program development phases comparison (ESA, NASA, DoD) 
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Duration of each phase depends on the nature of the project. Large and complex space 
missions can be require 10 to 15 years to complete phases A to D, and the operation phase can 
last from 5 to 15 years. Small-satellites instead are characterised by lower time for 
development (e.g. 12 to 18 months) and operations (e.g. 6 months to several years). ESA 
phases classification notation has been taken into account as reference. 
The objectives of each of these phases are the following: 
Table 7: Objectives of space program development phases 
PHASE DESCRIPTION 
P
h
as
e
 0
 During phase 0 a high-level study is conducted. Usually different mission concepts 
are evaluated and assessed prior the final one is selected in phase A. 
P
h
as
e
 A
 
In this phase the selection of an optimum and cost-effective system concept from 
different number of possible options that are considered is conducted. Moreover, it 
is conducted a feasibility demonstration of the project by means of design and 
analysis. Finally, in this phase is required to conduct a technical solution definition 
that shall allow to conduct a realistic performance, schedule, planning and cost data 
study for all subsequent phases. Generally, the outputs of phase A are preliminary 
information on mission, launcher, payload requirements and target performance 
specification. 
Usually, phases 0 and A have a relative low-cost impact on the budget in terms of 
real spent money. However, the cost implications from the decisions took in these 
phases in the future is remarkable. Ultimate cost of the mission will depend on 
decisions taken during early phases of the design. 
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P
h
as
e 
B
 
Three main objectives shall be achieved in this phase. First, the definition of the 
system and subsystem designs in a certain detail in order to allow to proceed with 
the minimum of problems to conduct the detail design during phase C. Second, 
subsystem requirements and design specifications, subsystem and equipment design 
and development plans, programme schedules and a full proposal for next phase are 
produced. Finally, some advanced activities of phase C are initiated (e.g. detailed 
design of critical parts) 
P
h
as
e
 C
 
Usually, this is one of the longest phases. It encompasses development and 
manufacture. Specifically, during this phase detailed design and analyses are 
completed. Moreover, preparation of manufacturing drawings and special 
procedures, and manufacture execution are conducted. Prototypes are 
manufactured and tested at this phase 
P
h
as
e
 D
 
Phase D is also known as Assembly, Integration and Verification phase. As the 
previous expression indicates, during this phase the assembly and integration of 
components and subsystems are conducted to obtain the system. Moreover 
qualification and acceptance verifications are conducted to flight hardware 
P
h
as
e 
E This phase encompasses delivery of the spacecraft to the launch site and support of 
the launch campaign as well as in-orbit operations 
P
h
as
e 
F 
During phase F disposal activities are conducted. The objective of this phase is to 
implement the disposal plan defined during design phases, document lessons 
learned and produce baseline mission report 
To achieve the abovementioned objectives, certain activities shall be conducted during 
spacecraft life-cycle. Concretely, technical activities of a project life-cycle can be represented 
by the well-known Vee-shaped model, as represented in Figure 31. The higher level inputs are 
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the stakeholder requirements and constraints which are used to define mission statement and 
objectives, and the input requirements and constraints are analysed, elicited and refined.  
 
Figure 31: Vee-shaped model 
The obtained outputs are moved as inputs to the next step, at which the system 
architecture design is conducted. Several steps are conducted to refine system functions and 
allocating them to the different components of the system. The next level the design of 
subsystems is conducted, defining requirements and developing models (i.e. software models, 
prototype hardware models, etc.). Last step of design encompasses equipment design. The 
activities that apply are similar to those conducted at system and subsystem level, but focusing 
the attention to the components. 
Once all the design is completed, the hardware items are manufactured and the software 
modules are implemented. At the end of the process both hardware and software is available 
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for verification activities. Some unit testing may be performed in parallel with implementation, 
especially for software. 
The right branch of the Vee-shaped model includes all activities related to assembly, 
integration and verification. Integration is conducted at various levels (i.e. components, 
subsystem and system). While assembly and integration is conducted, verifications are 
performed in parallel. First, at component level the software is integrated and verified. Then, 
components are assembled and integrated to obtain subsystems that are verified. Finally, all 
subsystems are also assembled and integrated to obtain the final flight system that is verified 
at system level. At the end of the process, all the requirements stated during the design steps 
(i.e. left side of the Vee-shaped model) shall be verified and closed out. Last step consists on 
product acceptance that validates the system and demonstrates to stakeholders that the 
spacecraft fulfils their requirements and constraints. 
The verification activities conducted on the right branch of the model are defined and 
planned during design phases. Indeed, one of the outputs on each step on the left-side of the 
model is the verification matrix, which details all the requirements, the verification method 
and the level at which it shall be verified. This input is used to define and plan the verification 
campaigns that are conducted during verification phase. 
5.2.1 Verification methods 
Different methods are available to accomplish verifications. It is up to AIV engineer(s) that 
is(are) developing verification plans to establish, together with engineers in charge of the 
design, the method(s) that will be used to verify each requirement. The methods available to 
conduct verifications are four, as detailed in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Verification methods 
METHOD DESCRIPTION 
Test (T) It is a verification method in which technical means, such as special equipment, 
instrumentation, simulation techniques, or the application of established principles 
and procedures, are used for the evaluation of the system, subsystems and/or 
equipment to determine compliance with requirements at any level of assembly 
within the system assembly hierarchy. 
To conduct tests, the use of elaborate instrumentation and special test equipment to 
measure the parameters that characterise the requirements may be used. Then, 
data obtained from tests is analysed as an integral part of the test program (note: 
not to be confused with “analysis” as verification method explained later on). 
Normally, testing is the preferred method for requirements verification and it is 
usually used in three main cases: 1) analytical techniques do not produce adequate 
results, 2) presence of certain failure modes that could compromise personnel 
safety, adversely affect flight systems or payload operations, or can induce the loss 
of the mission, 3) for components that are directly associated with critical system 
interfaces. 
Tests can be generally divided in two main groups: 
1. Functional tests: electrical or mechanical performance tests conducted on 
flight or flight-configured hardware and/or software at conditions equal to 
or less than design specifications. Its purpose is to establish that the satellite 
performs satisfactorily in accordance with design and performance 
specifications. Functional tests normally are performed at ambient 
conditions. Moreover functional tests (or reduced functional tests) are 
conducted before and after each environmental test or major move in order 
to verify system performance prior to the next test/operation. 
2. Environmental tests: usually performed on flight or flight-configured 
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hardware and/or software to assure the satellite will operate correctly in its 
flight environment. These kinds of tests usually include vibration, acoustic 
and thermal vacuum tests. Furthermore, environmental tests are normally 
combined with functional tests to verify correct functionality while the 
satellite is subjected to specific flight environment. 
Analysis (A) Analysis is the assessment of data by generally accepted analytical techniques to 
determine that the satellite meets specified requirements. Analysis techniques 
encompass wide range of activities: statistics evaluations, CAD modelling, computer 
and hardware simulations, etc. 
Generally, this technique is used when tests cannot adequately or cost-effectively 
address all the conditions under which the system must perform it, or when certain 
requirement cannot be verified without analysis. 
Inspection (I) Inspection determines requirements close-out by the visual examination of the 
satellite using standard quality control methods, without the use of special 
laboratory procedures or equipment. Direct physical attribute examinations, such as 
check-out, dimensions, weight, physical characteristics, etc., are the classical 
inspection activities. 
Review of 
Design (RoD) 
Review of Design is a method that encompasses activities mainly related to 
documentation review. Examinations of drawings, design documentation, software 
version descriptions, computer program code are classical activities of the review of 
design process. These activities are generally conducted during Preliminary and 
Critical Design Reviews. 
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LIFE-CYCLE GOOD PRACTICES 
The previous study highlighted the need to identify ways to increase the reliability of 
CubeSats and the mission rate of success. One way to do so, as already introduced before, is to 
conduct precise activities that could help to increase the previous mentioned parameters. To 
be able to identify the best activities to be conducted during all phases of CubeSat’s life-cycle, 
a wide and detailed questionnaire has been prepared (see Appendix B). This questionnaire was 
then distributed to all CubeSats developers requiring them to give detailed information 
regarding their projects. 
6.1 Questionnaire content 
The purpose of this study was to gather as much information as possible about all the 
activities conducted in the whole life-cycle of CubeSat by the developers. The survey was 
divided in five sections: 
1. General information: this section is devoted to gather general information about the 
spacecraft such as CubeSat type, launch information, objectives and mission 
description among other. 
2. Design information: inputs regarding design phase are requested in this section. The 
developed models and activities conducted during phase B and C are gathered. 
3. Handling information: actions taken during the handling of the CubeSat. Particularly, 
the information about the protections adopted if the CubeSat should be brought 
among different facilities 
4. Verification: this section aims at gathering information about all the activities 
related to the verification campaign. Concretely, it has been divided in three sub-
sections: 
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a. Preparation: information about the verification campaign preparation is 
requested. Concretely, information about the verification planning and set-
up has been asked. 
b. Execution: in this sub-section information regarding verification input 
values (e.g. temperature ranges, number of sensors, etc.) as well as 
justification about this values is required 
c. Results: the results of the verification campaign are asked (e.g. if failures 
have been observed, during what tests, etc.). 
5. Integration into the deployer and operations: all the information about the activities 
after the CubeSat has been integrated into the deployer as well as the activities and 
results of the operations are required. 
6.2 Questionnaire feedbacks 
The questionnaire was distributed to all CubeSat developers that, at the moment of the 
release (i.e., January 2014), launched a CubeSat. However, few feedbacks were received. 
Despite this setback, valuable inputs have gathered from the received answers from which 
correlation between life-cycle activities and failures have been evaluated and are in the base 
of the stated recommendations. The received information is detailed in the next sub-sections: 
6.2.1 General information 
The information gathered in the first section of the questionnaire shows that most of the 
CubeSats have been developed with a main educational objective and few of them for 
technology demonstration, validating the obtained data from public sources. As far as the 
budget is concerned, only half of CubeSats followed the original principle of developing 1U 
CubeSat with around 100k$. the others have been developed with a higher budget (e.g., one 
1U and one 3U have been developed with a  budget of 300k€ and 2M€ respectively). 
Regarding the type of CubeSats, the most developed are 1U, followed by 3U and then 2U. 
Taking into account the failures, half of feedback answered that they CubeSats are still active, 
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one quarter are non-active and one quarter have already deorbited. It is worth to remark that 
half of the deorbited satellites were never been active. 
These data confirms the previous statistical analysis from public data and gives, even the 
low sample numbers of feedbacks, quite confidence of the results. 
6.2.2 Design information 
The first information regarding the design is to stabilise the model philosophy followed by 
the developers. Half of them decided to follow an hybrid approach, while the rest are divided 
in the same way between protoflight and prototype approaches. The application of a precise 
standard is not yet done by most of the CubeSat teams. Indeed, only one (partially) applied a 
standard, while the others only followed the CubeSat Design Specification. Following similar 
trend, only 2 of them conducted reliability analysis to reduce the probability to suffer a failure. 
In general, at subsystem level, few simulations are conducted. Usually they are limited at 
EPS, ADCS and thermal subsystems simulations. On the other hand, CAD model at subsystem 
and system level is always conducted. 
It is also important to analyse what type of components are used. The provided answers 
by the developers show that all of them followed the CubeSat standard spirit and few to non 
Hi-Rel components are used in their satellites. 
During the manufacturing of the satellite it is important to assess the characteristics of 
the subsystems (e.g. correct functionality, mechanical characteristics, etc.). Most developers 
conducted functional tests at subsystem level which lead to the verification of correct 
functionality of these parts. On the other hand, no many teams performed environmental 
tests on the subsystems. Concretely, few of them conducted thermal, mechanical and/or 
radiations tests on some subsystems or components. 
Finally, most of them foresaw some kind of redundancy. Some applied redundancy on 
processors while some of them applied redundancies to critical subsystems as well as to avoid 
single point failures. 
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6.2.3 Handling information 
The required information in this section was aimed at assessing the foreseen protections 
against hazards which can damage the satellite while it is being transported among different 
facilities. All the developers protected their respective CubeSat against shocks. On the 
contrary, only few of them protected the satellite against other hazards like humidity, 
contamination and electrostatic discharges. 
6.2.4 Verification 
Most of the key actions to be conducted to assure (or at least increase the probability of) 
a mission success are conducted during phase D of a project life cycle. The verifications are one 
of the main activities which help to demonstrate that the spacecraft will be able to survive the 
different environments that it founds during its life cycle and it will conduct the designed 
mission. 
6.2.4.1 Verification preparation 
The first step to follow in the verification process is to plan the campaign. All teams 
established a step-by-step procedure for all tests, while only part of them planned the whole 
verification campaign in an AIV plan. There are also few of them that didn’t established the 
expected results before the tests. 
Regarding the sensors position, for mechanical tests they are placed along the three axes. 
In case of thermal tests, the sensors are usually placed on the internal critical points of the 
satellite. Their positions are established in different ways: 1) some teams determined them by 
means of thermal analysis, 2) few from experts advises and 3) in a sensitive way. 
6.2.4.2 Verification execution 
The verification execution includes the assessment of what verifications have been 
conducted at system level, the values of the applied loads and temperatures, the number of 
cycles in the TV/TC tests and the criteria adopted to establish these values. 
Unfortunately very few teams detailed the load levels and temperature limits of the tests. 
On the other hand, most of them answered the way in which they established them. All of the 
teams used the information provided by the launch authority regarding the vibration loads. As 
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far as the temperatures and number of cycles for the TV/TC tests are concerned, half of the 
teams gathered the information from a thermal analysis. The others established the 
temperatures from previous experience (sometimes with the support of experts) and from the 
datasheet of the components. Usually the number of cycles is limited by time and costs 
constrains. The radiation levels have been established, by the team which conducted the 
verification by means of test, using a commercial software which determined them. 
6.2.4.3 Verification results 
The results of the verifications pointed out that in most of the cases failures are observed 
and identified. This allows the teams to fix them before satellite launch and avoid that the 
failure takes place on-orbit. Indeed, only one of the CubeSat teams answered they didn’t 
observe any failure during the tests. On the other hand, the rest of the developers 
individuated at least one failure during the tests. Concretely, most of them were noticed 
during thermal-vacuum/thermal-cycling tests. Also some failures took place during the 
functional tests and few of them due to vibration tests. This information leads to take a clear 
conclusion that, among thermal, vibration and functional tests, the more stressing and harmful 
for the satellite are thermal tests. 
Once the failures are observed and identified, the teams proceeded to fix them and, in 
most of the cases, re-test the satellite. In principal, the tests conducted again were those 
devoted to demonstrate some functionalities which could be affected by the failures fixing 
actions even if some of them didn’t conduct the test during which the satellite failed. 
6.2.5 Integration into the deployer and operations 
One of the advantages of the CubeSat standard is, as explained before, that there is no 
necessity to design the adaptor to install the satellite into the launcher. Then, the satellite 
design shall take into account to conduct health-checks and batteries recharge activities while 
it is inserted into the deployer. As far as this topic is concerned, most of the times the CubeSat 
shall remain installed without the possibility to access them for a relevant number of days. 
Indeed, the received answers show that an average of 100 days passes between the CubeSat 
integration into the deployer and the launch date. 
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The correctly insertion of the CubeSat on-orbit is always confirmed by the launch and/or 
deployer provides while few times is only assessed by the reception of the first radio signal. On 
the other hand, most of the times there is not any confirmation of the correct deployment of 
the antenna. 
Regarding the reception of the satellite signal in the first hours after the on-orbit insertion 
is usually conducted except from some teams. The main problems are the failure of the 
satellite after the deployment (i.e. never heard) or the low formation of the team to manage 
the ground control station. On the contrary, most of the CubeSats which were heard in the 
first hours after the deployment has established a strong communication link to decode the 
signal. Only few of them were unable to decode the signal due to different causes like 
interferences with other CubeSats and/or subsystem failures. Taking into account the CubeSat 
signals which have been decoded during early operation phase, the most of them showed a 
nominal telemetry values. Some off-nominal values have been observed, mainly for 
temperature out-of-range (lower temperature than expected) and high number of reboots. 
As far as nominal mission operations are concerned, only two CubeSats had observed no 
failures. Most of the CubeSats have suffered at least a failure. The failures go from failures 
which were solved and the satellites were restored into its nominal configuration (mainly due 
to radiations) to failure lead to mission loss (from design errors to corrupted software on the 
on-board data handling). 
6.3 Correlation between mission success and computed 
actions 
The correlation between the inputs given in the survey answers are conducted in this 
paragraph. The first general correlation is mandatory to state, even if it is intuitive to say: the 
more analysis and tests are conducted, the most possibility to have a mission success there 
are. Concretely, a relation between the number of simulations, mainly at subsystem level, and 
mission success is observed. Another important state concerns the redundancies: the satellites 
where some kind of redundancy is present, especially redundancies to avoid single point 
failures, show a high mission success rate. 
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As far as assumed protection during CubeSat transport regards, in general it could be said 
that, intuitively, the more protections are applied, the high rate of mission success could be 
observed. Anyhow, the analysed data does not show a strong correlation in this case. Indeed, 
some CubeSats which have only been protected against shocks during their transport succeed 
at conducting the mission. 
Concerning the verification planning and execution, the more detailed they are, the more 
failures are observed during the verification phase and not after on-orbit insertion. The 
verification execution conducted to failures identification. These observations lead to the 
necessity to apply recovery actions on the satellite to restore its nominal condition after the 
failure. The received feedback show a relation between re-tests the CubeSat after restoring it 
from a failure and its mission success. Indeed, generally the satellite which has been re-tested 
has not been affected by a failure (at least the same failure identified during the verification 
campaign) while on-orbit. On the other hand, the fact that failure(s) has(ve) been observed 
lead to a cost increase and time delay. 
 
6.4 Recommendations and good practices 
The aim of the present section is to provide a list of recommendations and good practices 
to be conducted during the entire life-cycle of a CubeSat. As introduced at the beginning of the 
chapter, these advices are devoted to increase the probability of CubeSat mission success. 
The statements have been divided in different groups following the classical space 
program development phases. In particular, general considerations applying to all phases are 
stated. Then, the advises are stated in the phase(s) where they should be applied: design 
phase (where phase B and C have been gathered in one single phase), manufacturing (or 
procurement) and operation. The disposal phase has not been taken into account because, 
due to the nature of this phase, it is not possible to undertake actions to improve the 
possibility of mission success. 
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General considerations 
1. Correct practices: in general way, it is very important to think about all the actions 
and activities to be conducted during the entire life-cycle of the CubeSat as well as 
the needs and the schedule specifying when they are going to be conducted. This 
will help to have a clear view of the whole project. It is also recommended to 
conduct periodically peer-reviews which can be very useful to check the correctness 
of the performed activities. 
2. Good coordination: the presence of a system engineer role is highly advised to 
coordinate the team. Usually a precise set of activities is assigned to each team 
member. Anyhow the coordination among all members shall be conducted and a 
periodically meeting is advised to allow all team to know the present status of the 
project, the work conducted and the future planned activities. 
Design 
1. Think to the future: it is important, since the very early design phase, to think about 
future activities to be carried out which may require to take some considerations 
during the design phases. Concretely, it is important to take into account the 
requirements for verification phase (and the needs) from the beginning of the 
project: 
2. Recharge batteries during mission test: a mission test is necessary to assess the 
capability of the satellite to conduct the mission. This test last more than the mean 
time that CubeSat batteries last without recharging. Hence, it is necessary to 
envisage (i.e. state the requirement) the possibility to recharge the batteries 
through umbilical connector (when solar simulator is not available) while the 
satellite is switched-on. 
a. Recharge batteries during TVC test: during thermal-vacuum cycling test it is 
mandatory, following the ECSS standard, to conduct functional tests during 
maximum and minimum temperatures. This requirement implies that it is 
necessary to be able to switch-on the satellite while it is inside the 
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thermal-vacuum chamber. Moreover, it will be necessary to recharge the 
batteries during the TVC test. 
b. Communications during TVC tests: as specified in the previous point, 
during the TVC test it is required to conduct a functional tests. Sometimes, 
depending on the facilities, it is not possible to establish a RF 
communication link. Hence, it is highly recommended to design a 
communication link through physical umbilical connector in order to test 
the complete functionalities of the CubeSat without the necessity to 
communicate in radio-frequency. 
c. Introduce thermistors in the project: during the TVC it is necessary to 
monitor temperature inside the CubeSat. Hence, the installation of 
thermistors shall be foreseen. Usually these the equipment used to 
monitor the internal temperatures during the test are not the same as 
those installed to measure temperatures while in orbit. It is necessary to 
envisage the location and type of the thermistors, as well as to install them 
during the final assembly and integration activities. 
d. Restore ready-to-launch configuration: after the tests the satellite shall be 
restored in the launch configuration. Main activities could consist on 
delete storage memory where all the mission data is stored, fold the 
antenna, etc. All this operations shall be designed in a way that they could 
be conducted with the satellite completely assembled. 
3. Electrical connector for sensors: internal thermocouples and accelerometers, are 
required inside the satellite to monitor the temperatures (and the accelerations) 
during the TVC test (and vibration tests). It is encourage to foresee a connector 
where all these sensors are connected. In that case it will not be necessary to cut 
and isolate the wires (reducing the risk of power arcing and/or electrical discharges). 
Moreover it will provide a plug-and-play interface to retrieve the data from that 
sensor. 
4. Avoid single point failures: reduce single point failures via software redundancies if 
possible and/or hardware redundancies. 
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Methodology 
1. Classical Vee approach: CubeSats are low-cost, fast-development satellites. Anyhow 
the design, manufacturing, verification and operations shall be conducted as much 
similar to traditional projects as possible. In this context, the classical Vee approach 
is highly recommended for CubeSats projects. Starting from the mission statement 
definition (i.e. stating the purpose of the project), the mission objectives, 
requirements and constraints, as well as the system requirements shall be then 
derived. These steps are crucial to achieve a good project. Moreover, during the 
requirements definition, it is also necessary to establish at what level, stage and 
what methodology(ies) will be used to verify them. 
2. Documentation: the documentation of all activities of the project is crucial for 
different reasons. First of all, the documentation will help to have a smooth 
continuity on the project, avoiding information gaps if some members leave the 
team. Second, the documents are very useful to conduct peer-reviews which will 
help to assess that the team is achieving the established objectives. Finally, it will 
also be possible that some of the documents could be required by launch authority 
to accept the CubeSat to be launch. In this last case, the documentation of the 
project during the all phases will be also useful to avoid the necessity to produce it 
quickly if required by third parties, which can lead to specify errors and uncertainties 
due to the short available time. 
3. Consider all ICDs: one of the intrinsically a characteristic of a CubeSat project is that 
usually the launcher is unknown during the development of the satellite. Indeed, 
most of the times the launch is bought when the project is already in an advance 
stage. To avoid the possible limitations on wide available deployers available on the 
market, it is highly recommend to take into account ICDs of all deployers. These will 
give a set of requirements that, if followed, will allow to be accepted for any 
deployer to launch the CubeSat. 
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Analysis 
1. Thermal analysis: thermal aspects shall be taken into account from the beginning of 
the project. Most of the components on a CubeSat are COTS and they are usually 
very sensitive to temperature. In that case, a thermal analysis is needed to assess 
the maximum and minimum envisaged temperatures. Iterative analysis shall be 
conducted to refine the results when data from the subsystems is available. This 
analysis will give, from the obtained temperature ranges, the information to assess 
if some kind of thermal protection is necessary. Regarding these points, it could also 
be interesting to obtain, from the providers, any information about thermal 
behaviour of the components. Form the results of the questionnaire as well as from 
inputs from experts a good range of temperatures to design (and test) a CubeSat 
could be between -20ºC and +80ºC. Nevertheless, this limit shall not be taken as a 
mandatory input. Indeed, the very important consideration to be always taken into 
account is not to damage the satellite. 
2. Radiations analysis: as stated before, the COTS components usually used in CubeSats 
are not HiRel and hence are very sensitive to radiations. It is highly recommended to 
conduct radiation analysis taking into account different orbits to evaluate if 
protection against radiations is required. Regarding this topic, the active 
components and circuits are usually the most affected parts by radiations. Different 
software tools are available on the market to conduct this study. 
3. Mechanical analysis: it is important to conduct the mechanical analysis as much 
precise as possible to assure that the structure and all subsystems withstand the 
designed loads. When these are not available, different solutions could be applied 
(e.g. make a general envelope which covers the maximum loads of all possible 
launchers, use NASA-GEVS, etc.). It is necessary to remark that the quasi-static loads 
analysis shall be conducted applying different combinations of the longitudinal and 
lateral loads. 
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EPS design 
1. Subsystems powering: it is important to allow the system to isolate possible failures. 
One way to conduct this protection is design the power lines in series, which each 
one feeds one subsystem. Controlling each line separately from the others will allow 
to isolate a possible failure. 
2. Design a detailed power budget: to assess that enough power is available on-board 
is crucial for the mission. The power budget shall be updated while the design is on-
going. When new data is available (e.g. precise consumption of a component, better 
if tested) the power budget shall be updated. 
3. Design a detailed energy budget: the energy budget will be used to assess the 
instant required energy. A decreasing trend of energy budget (even when the power 
budget is positive) could cause a degradation of the mission results 
AOCS design 
1. Redundancy: high numbers of failures in AOCSs of satellites are due to failures on 
the gyros. A redundancy of gyros (if present) is recommended. 
2. Back-up mode: a back-up mode is always advised if possible. In the case of the AOCS 
it could be foresee attitude determination using only part of the available sensors 
(e.g. using accelerometers and determine angular velocity by computing the 
derivative). 
COMSYS design 
1. Increase the link margin: usually it is advised to have a minimum link margin of 6dB. 
Usually, during the design phases, the final orbit is not known. Due to this fact, it is 
necessary to assume the worst case to compute the link margin. Moreover, it is 
advised to try to increment the margin to assure a strong link even if possible 
failures and/or anomalies took place (e.g. high tumbling rate, antenna remains 
folded). 
2. Back-up line: the ability to communicate with the satellite is crucial to control the 
mission and to obtain data from the bus and payload. The communication 
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subsystem could be redundant and a back-up link could help to increase the 
possibility to communicate with the satellite if the primary communication line fails. 
3. Independent processor: it is possible that the communication between the 
communication subsystem and the others subsystems fails. In that case, the 
COMSYS processor should be able to send basic telemetry/signal (if possible with 
basic telemetry which shows the possible failure). This will maintain a 
communication link between space and ground segments and will allow operators 
to evaluate the problem and decide a possible action to recover the satellite. 
4. Emergency batteries: the EPS is a crucial subsystem and, unfortunately, could fail 
and/or have an anomaly. Non-rechargeable battery(ies) could be installed and used 
in case the EPS fails or an anomaly is observed. With this improvement the 
communications between both segments can be guaranteed and it gives time to 
operators to assess and take corrective/restoring actions (or at least obtain enough 
data which could help the assessment of the failure). 
5. Frequency drift avoidance: the frequency stored in the COMSYS could suffer a drift 
for various reasons (e.g. temperature, radiations, etc.). One of the possibilities is, if 
applicable (e.g. if the frequency is programmed in a memory), to implement an 
external reset that could restore the original designed frequency.  
OBDH design 
1. Different communication lines: to have different communication lines between the 
OBDH and the rest of the subsystems. This redundancy on the communication could 
help to reduce the risk of losing one subsystem due to a communication protocol 
failure. Each communication subsystem should have nominal link and redundant 
link. 
Mechanisms design 
1. Possibility to dismount: it is very important to allow the possibility to disassemble 
the satellite. During the verification campaign failures can take place. If this 
happens, it is probably required to have access to the internal part of the satellite or 
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even disassemble part of them.. E.g. screw the solar panels: it is highly 
recommended instead of glue them. In that case, they can be disassembled without 
the risk of breaking them. 
Design for radiations protection 
1. Boards’ configuration: the internal boards’ layout configuration could help to 
protect the most sensible components with respect to radiations. Different physical 
configurations shall be evaluated to assess the most convenient one which protects 
these most sensible components. In particular, in the most internal parts of the 
CubeSat the most sensible components shall be placed. In that case, they can be 
partially protected by the rest of boards. 
2. Protection: the abovementioned radiation analysis will provide information about 
the risk to be affected by radiations. If this risk is considered too high, the necessity 
of implement a protection arise and the components shall be protected by means of 
radiation shielding. 
3. Restart the system: a watchdog should be implemented to guarantee a reboot of 
the system if it remains stuck. It could be also useful to implement a command, sent 
from ground, to restart the system. The possibility to restart/reboot the system (cut 
off the power and restore it) could be useful to restore the configuration after 
radiation effects (e.g. SEU). 
4. Failures due to radiations isolation: SEL could take place. In that case it is important 
to isolate the failure in order to avoid failure propagation. In particular the isolation 
could be conducted applying resistors on the electric path. 
a. Latch-up Protection Technology circuit: introduce the LPT circuit. When 
SEL is detected, the LPT circuit shuts down the chip and holds it powered-
down for a present time. 
b. Silicon-On-Insulator devices could be used to reduce the probability to 
have a SEL. 
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Maintainability 
1. Order and simplicity: sometimes the failures could occur due to a “chaotic” internal 
configuration. Indeed, the high amount of wires could increase the risk of damaging 
them during the assembly and integration process. To avoid this problem (or reduce 
it), it is recommended to substitute the wires, whenever was possible, with printed 
circuit boards. For the connections that should be conducted by wires, it is advised 
to gather them as much as possible and to assess, during the design, where they will 
pass to assure an easy assembly process. 
2. Accessibility: during on-ground operations or recovery actions (if necessary after 
possible failures during tests) it could be necessary to access inside the CubeSat. The 
high accessibility will help during these tasks. 
3. Spares: during the development of the project the components are tested. It is 
possible that some of them were damaged during these tests. In other cases it is 
possible that the provider stops the production of some component while the 
project development is on-going. To avoid schedule delays in the first case and the 
necessity of changing some component which could imply a cost increase (and 
probably a schedule delay) it is important to have spare parts available. 
Design for ESD protection 
1. Avoid floating conductors: floating items like wires may cause an electrostatic 
discharge. In that case it is worth recommended to avoid and substitute them by 
printed circuits. 
2. Isolation: if the previous point could not be applied in all cases and floating 
conductors are present, it is necessary to isolated them with space certified silicon 
adhesive. If not, a power arcing (i.e. corona effect) could take place. 
3. Shielding: an electrostatic discharge could also take place between two electronic 
contacts. To avoid them it is advised to isolate them, for example varnishing all 
electrical contacts. 
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4. Ground: all circuitry should have a chassis ground reference. Keep everything inside 
a grounded Faraday Cage. Also all conductive layers of thermal blankets (if any) 
should be grounded (as already specified in the CDS). 
Dependability 
1. FMECA: to conduct this type of study is highly encourage to find critical points which 
can lead to failure. It could be started from the beginning of the project, and 
concretely it shall be started at least when subsystems definition is available. 
2. Risk analysis: to conduct a risk analysis by subsystems to individuate the most 
critical. Then the proper actions shall be conducted to reduce the criticity and the 
likelihood. It is also important to assess the availability risk in terms of facilities, 
time, people and money. Finally, it is also necessary to assess the components 
manipulation risk/hazard (also to the people, e.g. beryllium).  
Avoidance of certain materials 
1. Kapton: this material is produced for space applications with a low out-gassing rate. 
Anyhow, it is affected by atomic oxygen. Hence, it is necessary to reduce the use of 
this material in critical parts in the exterior of the CubeSat. 
2. Aluminium alloy: ESA has an alert on aluminium alloys 7000 series due to 
degradation observed in several cases. Hence, it is recommended to use aluminium 
alloys 6000 series. 
3. Cadmium and Zinc: these two materials are highly volatile metals and hence their 
use in space is forbidden. 
4. RoHS: in EU this directive has been stated and limits the use six hazardous materials 
(lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent chromium, polybrominated biphenyls and 
polybrominated diphenyl ether). To follow this directive will be mandatory in the 
near future. 
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Manufacturing (and/or procurement) 
1. Incoming inspection (correct state): it is important, when parts/components are 
acquired, to establish an “incoming procedure” which establishes the steps to follow 
to assure that the received product meets the desired requirements. In particular, it 
is necessary to conduct at least a functional test to assure that the component 
follows the expected behaviour as specified in the datasheet. 
2. User Manual: it is very important to follow the actions specified in the user manual. 
To not follow these rules could lead to damage the satellite or the 
subsystem/component. It is necessary to be aware what it can be done and what 
has to be avoided. 
Assembly, Integration and Verification 
Plan 
1. Test planning: the plan of the test campaign shall be conducted before starting it. As 
a minimum, the requirements to be verified, the tests to be conducted with the 
step-by-step procedure as well as the expected results and pass/fail criteria shall be 
specified. This planning will help to conduct the tests in a systematic way and to 
have the specifications to be able to conduct the tests more than one time in the 
same configuration. 
2. Personnel management: it is necessary to define a priori the exact role of each team 
member involved in the verification campaign. To not have a defined role for each 
one could lead to misunderstanding and human errors. 
3. GSE testing: it is important to have high confidence on the values measured during 
the tests. In that case it is important to test the GSE before starting the test on the 
system/subsystem. In that case it will be possible to assess that the output given by 
the GSE are correct: 
4. The electrical connection of the EGSE shall be controlled (correct welding, check 
wires continuity, etc.). 
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5. Satellite installation: the test set-up shall be correctly planned and conducted with 
sufficient margin of time before the test starts. The test duration shall be envisaged 
as well as safety measurements and regulations to protect operators. 
6. Verification results reports: it is very important to fill as-run procedure during the 
tests to be also sure that all steps have been followed. After them test reports shall 
be produced. 
7. Evaluate failures: during verifications failures/anomalies could be observed. Should 
it happen, NCRs shall be produced. In this case the root cause of the problem shall 
be founded and the possible solutions assessed before acting on the spacecraft. The 
intervention on the spacecraft is the last action after a failure is observed. If 
corrective actions are conducted to restore the satellite into its nominal condition 
after a failures has been observed, certain tests shall be conducted to verify the 
spacecraft meets the requirements after the intervention. 
8. Programmatic: during the planning it is important to create a list of possible 
problems which can be encountered during the test and how to solve them. This will 
allow a rapid response if their take place. It is also recommended to take into 
account certain margin of time and budget. Some tests could not be run nominally 
and failures could take place. In that case it is advised, after fixing the possible 
failures, to repeat the test in which failures have been observed. 
Subsystem level verifications 
General 
1. Real consumption: the real consumption of each subsystem specified in the 
datasheet (or after the subsystem manufacture) shall be verified by test. These 
values will then be used to define a more precise power budget. 
2. Test against launch requirements: it is important to test all subsystems/components 
not only against the functional requirements, but also against the possible 
requirements required to be accepted for the launch. E.g. tests to verify outgassing 
and hazard materials requirements. 
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Electrical Power System 
1. Test auto-discharge: storage and launch delay shall be considered. Hence, the 
verification of the batteries auto-discharge when connected to all loads (with DS 
pressed) should be assessed. This could be verified at subsystem level (connecting 
equivalent loads to the EPS) or at system level (if time is available). 
2. Good knowledge of the batteries: the batteries are critical components. They shall 
be properly and detailed characterised. At least a test at component level is 
necessary to assess their functional behaviour. To test them in thermal chamber is 
highly envisage (and TV if never used in space environment). 
3. Test power budget: the power budget shall be tested to verify and confirm the 
analysis conducted during the design phase. 
Communications System 
1. Low/no frequency drift: it is very important to assess that the radio of the 
communication system will not suffer frequency drift due to extreme temperatures, 
mainly if some CubeSats have similar frequencies in the same launch. A detailed 
FMECA on this point should be conducted 
a. Test: if it is possible and affordable, a thermal test it is recommended on 
the COMSYS. With the time the electrical characteristics can be changed. 
Worst case analysis should be done. 
System level verifications 
General 
1. Test comparison: functional tests shall be conducted before and after environmental 
tests campaign. These tests shall demonstrate the correct functionality of the 
satellite and that it has not been affected by the exposure of the spacecraft to space 
environment during tests. The same test should be conducted before the shipment 
to test facilities to have a reference case to compare the future results. 
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TV/TC tests 
1. Mechanisms test: to conduct the test of the mechanisms during the TV/TC test is 
encourage to assess the correct capability of the mechanism to conduct its 
functionality in space environment. The test shall be planned before the starting of 
the TV/TC test and it is necessary to foresee if any limitation applies. In particular, 
limitations due to the dimensions of the facility and GSE. 
2. Functional test: it is highly recommended to conduct functional testing during the 
thermal tests to verify the correct functionality the satellite at hot and low 
temperatures. 
Functionality 
1. Operative modes and transitions: it is important to test at ambient condition all the 
operative modes as well as transitions between them. It is worth to remark that the 
functionality test shall demonstrate the good functionality of the system (and each 
subsystem), not only check if switches-on. The correct functionality shall take into 
account that the correct outputs are achieved (e.g. correct values measured by 
sensors, etc.) 
2. Polarity: once the satellite is completely assembled, the polarity of actuators (e.g. 
magnetorquers) and sensors (e.g. gyros) should be tested. 
Tests optimisation 
1. Classify requirements in groups according to the fact that all of them could be 
verified in the same test (or in a step of a test). This will reduce the duration of the 
tests. 
2. Reduce the duration with a proper planning. A good combination will allow to 
eliminate some test preparation because the set-up is already conducted for a 
previous test, or the satellite status at the end of one test is the required status to 
begin the next one. 
3. Combine thermal bake-out and thermal-vacuum tests in one test in order to reduce 
the time and cost. This recommendation applies when bake-out test is required. 
Usually this is the case when the properties in terms of possible contamination (i.e. 
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values of RML, CVCM and TML) are known for all parts. If it is not possible to know 
these values (mainly TML and CVCM), the necessity to conduct a bake-out test could 
arise. 
4. Hybrid philosophy could help to reduce time and cost of test phase while keeping 
acceptable risk. Develop and test qualification and flight models for new/critical 
components/subsystems. Manufacture and test only flight models of 
components/subsystems which, from previous experience and/or analysis, the 
confidence level on the correct behaviour is guaranteed (e.g. structure, OBC used in 
previous missions and it had no failures, etc.) 
5. Coordination: most of the times the verifications (mainly environmental tests) are 
conducted in different facilities of the developer, with personnel external of the 
team. It is important to have a very good coordination to exchange information 
about the facilities, required interfaces, etc. quite in advance to correctly plan the 
tests. 
6. Foresee failures: during the verification preparation it is important to assess the 
possible failures which can occur during the tests and establish a recovery action. 
This could help to reduce the verification execution time. 
7. Order of the tests: TVC test have a higher cost with respect to mechanical tests. 
Hence, it is recommended to conduct the mechanical tests before the TVC test. In 
the contrary, if a failure is identified during mechanical tests, thermal tests should 
be repeated with a cost and time increase. On the contrary, if the satellite fails 
during thermal tests it could be recovered and the possibility to not re-conduct the 
mechanical tests is envisaged. 
8. Combine EM-autoCompatibility test during functional tests. The successful 
functional test leads also to a successful EM-autoCompatibility test. 
Transport, storage and maintenance 
1. Plan: establish a concrete plan to transport the CubeSat among the facilities (e.g. to 
test, integrate into the deployer, etc.). The test should include the procedures to 
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protect the satellite against shocks, contamination, humidity, ESD and other possible 
hazards. 
2. A reduced functional test to be conducted before and after each transportation will 
allow to assess that the transport doesn’t affect the correct functionality of the 
CubeSat. 
3. Establish precise storage conditions: during the storage of the satellite before 
integration into the deployer shall be conducted taking into account precise storage 
conditions regarding temperature, humidity, protection against contamination and 
other agents that could damage the satellite. 
4. Health check: a periodically health check should be conducted to verify the 
functionality of all subsystems. 
Pre-launch activities 
1. GCS test: it is important to check the correct functionality of the ground segment 
few days before the launch. 
On-orbit operations 
1. Failures envisage: to foresee possible failures which could take place in orbit is 
important. A recovery action/plan should be established before launch 
2. Stabilise the satellite: satellite stabilisation is encourage before to start the nominal 
operations to assure a strong communication link with the satellite. 
Other considerations 
1. PA role: it is an important role in all space projects and it is highly advised to have 
this in CubeSat projects. Nevertheless, sometimes the reduced participants in the 
CubeSat tem leads to the fact that PA rose is not covered. To cope with this gape the 
PA role could be conducted among the different participants of the group (cross-
check of documentation/design of the project). 
2. Reduce of contamination and non-authorised personnel: the CubeSat project shall 
comply with clean room class 100000 as per CDS. Nevertheless, this type of facility is 
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not always available. It is recommended to conduct the development, A&I and test 
in a dedicated room with a minimum clean level is guaranteed. Moreover, the 
access to this room should be limited to the team members. This will reduce the risk 
to damage the satellite or its subsystems by non-authorised personnel. 
3. Protection in the development room: a minimum protection shall be taken during 
the satellite (and/or its subsystems/components). Concretely protection against 
anti-static discharges and contamination (at least gloves) should be used. Avoid 
charge build-up. 
4. Protection against other hazards: other hazards, apart from the space environment 
hazards, could be present after a CubeSat is deployed (e.g. the CubeSat could be 
affected by hydrazine from the last stage of the launcher or from the primary 
satellite, electrostatic discharge, etc.). One possibility could be to activate an active 
AOCS (if available) to move the CubeSat and point the most robust face to the 
hydrazine cloud. 
 
6.5 Case study: e-st@r-I CubeSat FMECA 
The first action conducted within the research was started from the need to evaluate the 
causes that conducted to the loss of e-st@r-I (Educational SatelliTe at politecnico di toRino) 
CubeSat. This CubeSat has been developed by the CubeSat Team at Politecnico di Torino 
within e-st@r program. The CubeSat Team is a student team born in 2009 for the development 
of the e-st@r program in the framework of the initiative “Educational Payload on the VEGA 
Maiden Flight” proposed by ESA Education Office in 2008. The Team is formed by students 
under coordination of the Team Leader, who is responsible for the whole program. The Team 
is organised according to a defined work breakdown structure, which takes into account both 
technical and non-technical aspects. The FMECA technique was preliminary conducted during 
satellite developing. However, an in-deep analysis is required to evaluate the possible causes 
of failure during in-orbit operations in order to improve the design for future follow-on 
projects (see section 7.3). 
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6.5.1 E-st@r program 
E-st@r program is an educational program carried out at Politecnico di Torino within the 
CubeSat Team. It encompasses the design, development, manufacture, verification and 
operation of CubeSats conducted by students under the supervision of researchers and 
professors. This program, which is driven by educational and scientific purposes, is based on a 
hands-on-practice approach as a perfect means to achieve the University educational and 
technological objectives. I.e., to educate engineering students on systems development, 
management, and team work; and to achieve insight in the development of scenarios and 
enabling technologies for future space missions within a low-cost program. These program 
guidelines are summarised in Figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 32: E-st@r program guidelines 
The main program guidelines have been assumed as high-level objectives and constraints 
for the e-st@r program. They can be listed as follows: 
 WHAT/1: To inspire and prepare future space-professionals: students are the end 
users of the mission 
 WHAT/2: To improve knowledge in space science and engineering: real world shall 
take advantages of our missions 
 WHY: To meet stakeholders’ needs. Stakeholders are: students & civil society, 
scientific community and industry 
 HOW: To carry out a space program from the design to in-orbit operations, 
completely managed by students 
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The educational purpose of the program is pursued at several levels: undergraduate, 
graduate and postgraduate. Students come mainly from the Aerospace Engineering area, but 
also from Mechanical, Electronics and Communication, and Energy Engineering. 
6.5.1.1 Mission objectives 
The mission objectives represent the broad goals that the system must achieve to be 
effective, productive, efficient and useful. The motivations that led us to define the mission 
objectives include “needs” of both scientific-technological importance as well as educational 
significance. 
The relatively low cost from standardised components and piggy-back launch 
opportunities make CubeSats the perfect systems to achieve actual most significant 
challenges, i.e. to accomplish science goals while facing severe limitations on mass, volume 
and power. However, the CubeSats’ contribution to broad science goals shall be supported by 
the appropriate set of technologies. 
One of the most enabling technologies for future CubeSat missions is the capability of 
autonomous attitude determination and control, specifically where requirements in terms of 
stabilisation and pointing accuracy are critical to the effectiveness of experiments, payload 
operations, communications, and in turn to the mission success. To address this need, the 
primary technology objective of e-st@r program is to demonstrate the capability of 
autonomous determination and control, through the development and test in-orbit an active 
attitude determination and control system entirely designed and manufactured by students. 
Moreover, a second objective has been defined: testing in orbit COTS technology and self-
made hardware. 
The motivations, needs and constraints that led to the definition of the mission objectives 
are shown schematically in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33: e-st@r mission objectives 
6.5.2 E-st@r-I CubeSat description 
In 2008 ESA Education Office released a call for proposals named “Educational Payload on 
the VEGA Maiden Flight”. E-st@r-I project was presented and accepted as one of the 9 
CubeSats to be launched on the VEGA Maiden Flight. 
E-st@r-I is a 1U CubeSat developed for demonstrating autonomous attitude control 
capabilities based on magnetic actuation. A picture of e-st@r-I CubeSat is shown in Figure 34. 
 
Figure 34: e-st@r-I flight unit 
The nominal configuration in orbit provides for a free tumbling, without attitude 
stabilization. This task shall be accomplished upon the activation of the active attitude 
determination and control subsystem (A-ADCS), which actually represents the e-st@r-I 
payload. The stowed configuration of e-st@r-I is an aluminium-alloy cube-shaped box of 
100mm per side, with 5 out of the 6 faces occupied by solar panels.  
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Figure 35: e-st@r-II system architecture blocks scheme 
The sixth external surface hosts the antenna system and the access ports for ground 
operations. After the satellite activation, the antenna system deploys two arms of the dipole 
which remain attached to the CubeSat structure. The CubeSat has been designed, developed 
and assembled taking into account all the applicable requirements and constraints given in the 
CDS. 
E-st@r-I system architecture blocks scheme is reported in Figure 35. The platform in support of 
the payload includes the Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) devoted to provide, store, control 
and distribute the electrical power on-board, the Communication Subsystem (COMSYS) that 
provides the interface between the space and ground segments, and the On-Board Computer 
(OBC) which handles and executes commands, manages and stores data and performs 
autonomous on-board operations. The structure/mechanical system is devoted to carry the 
loads induced by the launch vehicle, to support and protect all other spacecraft subsystems, 
and to provide for spring plunger device. Passive thermal control has been designed for e-
st@r-I. 
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6.5.3 E-st@r-I in-orbit experience 
e-st@r-I was launched, after some delays on the scheduled date for the inaugural flight, 
on the VEGA Maiden Flight on February 13th 2012. Just after the release from the deployer the 
satellite was activated. However, first telemetry data were received only few days later. 
Moreover, the low quality of the signal with a low signal-to-noise (S/N) ratio made almost 
impossible to completely decode the signal and retrieve data. 
A preliminary assessment of possible causes for the low S/N ratio was conducted by the 
Team. The most realistic rationale that justified the problem was a possible low batteries 
state-of-charge. Hence, the Team commanded the satellite to switch its operative mode to 
another one (called safe energy) at which the consumption is reduced at the minimum (i.e. 
communications are stopped in downlink and the payload is switched-off). Even if the cause of 
the low S/N ratio was individuated, a more detailed analysis was required to individuate the 
original cause of the failure.  
6.5.4 E-st@r-I FMECA 
To conduct the assessment of possible failure origin causes occurred during in-orbit 
operations of e-st@r-II, the FMECA technique has been applied. The outputs of the FMECA 
have been crucial to improve the design for the follow-on CubeSat, called e-st@r-II (see 
section 7.3). 
An extraction of FMECA is shown in Figure 36 (complete FMECA is provided in Appendix C) 
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Figure 36: e-st@r-II FMECA (extract) 
The FMECA was conducted in a systematic approach: starting from system level, the 
subsystem and component decomposition have been followed to identify possible failures, 
causes and effects on the satellite. However, due to the fact that the satellite was entirely 
manufactured using COTS components, probability number and criticality number were not 
available. Anyhow, this drawback did not prevent to obtain high valuable outputs from which 
the failure causes of e-st@r-I were individuated. 
High numbers of outputs have been obtained from the analysis. First, possible failures at 
system level refer to failures of each subsystem. Expect for the failure of the payload (which 
has been considered critical), all the other possible failures are considered catastrophic. This 
event is a direct consequence of the fact that no redundancies are present at subsystem level, 
and hence, any possible failure of one of the bus subsystems will lead to the loss of the 
mission. 
Secondly, at subsystem level, most of the possible failures are classified as critical in the 
payload and EPS, while are catastrophic in the OBC and COMSYS. Failures that can occur in 
these last two subsystems lead to a complete loss of the mission, because the satellite would 
lose the ability to process data and/or communicated from/to ground segment.  
Third, most of the possible failures of the EPS were stated as critical. One of them (i.e. the 
unavailability of one of the battery packs to supply power) would lead to not feed some 
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subsystems. Furthermore, one possible failure of the payload would be that the subsystem is 
not able to stabilise the CubeSat. The non-stabilisation would lead the impossibility to 
recharge batteries. Thus, the combination of these events would originate the failure on the 
reception of the signal and, at the end, the anticipation of the operations cessation with 
respect to schedule. 
Important results have been obtained from this analysis. First of all, has been 
demonstrated the utility of applying this technique from the very beginning of a space project. 
Indeed, if a detailed analysis was conducted, the causes of the failures would be individuated 
during the design phase. Regarding the actions to avoid similar failures in the follow-on 
CubeSat, two main actions were envisaged: 1) to replace COTS battery packs by batteries from 
CubeSat EPS provider that already tested these components on-orbit, and 2) implement new 
operative modes in order to allow higher control on the payload activation and operations, 
giving more manual operability from ground, instead of automatic procedures. These two 
modifications along with others have been implemented in e-st@r-II. The e-st@r-II CubeSat 
has been used as test case for other part of the present research, detailed in next chapter. 
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7  
RELIABILITY-ORIENTED 
VERIFICATIONS OF CUBESATS 
Conventional satellites projects are, traditionally, oriented to give the same effort, in 
terms of cost, time and personnel, to design, development, integration and verification phases. 
On the contrary, CubeSats projects usually speed up design and development to conserve 
time, personnel, and financial resources for AIV phase. 
Generally speaking, CubeSats reliability can be increased testing the system’s functionality 
in all possible operational conditions that will face during its life-cycle. Normally, due to 
CubeSats components dimensions, they are not completely tested at equipment level, and are 
directly functionally tested at subsystem level. Environmental tests are generally conducted 
only at system level. Moreover, for classical projects standard procedures enforce the 
production of countless documents that could lead to an extremely bureaucratised project. 
To conduct such verifications, CubeSat developers normally try to follow international 
standards (e.g., ECSS standards) that, however, have been stated for large-conventional 
satellites projects, with longer time schedules and higher budget. Hence, a tailoring of these 
standards is absolutely necessary to allow their application to CubeSat projects. 
ECSS standards are studied and tailored to adapt them to CubeSat projects. A critical 
review of them is conducted in the present section, presenting an adaptation of the standards 
for AIV of CubeSats. The result is a standard methodology to conduct CubeSats verification 
that guarantees a sufficient confidence on satellite reliability and mission success maintaining 
a cost effective program. 
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7.1 European Cooperation on Space Standardization (ECSS) 
standards 
The European Cooperation on Space Standardization (ECSS) is an organisation that works 
to develop a coherent, single set of user-friendly standards for use in all European space 
activities. 
It has been developed as a cooperative effort between the European space agencies and 
space industries. The organisation is constantly reviewing the standards and publishing new 
updated versions. The ECSS standards are normative documents that encompass a 
comprehensive set of documents addressing all essential aspects of the three major space 
project branches for the successful implementation of space programmes and projects, i.e., 
engineering, project management and product assurance. Thus, ECSS standards are structured 
in three branches with the following contents: 
 Management: this branch (i.e., M-branch) gives guidelines to achieve successful 
completion of the space project in terms of cost, schedule and technical 
performance. Project management is performed following a structured approach 
throughout all stages of its life-cycle and at all levels of the customer-supplier chain. 
 Engineering: E-branch covers the engineering aspects of space systems and 
products, including the engineering process as applied to space systems and their 
elements or functions, and technical aspects of products used to accomplish, or 
associate with, space missions. 
 Product Assurance: the Q-branch guides the engineers to assure that the space 
products accomplish their defined mission objectives and more specifically that they 
are Safe, Available and Reliable. 
Verification process guidelines are reported in ECSS-E-ST-10-02C, and required tests in 
ECSS-E-ST-10-03C. Hence, these two documents are tailored to adapt them for a CubeSat 
project. In particular, their content is: 
 ECSS-E-ST-10-02C: the standard established the requirements for the verification of 
a space system product. Fundamental concepts of the verification process and the 
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criteria for defining the verification strategy are defined as well as the requirements 
for the implementation of the verification programme are specified. Moreover, a list 
of expected documentation is provided. 
 ECSS-E-ST-10-03C: this document addresses the requirements for performing 
verification by testing of space segment elements and space segment equipment on 
ground prior to launch. 
7.2 ECSS standards tailoring for CubeSats verification 
Verification main objective is to assess whether or not a system meets the requirements 
stated during design phase. In other words, verification activities answer the question Does the 
system/subsystem/equipment meet its requirements?. Thus, verification is a key-phase of a 
project life-cycle and the activities conducted are crucial to increase system’s reliability and 
establish a good confidence of a successful mission. The verification process shall be 
conducted in a systematic approach at different levels (i.e., equipment, subsystem and system 
levels).  
Generally, verifications process is made up of four main activities, i.e., planning, 
execution, reporting and control closeout, which are summarised, as detailed in ECSS-E-ST-10-
02C, in Figure 27: 
7 RELIABILITY-ORIENTED VERIFICATIONS OF CUBESATS  
108 
 
Figure 37: Verification process and activities 
The first step in verification process is to conduct verification planning. Supplier and 
customer give their inputs that, together with product requirements defined during design 
phase, constitute the three inputs for the verification planning. As an output the initial 
verification control document is obtained. It contains the correlation between the 
requirements, the level and stage in which they shall be verified and the verification method to 
be used. Moreover, the required documents to conduct verification are written in this phase. 
The planning of verifications is used, together with any additional technical documentation 
useful for verifications, to precisely execute them and report the results. The results are cross-
checked with requirements, and if the requirements are verified, they are closed-out and the 
final verification control document is released. 
Among all verification methods, analysis and test are the most used. Conventionally, the 
role of tests is to verify analysis while the role of analyses is to support functionality. Classical 
space projects foresee to conduct high number of analyses and tests to verify the 
requirements. However, this approach cannot be followed in a CubeSat project because it will 
lead to a boost of reviews, overspecifications and paperwork production. Generally speaking, 
testing is the preferred verification method with the lowest risk, but, because it represents a 
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large expense, the tailoring of the test program, should also assure that a cost effective 
program is achieved. 
The peculiarities of CubeSats (i.e., reduced mass and volume) allow to increase 
advantages of tests with respect to analyses. For example, testing CubeSat’s thermal 
behaviour by means of thermal-balance test is worth in terms of time, instead of creating a 
complex model to conduct a very precise thermal analysis. Moreover, it is possible to verify the 
real functionality of the satellite under certain environmental conditions. 
The proposed methodology is made up of two main activities, the first one is related to 
verification plan and the adaptation of ECSS-E-ST-10-02C, while the second is the tailoring of 
ECSS-E-ST-10-03C in a way to make CubeSat’s verification phase cost-effective and time-saving. 
Obviously both activities are highly related because the tailoring of tests has a strong impact 
on verification planning and execution. 
7.2.1 Verification planning 
The verification planning, as it comes to light from Figure 37, it is detailed once the 
product requirements are already stated; i.e. at each design level a verification matrix, where 
product requirements, verification method and level are specified, is used as input for 
verification planning. The new methodology proposed in this section suggests a first updating 
of procedure, i.e. to use the verification planning not only for verification execution but also as 
an input for design (see Figure 38).  
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Figure 38: Verification activities within Vee-shaped model 
Certain verification activities could require particular satellite functionalities that shall be 
taken into account during the design phases. For example, during thermal-vacuum cycling test 
normally satellite’s functionality is tested. Hence, the CubeSat shall have the functionality to 
be activated/deactivated through ground support equipment. This capability shall be taken 
into account during design phase, however not always is conducted. Thus, it is clear that 
ignoring verification requirements during design phases could require future design 
modification/test adaptations with the consequence increase of cost and schedule delay. 
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Figure 39: Verification activities flow-chart 
A precise activities path to conduct verifications, from the design to the requirements 
close-out, is proposed in Figure 39. As stated before, it is necessary to take into account that, 
during verification planning, some requirements for verification execution can arise; and then 
shall be taken into account for a re-design of the satellite. Possible non-verified requirements 
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at the end of verification process can also lead to a need of re-design of the satellite. These 
two facts shall be represented in the verification activities flow, which are not stated in ECSS, 
as can see in Figure 37. 
To conduct verification planning, it is necessary to define the levels and stages of the 
project at which the verifications will be conducted. Stages depend on the model philosophy 
adopted for the project (i.e., protoflight or prototype) while the levels depend upon the 
complexity of the project and on its characteristics. Taking into account CubeSat’s intrinsic 
characteristics, equipment and subsystem levels are really close, and most of the times both of 
them are confused. 
Finally, during verification planning the standard requires that certain number of 
documents shall be released. This list is extremely long for a CubeSat project, and to write all 
of them will probably bureaucratise too much this type of projects. Hence, it has been 
modified the requested documents regarding verification, mainly combining them, and stating 
their required content to minimise the paperwork. It is worth to remember, that the efforts 
shall be pointed to test the system, using it so much in so many situations that every possible 
way it could fail is found and fixed, using each failure to improve reliability. Paperwork shall be 
conducted to plan verifications and report them, but never to risk to death the program due to 
the high amount of documents to be produced. 
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Figure 40: Adaptation of required documentation for verification process from standards for conventional space 
projects to CubeSats projects 
Space project documentation for a space project required in the standards can be 
gathered in three groups: planning, reporting and close-out. The high amount of required 
documents is obviously overdemanding for a CubeSat project, and hence, a simplification of 
required paperwork is proposed, as presented in Figure 40. 
In general terms, the proposed method for documentation simplification states to 
develop only three main documents, one for each activity of verification phase. It is important 
to not replicate information in the documents in order to avoid useless paperwork. A precise 
document structure and content has been defined to be applied to CubeSats projects. In 
particular, the contents of each of these documents should be: 
 AIV Plan: As described in Figure 40, this document includes the contents of four 
different documents detailed in the standard, avoiding duplicity of information and 
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reducing its content to the minimum required to correctly conduct manufacturing 
and verification phase. The document should be divided in three parts. In the first 
one, general information about the satellite, including model philosophy adopted 
for its design and verification approach shall be specified. Second, the detailed 
procedure for mechanically assembly and integration of components to obtain 
subsystems from equipment level, and system from subsystems assembly and 
integration, shall be specified. Integration steps shall include possible intermediate 
test to be conducted during assembly and integration (e.g., electrical continuity, 
bonding, etc.). Finally, verifications at system level shall be planned. For each test it 
shall be specified: a description of the facilities in which the test will be conducted, 
the test set-up, required ground support equipment and a step-by-step procedure 
(i.e., required steps to conduct test, expected results and cross-correlation with 
requirements). 
 Verification Report: this documents aims to gather the results of verification 
activities, to clearly state the requirements that have been verified, to specify 
verification close-out judgements and to describe any possible open issues remained 
after verification. For these reasons, the content can be tailored with respect to 
ECSS requirements, avoiding to repeat information already explained in the previous 
document (e.g. verification approach or model philosophy). 
 Verification Control Document: this is the only document that shall contain the same 
information required for a conventional space project. Particularly, it shall contain 
the verification matrix, where all requirements are stated, specifying the verification 
method, the level and stage at which they shall be verified, the correlation with the 
document at which the verification is described, and the close-out judgement in 
binary terms (i.e., verified/non-verified). 
7.2.2 CubeSat verifications at system level 
Normally, standards shall be adapted to be applied to each project and, thus, each 
verification activity and product must be assessed as to its applicability to a specific project. 
 7.2 ECSS standards tailoring for CubeSats verification 
115 
However, the standardisation achieved with the CubeSat standard definition allows us to state 
a set of required verifications, regarding functionality as well as launch and space environment 
survival, which should be conducted for all CubeSats projects. 
A study on the content of ECSS-E-ST-10-03C is conducted to assess the minimum required 
tests to be conducted in a CubeSat project at system level and especially to propose an 
optimised test schedule to obtain a time and cost effective verification phase. The 
abovementioned standard defines a system engineering approach with a description of 
required and optional tests, to be conducted at equipment and system level taking into 
account the model philosophy adopted for the project (i.e., protoflight or prototype 
approach). Moreover, different mandatory reviews to be conducted during testing process are 
specified. 
It is evident that CubeSats can be different at subsystem level. Even so, at system level 
they are very similar. In particular, due to CubeSats standardisation the form-factor as well as 
mechanical interfaces with deployer adaptor are the same. Moreover, the standard CubeSat 
has been thought in a way that any possible debris due to a damage on the satellite remains 
inside the CubeSat structure and CubeSat’s deployer, avoiding a damage to the primary 
payload and/or launcher. Hence, depending on different parameters like adopted model 
philosophy, launcher, orbit parameters, etc. different levels and durations of environmental 
tests can be applied. However, the same tests shall be conducted for all CubeSat projects in a 
certain step order. 
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Figure 41: Standards required and optional tests, and proposed verifications for CubeSats 
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Figure 41 shows the required (dark grey) and optional (light grey) tests for a space project 
designed following a protoflight approach at system level, and the proposed tests for CubeSats 
verification, considering also possible combinations for verification optimisation. Moreover, 
the verification methods for CubeSats verifications are detailed. It has been taken into account 
the protoflight approach because it is the one for which the standard envisages a wide number 
of tests. Note: the figure does not take into account required tests for space systems 
performing atmospheric entry nor for crewed missions. 
Tests foreseen in standard have been gathered and classified in four groups for CubeSats 
projects: required tests, optional tests, not applicable tests or change test for analysis method. 
The verifications that have been individuated to be conducted in a CubeSat project at system 
level are: 
Functional-oriented verification 
Verification method: mandatory test 
The functional verification shall be conducted by test. It aims at verifying functional 
requirements of the CubeSat. The test encompasses the functional, performance and polarity 
tests described in the standard. All of them can be conducted in one test for time and cost 
saving. In this test, all functionalities shall be tested, including all operative modes and 
transitions. 
Additionally to the previous activities, the electromagnetic auto-compatibility test can be 
conducted during the functional test. I.e., it is checked that no electromagnetic disturbances 
created by the CubeSat itself are observed on the spacecraft functionality. Moreover, micro-
vibration susceptibility tests, if applicable, can be conducted during the functional tests to 
evaluate the effect of potential sources to the component that is sensitive to micro-vibrations. 
Mission-oriented verification 
Verification method: mandatory test 
Mission-oriented verification shall be conducted by means of test (i.e., mission test). It 
aims at verify the ability of the satellite to perform the mission and to identify anomalies not 
discernible in any other test before launch. In this kind of test the test like you fly activities 
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applies. This concept means fly the mission on the ground, i.e., perform the test following the 
entire mission profile (timeline and sequences). The mission test shall simulate, within the 
constraints of what can be simulated on ground, the real conditions that the satellite will meet 
on orbit, excluding environmental conditions (i.e., temperature and pressure), which are 
addressed during environmental verifications. 
Optical alignment 
Verification method: optional test 
If CubeSat is equipped with optical components, a test shall be conducted to assess the 
correct alignment. 
Physical properties 
Verification method: mandatory test and analysis 
Three main physical properties shall be verified: mass, centre of gravity (CoG) and 
moment of inertia (MoI). CubeSat’s mass shall be verified by means of test using a precision 
scale. CoG and MoI shall be verified, at least, through analysis. 
Modal survey 
Verification method: mandatory analysis 
The search of frequencies and mode shapes shall be conducted, at least, by analysis. A 
detailed CAD model shall be used to analyse the previous mentioned magnitudes. A highly 
simplified CAD model could lead to an increase of real modal frequencies. 
Static 
Verification method: mandatory analysis 
In the same terms of modal survey, the verification that the satellite can cope with static 
loads can be conducted only by means of analysis. A correct analysis carried out with certified 
software is enough to verify the static loads requirement. 
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Random vibration 
Verification method: mandatory test 
Random vibration test is primarily used to test and to qualify the CubeSat parts: electronic 
boards, instruments, etc. Random vibration tests are used to qualify flight hardware because 
they closely imitate the real launch environment by simultaneously exciting multiple 
frequencies. Random vibration levels and durations shall be agreed with launch provider. 
Sinusoidal vibration 
Verification method: mandatory test 
Sinusoidal vibration test simulates the low-frequency sinusoidal dynamic loads. The 
sinusoidal tests are performed to verify the CubeSat structure dimensioning under the flight 
limit loads. Tests levels and durations shall be agreed with launch provider. 
Shock 
Verification method: mandatory analysis 
Some launch providers could require a shock test. However, the characteristics of CubeSat 
projects allow avoiding this test and verifying shock response by means of analysis. In 
particular, the small dimension of the satellite, the closure of all components in the internal 
part of the structure and the installation of the CubeSat inside the deployer for the launch 
allow to conduct a shock sensitivity assessment instead of shock test. 
Structural integrity 
Verification method: mandatory test 
Structural integrity tests include all verifications regarding pressurised vessels installed in 
the CubeSat. At the present, no CubeSats are equipped with this type of components because 
no pressurised vessels were allowed in accordance with CubeSat Design Specification (CDS) 
rev.12. However, the new revision of CDS (i.e., rev.13) allows the installation of this type of 
equipment. Hence, structural integrity tests shall be conducted if the pressurised vessel is 
installed in the satellite. 
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Thermal verifications 
Verification method: mandatory test 
Thermal verifications include four different activities: thermal-vacuum cycling test, 
thermal ambient cycling test, thermal balance test and bake-out test. In particular, thermal-
vacuum cycling test aims at verify the correct functionality of the satellite when subjected to 
space environment in terms of temperature and pressure; thermal ambient cycling test is 
devoted to verify the correct operations of the spacecraft under space environment in terms 
of temperature (when the satellite will operate under a non-vacuum environment during its 
entire life); thermal balance test is conducted to verify the correctness of thermal analysis; 
bake-out test is conducted when some CubeSat materials are not compliant with respect to 
outgassing requirements. In this last case, the satellite is subjected to relatively high 
temperature under vacuum to allow outgassing of materials. 
A combination of previous tests is proposed to reduce time and cost. First of all, thermal 
ambient test is not applicable due to the fact that the CubeSat will always operate under 
vacuum ambient. Hence, the thermal verification is a combination of the other three tests. In 
particular, during thermal-vacuum cycling tests, the maximum temperature reached during 
hot plateaux shall be maintained during certain duration to conduct a bake-out test. 
Furthermore, during the test, the characteristics on the temperature variation shall be 
correlated to the thermal model conducting, in this case, the thermal balance test during the 
first non-operational cycle. 
ElectroMagnetic Compatibility (EMC) 
Verification method: optional test 
EMC test objective is to verify that the satellite is designed to achieve electromagnetic 
compatibility of the spacecraft in the presence of external electromagnetic environment. 
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7.2.3 Verification sequence 
The verification process shall follow a precise sequence, as depicted in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42: Sequence for CubeSats verification at system level 
This sequence shall allow to verify the correct CubeSat functionality at ambient condition. 
Afterwards, environmental verification shall be conducted to assess that the CubeSat is able to 
survive launch and space environment. Moreover, the environmental tests shall be conducted 
in the precise sequence to be representative of life-cycle events. I.e., first of all launch takes 
place and then insertion into orbit. Hence, vibration tests shall be conducted before thermal-
vacuum cycling test. 
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7.3 Case Study: e-st@r-II CubeSat 
The previous proposed approach has been applied to e-st@r-II (Educational SaTellite at 
politecnico di toRino) CubeSat developed by the CubeSat Team at Politecnico di Torino within 
e-st@r program. 
7.3.1.1 E-st@r-II CubeSat 
E-st@r-II is a CubeSat developed as a follow-on of e-st@r-I, born with the same objective 
of testing on-orbit an active attitude determination and control subsystem. Generally 
speaking, the spacecraft architecture is identical to the first version of the satellite, 
represented in Figure 35. Due to the observed on-orbit failures of the first satellite, the post-
mission FMECA analysis (see section 6.5) suggested making some minor modifications both in 
the hardware and in the software of the new satellite. Hereafter, the main differences 
between e-st@r-I and e-st@r-II, divided by subsystem, are highlighted (from the structure and 
thermal control system point of view, no modifications have been applied). These differences 
have obviously conditioned the application of the previous method. The differences are: 
 Active ADCS: main changes with respect to e-st@r-I design are in the modes of 
operation of the payload rather than in the hardware configuration. In e-st@r-I the 
payload was activated autonomously on-board immediately after the CubeSat was 
released from the deployer, as also observed in the FMECA. This point was identified 
as one of the most critical once, because it could lead to a fast batteries depleting. In 
the new design, the payload is activated upon command from the ground control 
station, as detailed later on in section 7.3.1.4. To permit this new functionality, a 
circuit has been added in the printed circuit board (PCB), with respect to e-st@r-I 
ADCS PCB. Regarding the hardware, second minor modification regards the position 
of magnetorquers, which were placed internally on the structure in e-st@r-I. In the 
new satellite, to allow the reduction of internal complexity, they have been installed 
externally between structure and solar panels. 
 EPS: this subsystem has been individuated as one of the most critical of e-st@r-I 
CubeSat in the FMECA analysis. Hence, the difference states in the storage, 
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regulation and distribution hardware. In particular, the batteries and regulation unit 
have been substituted by COTS hardware from a commercial company with 
recognised space engineering background. 
 OBC: modifications and new operational modes have been applied, mainly related 
to new payload operations. These modifications applied to OBC software. 
 COMSYS: in the case of this subsystem, the difference states in the software. In the 
new CubeSat, this subsystem is aimed to detect autonomously faults and recover 
communications using stored software sequence and hardware reset. In particular, 
a beacon signal (self-generated by the COMSYS and modulated in CW) has been 
implemented if no data are provided by the OBC for 5 minutes. Concretely, the 
string “estar2” is transmitted in Morse code. In case of a request for RF cessation, 
CW transmission can be stopped using a specific command from GCS. This command 
also works in case of OBC failure because it is executed directly from the COMSYS. 
7.3.1.2 E-st@r-II mission architecture 
E-st@r-II mission architecture is composed by classical space missions’ elements, shown 
schematically in Figure 43. In particular: 
 Space segment: e-st@r-II, a 1U CubeSats (payload and bus). The platform includes 
all subsystems in support of payload operations (i.e. bus), and the payload, which is 
an active attitude determination and control subsystem. A detailed description of 
the CubeSat is given in section 6.5.2. 
 Ground segment: the ground segment of the e-st@r program (and hence, for the e-
st@r-II project) consists of two ground stations: the main Ground Control Station 
(GCS) is the ARI – section of Bra (Ham Radio Club) and the second is the Mobile 
Ground Control Station (MGCS) located at Politecnico di Torino that is transportable 
and may be transferred everywhere. ARI-Bra station is an existing radio amateur 
station that supplies all the elements needed to communicate with e-st@r-II 
satellite: it is able to send commands to the satellite and to receive the telemetry 
packets. Other stations around the world (radio amateur network) may receive the 
CubeSat signal, but not command it. 
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 Launch segment: piggy-back launch is envisaged, but at the moment it is not yet 
defined. 
 Subject: data measurement. Payload essentially senses the LEO environment, in 
terms of magnetic field. Data from magnetometer are used for his attitude 
determination task. Moreover, the satellite shall provide a large quantity of data 
about this orientation and angular velocities. These data will be subject of analysis 
on ground to verify the determination and control algorithms. Other telemetry data 
(i.e. temperatures, battery state of charge, on-board computer status, and 
communication system status) will be collected and analysed on ground to verify the 
proper functioning of COTS components, self-made hardware and software. 
 Orbit: injection into LEO is foreseen, but at the moment the orbital elements are 
unknown. 
 Operations: students at main and backup GCSs. Data processing at Systems and 
Technologies for Aerospace Research Laboratory (STARLab) for deeper investigation, 
or in case of emergency. Radio-amateur network and CubeSat Community will be 
involved in the data collection and will support the mission operations. 
 Communications: telemetry data are sent by the CubeSat to the main GCS and to 
other stations all over the world. Data are coded in a defined protocol and 
transmitted to ground. The uplink commands are received on-board and relayed to 
other subsystems (mainly the OBC) according to a defined protocol. The downlink 
protocol is public in order to reach the largest quantity of ground stations and 
gather most data as possible. Uplink protocol instead, is not published and 
encrypted with secure code to avoid unauthorised commands from being 
transmitted and accepted by the satellite. 
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Figure 43: e-st@r-II mission architecture 
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7.3.1.3 E-st@r-II mission phases 
A precise mission profile has been defined for the e-st@r-II mission. The mission phases 
are depicted in Table 9, which includes only orbit lifetime. 
Table 9: e-st@r-II mission profile 
Phase/Event Duration Description 
Launch T0 T0 is the actual lift-off time of the launch vehicle 
CubeSat release and 
activation 
T1 T1 is given by the burnout time necessary to reach 
the orbit plus the time needed to be ejected from 
the deployer. The CubeSat is instantaneously 
activated by the DS and enters the first mission 
phase in orbit 
CubeSat appendages 
deployment 
T2 T2 is given by the time delay imposed by CDS (30 
min + margin) plus the time needed to deploy the 
antenna (approximately 1 minute) 
Commissioning T3 T3 is the time needed to prepare and check out the 
CubeSat for nominal operations. T3 ranges from a 
minimum of 10 minutes to several days, depending 
on commissioning activity result 
Begin of mission T4 T4 is the time at which the nominal mission begins 
officially 
End of mission T5 T5 = 1 (TBC)-to-12 (TBC) months after T4. Extended 
duration shall be considered. 
Disposal of CubeSat T6 T6 is the time needed for the orbit to decay after 
the mission has been declared finished (after which 
the CubeSat will burn in the upper layer of Earth’s 
atmosphere). 
7.3.1.4 E-st@r-II operational modes 
Different operational modes have been implemented to allow the CubeSat to accomplish 
its mission. They depend upon the mission phase and operational needs. They have been 
derived from the applicable requirements and the mission phases. In particular, potential 
failures and malfunctions have been considered. Moreover, transitions between modes of 
operation have been implemented, and it can be either automatic or commanded from 
ground, as depicted in Figure 44. 
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Figure 44: e-st@r-II modes of operations and transitions 
 
The operative modes that have been designed and implemented are described in Table 
10, which reports also the associated mission phases. In case some failures occur, the satellite 
can operate in degraded modes. 
Table 10: e-st@r-II operational modes 
Mode Mission phase Description 
Dormant Launch and 
CubeSat release 
The CubeSat is “dormant”, no RF emissions, no power 
consumption. All the subsystems are turned off 
Activation CubeSat 
appendage 
deployment 
The CubeSat is activated by the DS. EPS is active. 
ADCS is in Mode 0: no component is active. The OBC 
starts booting and remains in a stand-by mode until 
all necessary checks are passed. Then the antenna is 
deployed. This mode is irreversible and cannot be 
repeated after the antenna deployment 
Basic Mission Commissioning 
Nominal mission 
The CubeSat sends telemetry packets to ground every 
120 seconds. It may receive commands from main 
GCS and execute them 
Full Mission A Nominal mission The payload is activated. It performs the angular 
velocity damping using magnetometers and magnetic 
actuators (i.e. detumbling) 
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Full Mission B Nominal mission The payload is active and attitude determination is 
conducted. Gyroscopes measurements are used 
together with the magnetometer ones to estimate 
the attitude with an Multiplicative Extended Kalman 
Filter 
Fail Safe Commissioning 
Nominal mission 
This is an off-nominal operative mode, and it is used 
in case communication between OBC and COMSYS 
fails. In this case, COMSYS autonomously sends 
Morse code (CW) every 5 minutes 
Save Energy Commissioning 
Nominal mission 
End-of-life 
This is an off-nominal operative mode, and it is used 
in case low power is detected on-board. The CubeSat 
only carries out vital functions at minimum power 
consumption upon command from ground. 
Communication to Earth is stopped. Payload is 
deactivated 
Silent Commissioning 
Nominal mission 
End-of-life 
In this mode communication to Earth is stopped. This 
mode is used in case a shutdown command is sent to 
the CubeSat upon request of ITU 
 
 
Figure 45 shows the diagram of the mission phases and the relative modes of operation of 
the satellite during each phase. 
 
Figure 45: e-st@r-II mission phases and operational modes 
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7.3.1.5 Fly-Your-Satellite! Program 
E-st@r-II project was selected as one of the six CubeSats to participate in the Phase 1 of 
the Fly Your Satellite! (FYS!) Programme launched by ESA Education Office at beginning 2013. 
The ‘Fly Your Satellite!’ programme is an exciting initiative from the Education and Knowledge 
Management Office of the European Space Agency focused on CubeSat projects run by 
university students. The programme is one of the several hands-on opportunities offered by 
ESA Education and provides experience of the full lifecycle of a space project. ESA provides the 
CubeSat teams with direct support from ESA technical specialists and access to state-of-the-art 
environmental test facilities. ESA will also procure a launch opportunity for selected CubeSats. 
E-st@r-II successfully completed the first phase after the Technical Requirements Review 
in October 2013. At the date of the present thesis edition, the CubeSat is one of the three 
CubeSats that completed the development and functional testing in ambient conditions during 
the Phase 2, and it will be subjected to environmental test campaign scheduled for beginning 
2015 at European Space Research and Technology Centre (ESTEC) facilities. Functional and 
environmental verifications has been and will be conducted following verification planning 
developed within the present PhD in accordance with methodology detailed above. The 
precise verification planning is detailed in the next section. 
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7.3.2 Assembly, Integration and Verification of e-st@r-II 
E-st@r-II AI&V activities have been planned and executed following the studied method 
detailed in the previous section. The detailed information on how to conduct these three 
activities are gathered in the e-st@r-II AIV document composed by the information detailed in 
section 7.2.1. In particular, the document encompasses the assembly and integration plan of 
the satellite, divided in two main steps (i.e. preliminary integration and final assembly and 
integration) that includes the verifications to be conducted at component/subsystem level; 
followed by a specific section that includes verification plan for verifications at system level 
(i.e. functional and mission tests at ambient conditions, and environmental tests). 
7.3.2.1 Assembly and Integration plan 
As already introduced before, the A&I plan is organised in three sections, as shown in 
Figure 46. The first one includes the preliminary integration of the satellite in order to obtain 
the subsystems. In the second section the mechanical and electrical assembly and integration 
of subsystems is conducted. At the end, final assembly and integration of structure and solar 
panels is carried out. Moreover, two tests are foreseen (which will be explained in the 
verification plan section): in-process test and Integrated System Test (IST). The steps of second 
and third activities are detailed in Figure 47. 
 
 
Figure 46: Assembly and Integration sequence of activities 
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Figure 47: Assembly and Integration sequence 
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The preliminary integration consists on the mechanically and electrically integration of the 
three components: 1) SD card on the OBC board, 2) PIC-16 microcontroller on the COMSYS 
board, and 3) ARM-9 microcontroller on ADCS board. A functional test is conducted on each 
board after integrations to assess the correctness of the conducted activity. 
The mechanical and electrical assembly and integration of subsystems is the main activity 
from which the CubeSat flight model is obtained. Starting from bottom plate, each subsystem 
is assembled and integrated following the established procedure (excluding structure and solar 
panels for further verifications to be conducted with in-process test). Between each step, 
different checks are conducted to assure that the assembly and integration has been 
conducted correctly. In particular: 
 Mechanical checks: mainly three verifications are conducted. First, physical 
alignment measurement by means of calliper and ruler is carried out to verify the 
correctness of the mechanical assembly. Then, the mass of each assembled part is 
measured through precise scale to verify that the parameter is within the 
requirement. During structure assembly, applied torque to screws is measured 
and evaluated to assess that the correct torque has been applied. 
 Electrical checks: these checks mainly consist in three tests. First, a point-to-point 
continuity test is conducted to verify that electrical paths are established between 
two identified points (i.e. the identified path conducts electricity as expected). 
Voltage and signals values are then measured. With these two tests it is intended 
to verify the correct voltage values in the identified points (e.g. regulated bus, 
microcontroller input voltage, etc.) and signal values (e.g. COMSYS PIC-16 
microprocessor signals). 
Before the final integration of solar panels and structure, an in-process test based on 
hardware-in-the-loop technique is performed to demonstrate the correct behaviour of the 
satellite focusing on the good functionality of the payload. 
In the final assembly and integration the solar panels are connected to EPS board and the 
assembly of the structure is conducted. An Integrated System Test (IST) was envisaged to be 
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conducted after the assembly and integration to verify that the previous activities were 
correctly performed. 
7.3.2.2 Verifications planning 
The verification plan encompasses different functional tests and environmental tests, as 
observed in Figure 48, where steps in sequential way are represented and linked to required 
documentation to execute the verification activities. 
 
Figure 48: e-st@r-II verification activities and required documentation 
The AIV plan is constituted by five different parts. In particular, two of them regard 
functional verification while three concern environmental verification. In test plans a general 
description of test activities (i.e., BFT, FFT and MT for functional verification, and TVC and 
vibration tests for environmental verification) are detailed. In Test specification and procedure 
technical information are explained. In particular, the requirements to be verified (around 300 
for the e-st@r-II project), test facilities, set-up and tools, pass/fail criteria, step-by-step 
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procedure as well as documentation to be produced after the verification execution. The 
foreseen functional verifications are the following: 
 Basic Functional Test: it aims at verifying the requirements against the basic 
functionalities needed to conduct the basic mission (i.e., no activation of the 
payload). 
 Full Functional Test: it aims at verifying all the requirements, including those related 
to the payload. A tailored FFT is expected to be conducted during TVC test at hot 
and cold temperatures. 
 Mission Test: it aims at verifying the ability of the satellite to perform the mission 
and to identify anomalies not discernible in any other test before launch. In this kind 
of test the test like you fly activities applies. In this case, the test execution shall last 
a minimum of one week. Due to this fact that it is intended to simulate the mission, 
the CubeSat shall be maintained active for the whole duration of the test. Hence, 
due to the lack of solar simulator at Politecnico di Torino, the solar panels are 
simulated by means of programmable power supplier. 
An analysis of the requirements leads to the definition of two different environmental 
tests to be conducted at system level: 
 Vibration Tests: sinusoidal and random vibration tests 
 TVC Test: outgassing data was not available for some parts of the satellite. Hence, 
bake-out test were required to be conducted. ESA specialists accepted the proposal 
of conducting the bake-out during thermal-vacuum cycling test. The hot plateaux 
are held for a total of 140 hours to assure a good confidence that the materials will 
not outgas during launch. 
Regarding verification management, during verification process two main reviews has 
been conducted with ESA specialists. In particular: 
 Test Readiness Review: during this review, the Team demonstrated to ESA 
specialists the correctness of the functional verification planning and the readiness 
of the CubeSat flight model to be subjected to functional tests. 
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 Shipment Readiness Review: the SRRe has been conducted between the Team and 
ESA specialists, during which the correctness of environmental verification planning 
and the readiness of the CubeSat have been demonstrated. ESA representatives 
released the authorisation to proceed with environmental verification campaign at 
ESA/ESTEC facilities. 
Functional Verifications 
The objective of the test campaign is to verify, under ambient conditions, that the 
CubeSat performs the operations for which it has been designed. In particular, the functional 
verification campaign is aimed at demonstrating that the spacecraft accomplishes all the 
expected functions and is able to accomplish the designed mission. 
The test planning begins with the identification of the functional requirements that the 
CubeSat shall satisfy and hence the functions to be executed. These requirements are stated in 
the verification matrix. The test activities consist, as previously introduced, of a Functional 
Tests (FTs) and Mission Test (MT). Moreover, during FTs some requirements are verified by 
means of direct measurement of the parameter by means of GSE (e.g. battery voltages). 
Specifically, functional tests verify the system versus the requirements, which specify the 
expected values to be obtained during the tests. In the other hand, mission test verifies the 
system against the mission, keeping in mind the mission profile. A diagram of the context for 
the functional tests and mission test is shown in Figure 49. 
 
Figure 49: Context for the functional tests and mission test 
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Along with this information, the pass-fail criteria for each requirement has been stated 
together with the mapping matrix, where the correlations between each requirement and step 
of the procedure in which it is verified are stated. In Table 11 and Table 12 pass-fail criteria and 
mapping matrix for full functional test are reported as an example of the previous explained 
activities. These activities have been also conducted for all other verifications (Basic Functional 
Test and Mission Test). However, in order to allow a smooth read of the thesis, only full 
functional test has been stated as an example. 
Table 11: Full Functional Test pass-fail criteria 
Functions to be verified Action Pass/Fail Criteria (summary) Requirem
ents 
verified 
Satellite dormant mode Direct 
measuremen
t 
Power line, 3.3V, 5V and battery bus 
are deactivated by the DS.  
SSR.05 
OPS.07_0
2 
Satellite activation Direct 
measuremen
t 
The power line is activated by the DS 
release and Voltage on H2 36 is equal 
to battery state of charge (with 
margin) 
3.3V, 5V and battery bus are activated 
by the DS. 
SSR-EPS-
INT.01 
SSR-EPS-
INT.02 
Antenna deployment Visual 
inspection 
Antenna is deployed after 30 min OPS.07_0
2 
OPS.04 
Basic Mode correct 
execution 
Data analysis The first telemetry is received after 30 
min from DS release. 
Telemetry packets are received on GCS 
and data are consistent with basic 
mode of operation. 
Packets are received any 120 +/- 15 
sec, and include the expected 
information in the correct format 
ADCS status = 0 
Subsystems communicate via e-st@r-II 
bus 
Downlink is established in the correct 
frequency 
OPS.05 
SSR-F.05 
SSR-F.10 
SSR-
F.10_03 
SSR-OBC-
F.01 
SSR-OBC-
F.01_04 
SSR-OBC-
F.05 
SSR-COM-
F.02 
SSR-COM-
D.06 
OPS.07_0
3 
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Full Mission A mode 
correct execution 
Data analysis The command to switch to Full A is 
executed. 
Telemetry show that the IMU is active 
ADCS status = 1 
OPS.07 
SSR-OBC-
F.01_10 
OPS.07_0
4 
SSR-F.03 
Commands execution in 
Full Mission A 
The satellite is able to 
receive signal from 
ground,  
the OBC is able to 
manage commands, 
COMSYS is able to 
receive and demodulate 
commands on the 
designed frequency.  
GCS is able to send UHF 
signals and the GUI 
allows to send 
commands to the 
spacecraft 
Data analysis Commands are correctly sent to the 
spacecraft and the spacecraft returns 
the transponder. 
Telemetry data show the changes 
according to the commanded values 
OBC and ADCS dataflow show the 
changes according to the commanded 
values 
 
SSR-F.05 
SSR-
F.10_03 
SSR-OBC-
F.01 
SSR-COM-
F.01 
SSR-COM-
F.07 
SSR-COM-
F.16 
SSR-COM-
D.06 
GSR-HW-
F.01 
GSR-SW-
GUI.05 
Transition from Full 
Mission A to Full 
Mission B - Mode 
Data analysis The command to switch to Full B is 
executed. 
Telemetry shows that the IMU and 
magnetorquers are active. 
ADCS status = 2 
OPS.07 
SSR-OBC-
F.01_10 
OPS.07_0
4 
SSR-F.04 
Commands execution in 
Full Mission B 
The satellite is able to 
receive signal from 
ground,  
the OBC is able to 
manage commands, 
COMSYS is able to 
receive and demodulate 
commands on the 
designed frequency.  
GCS is able to send UHF 
signals and the GUI 
allows to send 
commands to the 
Data analysis Commands are correctly sent to the 
spacecraft and the spacecraft returns 
the transponder. 
Telemetry data show the changes 
according to the commanded values 
OBC and ADCS dataflow show the 
changes according to the commanded 
values 
 
SSR-F.05 
SSR-
F.10_03 
SSR-OBC-
F.01 
SSR-COM-
F.01 
SSR-COM-
F.07 
SSR-COM-
F.16 
SSR-COM-
D.06 
GSR-HW-
F.01 
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spacecraft GSR-SW-
GUI.05 
 
Transition from Full 
Mission A to Save 
Energy Mode 
Data analysis The command to switch to Save Energy 
is executed. No RF signal on GCS 
No ADCS task is executed on ADCS 
interface  
OBC task are suspended in the OBC 
interface PC 
OPS.07 
SSR-OBC-
F.01_10 
OPS.07_0
6 
 
Transition from Basic 
Mode to Save Energy 
Mode 
Transition from Full 
Mission B to Save 
Energy Mode 
Transition from Full 
Mission A to Silent 
Mode 
Data analysis The command to switch to Silent mode 
is executed. No RF signal on GCS 
OPS.07 
SSR-OBC-
F.01_10 
OPS.03 
GSR-SW-
GUI.05_07 
GSR-SW-
GUI.05_11 
Transition from Basic to 
Silent Mode 
Transition from Full 
Mission B to Silent 
Mode 
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Table 12: Full Functional Test mapping matrix 
ID Requirement Step 
OPS.04 The CubeSat shall be designed to deploy booms, antennas, and solar 
panels at least after a minimum of 30 minutes after the CubeSat's 
deployment switch(es) are activated from CubeSat Deployer ejection 
920 
OPS.05 The Cub Sat shall b  designed to wait a minimum of 30 minutes after 
the CubeSat's deployment switch(es) are activated from CubeSat 
Deployer ejection to execute RF transmissions more powerful than 1 
mW 
1100 
OPS.07_02 An activation mode shall be implemented: the CubeSat shall be 
activated immediately after the release from the P-POD 
1100 
OPS.07 Different operative modes shall be implemented to control different 
mission phases and conditions (both nominal and off-normal) 
1400 
2250 
2500 
GSR-SW-
GUI.05_01 
Command to switch to different operative modes shall be 
implemented: basic, full, silent  and save energy 
3890 
SSR-OBC-
F.01_10 
The OBC shall allow for operative mode switching 3890 
OPS.07_04 A full mission mode shall be implemented: the CubeSat shall be able to 
point Earth, communicate with GCSs, and accomplish slew 
manoeuvres, if commanded to 
1380 
2720 
SSR-F.03 The CubeSat shall be able to determine its attitude 1400 
SSR-F.04 The CubeSat shall be able to control its attitude 2750 
GSR-SW-
GUI.05_08 
Command to manoeuvre the satellite shall be implemented 2750 
OPS.07_06 A save energy mode shall be implemented: the CubeSat shall carry out 
only vital functions at minimum power consumption upon command 
from ground. Communication to Earth is limited to some extent and 
eventually it can be totally stopped. This mode can also be used in case 
a shutdown command is sent to the CubeSat upon request of FCC. 
2250 
2500 
3500 
OPS.03 CubeSat shall be designed to accept a shutdown command, as per 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation 
2140 
3380 
OPS.07_07 A Silent Mode shall be implemented: CubeSat shall be able to stop any 
RF signal if commanded to 
2140 
2380 
3380 
GSR-SW-
GUI.05_07 
Command to shut down the satellite shall be implemented 2140 
2380 
3380 
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The full Functional Test sequence is depicted in Figure 50. 
 
Figure 50: Full Functional Test sequence 
The test set-up, sequence and step-by-step procedure are then stated. In particular, the 
test set-up for full functional test states as follows: The test will be performed during daytime, 
with the satellite fully integrated. The status of the satellite before the beginning of the test, 
and during the preparation, shall be inactive. GSE shall be set up in the designated area of the 
laboratory. MGCS software shall be initialized, and the MGCS shall be ready to receive the 
communication from the satellite with the radio frequency set to 437.485 MHz. TNC shall be 
set on 1200bps data rate. A backup of the GCS files from the previous communications shall be 
saved prior to the deletion of the files in the GCS log. The necessary connections with GSE shall 
be made with the satellite inactive. 
A part of the step-by-step procedure for the Full Functional Test is shown in Table 13. 
  
START
Remove RBF
Release DS
Activation mode
Antenna 
deployed?
Wait for the antenna 
deployment
Send the command 
STOP REBURN
Wait transponder 
and telemetry 
packets
Test commands in 
Full A mode
YES
NO
Full Mission A
Basic Mode
Silent
Full Mission A Save Energy
Basic
Full Mission A
Full Mission B
Test commands in 
Full B mode
Silent Full Mission B
Save Energy
Basic
Full Mission B
Full Mission A
Full Mission A Basic
Battery Bus
 > 7.4V? 
YES
NO
Send the command
DOWNLOAD 
TELEMETRY
END
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Table 13: Full Functional Test (partial) step-by-step procedure 
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Environmental Verifications 
The environmental verifications at system level consists on evaluating through test and 
analysis the capability of the CubeSat to withstand launch and space environment in terms of 
mechanical loads, temperature and pressure. The environmental verification plan foresees the 
verification of the static loads and natural frequencies by means of analysis conducted with 
Catia and Patran/Nastran tools. The verification plan envisage to verify the vibration and 
thermal-vacuum requirements by means of test. Following the defined method explained in 
the present chapter, the specifications and procedure for these tests have been stated. The 
tests will be conducted at ESA/ESTEC facilities under the supervision of ESA experts. The tests 
execution will follow the same order in which the satellite will encounter during the launch, i.e. 
first vibrations and then thermal-vacuum. The environmental verification plan has been 
detailed in the same way as the functional verification plan has been detailed. The verification 
matrix has been considered as the starting point from which all the requirements for 
environmental verification have been extracted. They have been classified based on the 
verification at which they have to be verified (analysis, vibration test, TVC test). The pass/fail 
criteria has been stated for each of them and the step-by-step procedure for each test have 
been established. Finally, the verification plan envisages the execution of functional tests 
before and after each environmental test (called Reduced Functional Tests – RFT) as well as 
different functional test during hot and cold plateaux of the TVC test (called TVC Functional 
Test – TFT). A flow-chart that depicts the environmental tests campaign activities is presented 
in Figure 51. 
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Figure 51: Environmental tests campaign activities flow-chart 
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The vibration tests encompass two type of vibrations: sinusoidal and random. The former 
is aimed at verifying the structure dimensioning under the flight limit loads while the latter, 
which substitutes acoustic vibrations test for spacecraft of reduced mass, is used to qualify 
flight hardware because it closely imitates the real launch environment by simultaneously 
exciting multiple frequencies. The step-by-step procedure foresees the insertion of the 
satellite in a test-deployer that will be installed on the electrodynamic shaker. In order to 
speed-up the test execution both vibration tests will be combined; i.e. instead of conduct first 
sinusoidal vibrations and then random vibrations, the excitation will be executed to X axis for 
both vibration types, then Y axis and then Z axis. The vibration levels have been established by 
ESA specialist based on previous experience on CubeSats launch and will be controlled on the 
satellite by means of accelerometers that will be installed on the satellite for this purpose and 
will be removed after the test. 
As far as thermal-vacuum tests concerns, it has been envisaged to conduct, not only TVC 
test, but also bake-out test, as introduced above, due to the lack of information regarding 
some materials outgassing values. The need to conduct bake-out test represents a drawback 
for the Team, mainly because it implies a cost increase that the CubeSat Team cannot afford. 
Hence, it has been proposed, as already stated in the good practices for CubeSats 
development, to conduct the bake-out test during TVC test. This has been accepted by ESA 
specialists. Then, the TVC test will consist in four cycles of hot/cold temperatures under 
vacuum condition; and the hot temperature will be maintained for longer time to conduct 
bake-out test, as shown in Figure 52. 
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Figure 52: TVC test sequence 
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Going in-depth on the test description, during the first cycle the satellite will be non-
operational, while the functionalities will be tested at hot and cold plateaux in the other three 
cycles. Moreover, a full discharge/charge cycle of the batteries at hot and cold plateaux will be 
conducted to assess the influence of temperature on undervoltage threshold protection. To 
conduct this test, four thermocouples have been installed on the satellite. The temperature 
limits have been established after a thermal analysis and also based on the components 
temperature ranges (operative and non-operative). Finally, a special ground support 
equipment (GSE) has been developed in order to control the activation of the satellite because 
the actual design does not allow to activate/deactivate the satellite by means of electrical 
connection. Hence, it has been installed a relay in parallel to the deployment switch from 
which the activation of the satellite is controlled. This equipment will be removed, after the 
verification execution. Moreover, the MGCS will be installed outside the TV chamber in order 
to communicate with the satellite. Finally, a set of voltmeters will be used to measure the 
batteries voltages. The connections will be conducted by means of one interface port (sub-D-
25 connector) present on the facility. A schematics of the TVC test set-up is presented in Figure 
53. 
 
Figure 53: TVC test set-up schematics 
As introduced above, a set of functional tests are foreseen to be conducted during the 
TVC test. Each RFT is identical with respect to tested command. The differences lay on the 
status of the SD card, where data is stored, before and after the test because could be needed 
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for future tests to leave the card full or empty. Iin particular, RFT/A and TFT will be performed 
during the TVC test. Concretely, the RFT/A will be conducted after insertion of the satellite in 
the TV chamber (and the TV chamber closure) at ambient temperature and pressure. This test 
is foreseen to assure the correct installation of the satellite inside the TV chamber. As already 
foreseen for the RFT/A, the SD card will be completely erased after the test in order to allow to 
test the antenna deployment system during the first TFT. Hence, the RFT/A will be conducted 
with the antenna folded. Then, the satellite will be switched-on again in the cold plateaux 
where TFT will be carried out. In this first test, the antenna deployment system will be tested. 
Then, TFT are envisaged in the other moments of the TVC test where the antenna deployment 
will not take place again. Finally, during the increase and decrease of temperature in the 
fourth cycle the satellite will remain switched-on and a TFT will be conducted. 
7.3.2.3 Verification execution 
Functional verifications have been conducted in the STARLab of the Politecnico di Torino. 
In Figure 54 a picture of e-st@r-II during Mission Test at STARLab is reported. The Laboratory 
constitutes the main facility where the CubeSat Team design and develop their projects. 
 
Figure 54: e-st@r-II Mission Test at STARLab 
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The basic functional test has been carried out without errors, showing that the satellite is 
able to perform properly and contemporaneously basic functions and tasks as well as the on-
orbit operations. Telemetry data contained in the packets are not corrupted as well as the 
commands are properly sent by the mobile ground control station (MGCS) and executed by 
the satellite.  
A large number of requirements have been verified within a single run demonstrating the 
capabilities both of the satellite (except for ADCS) and of the MGCS hardware and software 
involved in this test. The ADCS functions and related capabilities are not verified because only 
the basic mode of operations has been considered in this test. It also means that no transitions 
between modes of operations have been tested. Moreover, the commands that foresee the 
involvement of this subsystem have not been taken into account. In conclusion, the BFT has 
been a complete success because all the basic functionalities of the satellite are verified and 
no relevant failures occurred. No open issues remain at the end of the test. 
The full functional test has been correctly conducted and all requirements were met. The 
verifications close-out were detailed in the verification reports and the verification matrix were 
filled with the reference of the documents were each requirement verification is reported. A 
partial verification matrix is shown in Table 14. 
It has been shown that the satellite is able to perform properly and contemporaneously 
all functions and tasks as well as the on-orbit operations. Moreover it is able to transit from a 
mode of operation to another and to work properly in any mode of operation. During the test, 
the transition from and to Fail Safe Mode (i.e., mode in which communication between OBC 
and COMSYS fails) were not tested because it was not possible to perform a failure injection in 
the communication between both subsystems. A minor anomaly came up: the transponder 
signal (i.e., automatic transmission from the CubeSat that confirms the validation of the 
received telecommand) for the transition from Silent Mode (i.e., downlink communication is 
stopped) and Full Mission B Mode (i.e., all subsystems switched-on and ADCS performing 
attitude control) has not been received by the MGCS. Anyhow, the command was correctly 
validated and executed on board by the OBC even if the transponder were not sent. The 
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rationale that justifies this fault states in the contemporary occurrence of transponder and 
telemetry packet transmission where only the later were performed by the COMSYS. 
Table 14: e-st@r-II verification matrix (partial) 
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As far as mission test regards, it has been carried out without relevant observed faults, 
showing that the satellite is able to perform properly the designed basic, full and off-nominal 
on-orbit operations. The foreseen mission profile has been conducted with success: telemetry 
packets did not report corrupted values, telemetry data always remained within the expected 
ranges for the proposed mission profile, and the required commands were executed by the 
satellite without misbehaviour. Two minor faults have been observed: first of all, two OBC 
software reboots occurred during the test; this is a non-nominal behaviour that actually is 
negligible and does not impact the on-orbit mission. Secondly, after the transmission of the 
command to activate the payload, the first received telemetry packet does not show the 
correct ADCS values: from previous tests it has been verified that usually ADCS telemetry 
updates on the second/third packet after command execution. This behaviour is typical of the 
nominal ADCS-OBC software communication and operation, and it does not represent and 
issue at the end. 
The results of the functional tests clearly show the verification of all functional 
requirements and demonstrated the ability of the satellite to conduct the designed mission, 
increasing its reliability. Moreover, key-issues have been identified being highly useful for 
future real on-orbit operations. In particular, unexpected errors on received telemetry have 
been identified and they will be taken into account for the on-orbit operations planning and 
execution. 
At the time where this PhD thesis has been written, only quasi-static loads and natural 
frequencies analysis has been conducted from the all envisaged environmental verifications 
due to some delays mainly on the availability of test facilities at ESA/ESTEC and delays on the 
first phase of the project (i.e. functional verifications at ambient condition). The environmental 
tests are envisaged to be conducted during the first quarter of 2015 but no exact date has 
been already established. The results of the mechanical analysis shows that the satellite is able 
to withstand the quasi-static loads, identifying a sufficient margin of safety (i.e. 2.15). 
Moreover, the modal analysis individuated the first natural mode of vibration at 210 Hz 
approx.. which is higher than the requirement of a minimum natural frequency of 120 Hz. 
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MISSION-ORIENTED RELIABILITY 
One way to overcome the relative reduced CubeSats reliability is to focus the attention to 
mission objectives and mission reliability. The proposed approach is based on the fault 
tolerance techniques. In the origin of reliability, these techniques were applied to outdo the 
relative low reliability of systems components. Indeed, redundancies at subsystem level were 
applied to increase the reliability of the whole system without improving components. 
Increasing reliability at system level by only means of applying fault prevention and 
removal techniques could lead to a boost on project cost. The design complexity and time-
consuming (and hence costly) verification activities can be prohibitive for most of CubeSat 
projects. A good compromise between cost and reliability is to partially increase this 
dependability attributes at system level and partially at mission level, to achieve a good 
confidence that mission success will be reached. The former point has been addressed in the 
previous two sections. The latter is evaluated in this section. Different ways to achieve desired 
reliability at mission level that could assure the accomplishment of mission objectives are 
stated in the present chapter. 
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8.1 Space segment architecture 
The reliability of the mission depends on reliability of different mission architecture 
elements (mainly satellite but also launcher, ground segment, mission operations, etc.). 
Selection of appropriate launcher is driven, not only by technical requirements, but also 
political and economic aspects are taken into account. Anyway, it is not possible, from the 
mission point of view, to act on the reliability on the launch element and ground segment. 
Hence, it has been assumed that activities on ground segment are conducted perfectly and the 
launcher operates properly inserting satellite(s) in the desired orbit(s). Therefore, it has been 
only taken into account satellite(s) reliability as main parameter of mission reliability. 
The idea proposed is to achieve acceptable mission reliability by implementing different 
mission architectures. Traditionally, most of unmanned space missions have been conducted 
by monolithic multi-objective conventional satellites, as detailed in chapter 2. New mission 
architectures are being developed as a complement of classical missions or to achieve mission 
objectives at lower cost. For example, a constellation of CubeSats for Earth observation could 
maximise coverage with respect to a monolithic architecture. 
8.1.1 Swarm-like constellation 
Swarm-like constellation is studied as a solution to increment reliability at mission level. 
The study foresees the deployment of a swarm-like constellation formed by different number 
of CubeSats. The reliability of the mission as dependable of each satellite is evaluated and 
compared with reliability of monolithic architecture composed by a conventional satellite. It is 
also considered the effect of losing some satellites in the constellation. 
The like-swarm constellation can be modelled as a parallel system of identical CubeSats, 
as depicted in Figure 55. 
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Figure 55: Swarm-like constellation block diagram as parallel system of identical CubeSats 
All CubeSats in the constellation are assumed to be identical, as stated above, and have 
independent life distributions. Moreover, the state of the CubeSats are considered binary i.e., 
operational or non-operational. In this case, the reliability of the system (i.e. swarm-like 
constellation of CubeSats) is the probability that any one satellite is operational. In particular, 
the reliability of the system is: 
 
𝑅 = 1 − (1 − 𝑝)𝑛 (8.1) 
 
Where p is the probability that a satellite is operational. 
However, for the present study it is not necessary true that only one operational 
CubeSat is enough to accomplish the mission. Then, it is necessary to evaluate the 
reliability of the system as the probability that k CubeSats are operational. Generally 
speaking, these types of systems are known as k-out-of-n systems. In this case, the 
system (i.e. the constellation) fails when k+1 components (i.e. CubeSats) fail. 
For these systems, taking into account again that all units have identical and 
independent life distributions and the probability that a unit is functioning is p, then 
the probability of having exactly k functioning units out of n is: 
 
𝑃(𝑘;𝑛,𝑝) = (
𝑛
𝑘
) 𝑝𝑘(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑘           𝑘 = 0,1, … , 𝑛 (8.2) 
 
The system is functioning properly if k or k+1 or … or n-1 or n units are 
functioning. Therefore, the reliability of the system is: 
 
𝑅(𝑘;𝑛,𝑝) = ∑ (
𝑛
𝑟
) 𝑝𝑟(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑟
𝑛
𝑟=𝑘
 (8.3) 
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8.2 Swarm-like constellation vs. monolithic architectures 
The comparison between these two architectures is conducted in terms of reliability and 
mean-time-to-failure. The observed reliability of conventional satellites is obtained from 
literature, as specified in section 4.5. The first step is to assess the reliability of the swarm-like 
constellation for different values of k. The first objective is to identify the value of k for which 
the reliability of the constellation after two years (as a reference mission time) is similar to the 
reliability of a mission conducted with a monolithic conventional satellite. 
In chapter 4.4.2 it has been demonstrated that the observed CubeSats reliability follows 
Weibull distribution. The reliability expression as well as two Weibull parameters for CubeSats 
and all-satellites are: 
Table 15: Reliability expression for Weibull distribution and parameters for CubeSats and all-satellites 
Reliability expression for Weibull distribution 
𝑹 = 𝒆−(
𝒕
𝜽⁄ )
𝜸
 
 Shape parameter γ 
[dimensionless] 
Characteristics life θ [years] 
CubeSats 0.2853 6619.4 
All-satellites 0.3875 8316 
Substituting the both shape parameter and characteristic life for all-satellites in the 
reliability expression for Weibull distribution, for t=2 years, the reliability of R=0.9612. To 
calculate the value of k, a constellation of 20 CubeSats is assumed (i.e., m=20). A MatLab® 
script has been developed to evaluate k. The comparison of reliability among a monolithic 
architecture (with a CubeSat and a conventional satellite) and a CubeSats constellation is 
shown in Figure 56. 
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Figure 56: Reliability comparison between different mission architectures 
Assuming a constellation of 20 identical CubeSats, with the requirement of a minimum of 
16 operative spacecraft to accomplish the mission, the obtained reliability is higher than a 
monolithic architecture of a conventional satellite after 3.59 years after launch. Before this 
time, the constellation has a higher reliability with respect to monolithic architecture, while 
after 3.59 years, the latter is characterised by a higher reliability with respect to the former. 
Hence, it has been demonstrated, in a preliminary analysis, that it is possible to achieve higher 
mission reliability with a constellation of CubeSats than with a monolithic classical satellite. 
Then, it is possible to evaluate the MTTF when k changes from 1 to 20. The obtained value 
indicates the time at which it is expected to lose the capabilities to completely achieve all 
mission objectives because minimum number of required satellites are not operational due to 
failures. Thus, on the basis of this value, it should be possible to establish a precise 
maintainability plan which can consist of a substitution of failed CubeSats inserting new once 
on orbit. Assuming, as previously, a constellation with initially 20 operative CubeSats (i.e., 
n=20), the variation of MTTF with respect to k is shown in Figure 57. 
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Figure 57: MTTF variation of a 20 CubeSats constellation with respect to k 
The obtained result confirms the expected output, i.e., maintaining the number of 
CubeSats on the constellation constant, the higher is the number of required operational 
satellites to conduct the mission, the lower is the MTTF. It is clear that, for a constellation of 20 
CubeSats, if only 1 is required to be operational in order to achieve the mission objectives, the 
MTTF is unrealistically high (precisely, 787 years). Obviously, a constellation of 20 CubeSats will 
not be deployed if only 1 satellite is required to accomplish the mission. Focusing the attention 
to a more realistic cases, for k=15, the expected MTTF is two years. Taking into account these 
results, different mission configurations shall be evaluated. For example, a mission of 4 years 
could be accomplished with a constellation of n=20 CubeSats with k=15, and replacing the 
failed after 2 years. 
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8.3 Case study: HumSat/GEOID constellation 
A real project, called HumSat/GEOID constellation, has been adopted as case study to 
apply the previous identified method to increase reliability at mission level. As part of this 
project, the CubeSat Team is developing 3STAR, a 3U CubeSat to be inserted into orbit in order 
to be one of the space segment elements of the constellation. 
8.3.1 3STAR 
3STAR CubeSat is a project contained in the e-st@r program. It is the third CubeSat 
developed by the CubeSat Team, which also has educational and technological objectives. 
Besides the HumSat/GEOID payload, which is a communication subsystem to provide 
telecommunications services in support to humanitarian and emergency applications, 3STAR 
has a remote sensing payload. In particular, P-GRESSION multi-purpose payload under 
development at Politecnico di Torino will be installed in the satellite to perform different 
remote sensing techniques for Earth observation, atmosphere profiling for climate studies, and 
eventually warning services. 
At the present, 3STAR project is under development at STARLab. In particular, the project 
is in the phase B of the life-cycle and the first prototypes of the subsystems will be developed 
in the next months. 
8.3.2 HumSat project 
HumSat (Humanitarian Satellite) Network project goal is the development of a nano-
satellite constellation and its corresponding ground segments (shown in Figure 58) to provide 
support for humanitarian initiatives, especially in developing areas. Moreover, the project will 
provide educational hands-on practice to university students boosting cooperation between 
universities from different countries. HumSat project has been endorsed by European Space 
Agency, United Nations through the Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), University of 
Vigo (Spain), California Polytechnic University (USA) and Autonomous National University of 
Mexico and CRECTEALC (Mexico). 
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Figure 58: HumSat/GEOID network 
Going in detail on the network architecture, the space segment is composed by different 
number of nano-satellites (including CubeSats) where 3STAR CubeSat will be inserted. The 
satellites will gather information from on-ground sensors placed all around the World. These 
sensors, freely deployed and developed by users of the network, are the user segment. All this 
information will be then transmitted and collected on the ground segment elements. The 
ground segment is formed by different nodes (i.e. ground control stations); each of one is part 
of the GENSO network. Each node will be also used to communicate and control the satellites. 
A Centralised HumSat Control Facilities collects the data from all nodes and stores them for 
retrieval by the users. It also implements the necessary mechanisms to provide confidentiality 
to users’ data. 
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8.3.3 GEOID 
GEOID, which stands for GENSO Experimental Orbital Initial Demonstration, is a project 
that will act as a primary tool for the large-scale validation of the GENSO network. The GENSO 
(Global Educational Network for Satellite Operations) network aims to increase the return 
from educational space missions by forming a worldwide network of ground stations and 
spacecraft which can interact via a software standard. GEOID initiative is considered as the ESA 
contribution to the HumSat project being the communications backbone and test-bed for the 
initial version of the HumSat system. 
8.3.4 HumSat/GEOID constellation mission-oriented reliability 
Ridolfi et al. utilised the HumSat/GEOID project as a key study to set up an optimisation 
process aimed at determining the best configurations of a swarm-like constellation of 
CubeSats. That study foresaw the deployment of a constellation formed by nano-satellites and 
ground stations to provide communication services between different locations on Earth with 
a store-and-forward architecture. Different number of CubeSats have been considered for the 
study. The authors established the optimum number of CubeSats to guarantee certain global 
coverage and constellation cost. The objective of the present key study is to add a figure-of-
merit with respect to reliability, and validate the results obtained by Ridolfi et al. or propose 
different possible solutions to maximise mission reliability. 
 
Different architectures have been considered the previous mentioned study. In particular, 
they are: 
 7 CubeSats in one orbital plane 
 8 CubeSats in one orbital plane 
 9 CubeSats in three orbital planes 
 12 CubeSats in three orbital planes 
First approach takes into account the number of CubeSats. The target objective, as 
considered before, is to have a mission reliability equal or higher than those of a monolithic 
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architecture with conventional satellite after 2 years from the deployment of the satellites 
(i.e., R=0.9612). The script used in section 0 is used to determine the value of k for each 
architecture that assures an equal or higher mission reliability of 0.9612 after two years. The 
obtained results are the summarised in Table 16. 
Table 16: k, n and R(t=2 years) for different mission architectures 
Nº of CubeSats (n) k R(t=2 years) 
7 5 0.9818 
8 6 0.9727 
9 7 0.9618 
12 9 0.9833 
The results highlight that the higher is the number of CubeSats in the studied architecture 
(i.e., n), the higher is the difference between n and k to obtain a similar reliability of monolithic 
architecture with a classical satellite. A comparison of the previous architectures reliability is 
given in Figure 59. 
 
Figure 59: Reliability of CubeSats constellation for different n and k vs. monolithic architecture with conventional 
satellite 
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Previous graphic stresses that the increase of CubeSats does not entail higher mission 
reliability during the whole mission. For the first two years after insertion into orbit, a 
constellation of 12 CubeSats guarantee the highest reliability of all architectures taken into 
account. However, after approximately three and a half years a constellation of 7 CubeSat with 
5 operational spacecraft guarantees the highest reliability. Therefore, taking only into account 
the reliability, the best architecture for the first two years of mission is a 12 CubeSats with a 
requirement of minimum 9 operational. Nevertheless, the reliability difference during first two 
years of mission of the best two architectures is relatively low (∆R=0.0022). Thus, a different 
approach could be established: insert 12 CubeSats on-orbit but with the need of use 7 of them, 
and 5 as a back-up. 
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9  
CONCLUSIONS 
This PhD thesis explored the dependability of small-satellites and their missions, focusing 
the attention on CubeSats. The concrete research aims at filling the existent gap on literature 
about CubeSats failures and to explore possible methods to increase their dependability by 
means of improving their attributes. 
The use of CubeSats, a satellite standard defined on its basic unit as a cube of 10cm side 
and maximum 1.33Kg, experienced a boost in the last decade. Mainly designed and developed 
in the university field, the use of this type of satellites for more-than-educational purposes is 
being increased in the last years. However, it is a common feeling in the CubeSat community 
that high number of this satellites failed once on-orbit. The research confirmed that more than 
50% of the CubeSats failed after their insertion on-orbit, mainly due to lack of communications 
or problems with electrical power system. However, it could not be possible to identify the 
root cause of failures, mainly due to lack of information from CubeSats developers. Anyhow, 
the number of failures was available, and by means of non-parametric and parametric analysis 
has been demonstrated that CubeSats’ failures follow a Weibull distribution, characterised by 
a high infant mortality. 
A comparison between traditional space projects and CubeSats projects has been 
conducted. The former are characterised to accept low risk and consequently increase 
reliability through design and verifications complexity as well as mass and cost increase; the 
later usually accept high risk with low design and verifications complexity that lead to a mass 
and cost reduction. From this analysis it has been identified three key methods to increase 
CubeSats and CubeSats missions’ reliability: 1) good practices to be conducted during all 
phases of satellites life-cycle, 2) reliability increase through verification, and 3) reliability 
increase at mission level. 
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The first method is based on applying good practices during all CubeSat life-cycle phases 
in order to increase the mission rate of success. An evaluation of activities conducted by 
CubeSat developers has been conducted through a questionnaire sent to all developers. The 
received answers have been used to state the good practices that will help future CubeSat 
developers to improve their projects. 
Secondly, tailoring international standards has been a key-activity to establish a precise 
and systematic methodology for verification planning and execution of CubeSat. Following the 
proposed methodology gives to CubeSat developers the opportunity to conduct verification 
activities in an optimized way with respect to ECSS, allowing them to focus the attention on 
key-aspects like functional and concrete environmental verifications. The execution of these 
verifications leads to conduction of reduced cost and time-saving verification campaign. 
This second method has been applied to e-st@r-II CubeSat. It has been demonstrated that 
the methodology perfectly fits a CubeSat project requirements in terms of cost, time and 
human-resources requirement. The execution of the planned verifications led to the 
verification of functional requirements of the satellite, increasing its reliability and the 
confidence of its ability to conduct the designed mission. Environmental verifications will allow 
to also increase both reliability and expected mission success. However, at the date these 
verifications could not be conducted due to management delays on ESA/ESTEC facilities side. It 
is expected that they will be carried out during first quarter 2015. 
Finally, the characteristics of CubeSat projects allow the development of different mission 
architectures (e.g. swarm-like constellations) with respect to traditional monolithic 
architectures. This new concepts allow to define an alternative way to increase the reliability, 
at mission level instead of system level. Assuming that CubeSats reliability follows a Weibull 
distribution (as already verified), it has been demonstrated that it is possible to obtain a higher 
reliability at mission level for a CubeSats swarm-like constellation with respect to a classical 
monolithic satellite, even if single CubeSat reliability is lower than traditional satellite. 
This study has been applied to 3STAR CubeSat, which is being developed at Politecnico di 
Torino within HumSat/GEOID program. The method demonstrated that a satellite constellation 
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of 12 CubeSats with a minimum of 9 operating is characterised by a higher reliability than a 
traditional satellite after 10 years of insertion into orbit. 
In conclusion, it has been proven that the three proposed methods are effective to 
increase the CubeSats reliability and their mission rate of success. Moreover, with this 
research a useful guidelines for design, development, verify and operate a CubeSat has been 
supplied to all CubeSat community. Finally, as a main part of the research, it has been 
demonstrated that improving the verification activity is a key factor for the development of 
CubeSats, and leads to higher confidence in the success of CubeSats missions. 
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APPENDIX A  
Newton-Raphson Method 
The Newton-Raphson Method is used for solving nonlinear equations iteratively based on 
the idea of linear approximation. Let 𝑓(𝑟) be a well-behaved function, let r be a root of the 
equation 𝑓(𝑟) = 0, and 𝑥0 be a good estimate of r. The function 𝑓(𝑥) is then expanded using 
Taylor series: 
𝑓(𝑟) = 𝑓(𝑥0) + (𝑟 − 𝑥0)𝑓(𝑥0)
′ +
(𝑟 − 𝑥0)
2
2!
𝑓(𝑥0)
′′ + ⋯ (B.1) 
 
Being 𝑥0 a good estimate of r, then 𝑟 = 𝑥0 + ℎ. Hence, ℎ = 𝑟 − 𝑥0, being h relatively 
small due to the fact that 𝑥0 is a good estimate of r. Thus, the previous polynomial of degree 
infinity equation (B.1) can be solved taking only the first two terms of the right-hand side: 
 
0 = 𝑓(𝑟) = 𝑓(𝑥𝑜+ℎ) ≈ 𝑓(𝑥0) + ℎ𝑓(𝑥0)
′  (B.2) 
Hence, h and r expressions are: 
ℎ ≈ −
𝑓(𝑥0)
𝑓(𝑥0)
′  (B.3) 
𝑟 = 𝑥0 + ℎ ≈ 𝑥0 −
𝑓(𝑥0)
𝑓(𝑥0)
′  (B.4) 
Hence, placing 𝑥1 as the improved estimate of the root r, the following expression is 
obtained: 
𝑥1 = 𝑥0 −
𝑓(𝑥0)
𝑓(𝑥0)
′  (B.5) 
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𝑥1 is then used in lieu of 𝑥0 in eq. (B.5) to obtain a better estimate of the root. The 
process is then iteratively repeated until the difference between two consecutive estimates of 
the root is acceptable (i.e., under a certain threshold). The general expression for the Newton-
Raphson Method is the following: 
𝑥𝑛+1 = 𝑥𝑛 −
𝑓(𝑥𝑛)
𝑓(𝑥𝑛)
′  (B.6) 
The steps are summarised as follow: 
1. Determine an initial estimate 𝑥0of r, such as 𝑓(?̂?0) ≅ 0 
2. Calculate the second estimate 𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝑥𝑘 −
𝑓(?̂?𝑘)
𝑓
(?̂?𝑘)
′  (i.e. k=0, k+1=1 for the first 
iteration) 
3. If |𝑑| = 𝑥𝑘 − 𝑥𝑘+1 ≥ 𝜀, being 𝜀 a chosen threshold, increase k (i.e. k=k+1) and 
proceed from point 2 again. If |𝑑| = 𝑥𝑘 − 𝑥𝑘+1 ≤ 𝜀, a root value is obtained 
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APPENDIX B 
CubeSats Questionnaire 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
1. Institution 
 
 
2. Satellite name 
 
 
3. CubeSat type (Select one option) 
 1U   1.5U   2U   3U 
 
4. Objectives of the project 
Objective #1 
 
Objective #2 
 
Objective #3 
 
 
5. Participants to the project (%) 
(a) Undergraduate students 
 
(b) Graduate students 
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(c) PhD students 
 
(d) Professors 
 
(e) Industry professionals 
 
(f) Others 
 
 
6. Total funding level of the project (please specify currency) 
 
 
7. Launch and orbit specifications 
(a) Date of launch [dd/mm/yyyy] 
 
(b) Launch site 
 
(c) Launcher 
 
(d) Orbit inclination [deg] 
 
(e) Perigee [Km] 
 
(g) Apogee [Km] 
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8. Actual status of the satellite (Select one option) 
 Active   Non active   Deorbited   CubeSat launched to the ISS but not yet  
      deployed 
 
9. Please, provide a brief description of the mission 
 
 
 
CUBESAT DESIGN 
 
10. Model philosophy adopted (Select one option) 
 Prototype   Protoflight   Hybrid 
 
11. Has some standard been followed? (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
12. If in the previous question you answered yes, please specify what standard you 
followed 
 
 
13. Have you performed some reliability analysis from the very early development 
phases to improve robustness of the CubeSat? (e.g. FMECA, etc.) (Select one 
option) 
 Yes   No 
 
14. If in the previous question you answered yes, please specify the methods used 
to evaluate the CubeSat reliability 
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What of the following models have you build? Please, specify also if they are 
mathematical/virtual model(s) and/or hardware model(s) 
15. Type of model 
 
 Mathematical/Virtual Hardware 
(a) CAD model (only Mathematical/Virtual selection is 
possible for this model) 
  
(b) Electrical model   
(c) Structural model   
(d) Thermal model   
(e) Engineering model   
(f) Engineering Qualification model   
(g) Qualification model   
(h) Flight model   
(i) Protoflight model   
  
 
16. Has any software model of the subsystems been established in order to analyse 
by simulation the behaviour of each of them? (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
17. If in the previous question you answered yes, please specify which 
subsystem(s) has(ve) been modelled 
 EPS 
 ADCS 
 COM 
 OBDH 
 Thermal 
 Mechanisms 
 Payload 
 Other (please specify) 
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18. Has a software simulation of the entire system functionality been performed to 
improve the CubeSat design before starting the hardware manufacturing? (Select 
one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
19. Have HiRel components been used? (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
20. If you answered yes in the previous question, please specify what components 
are HiRel 
 
 
21. Have tests been performed at equipment level? (either on self-developed or 
acquired equipment) (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
22. If in the previous question you answered yes, please specify on what 
components/equipment you conducted the following tests 
(a) Functional tests 
 
(b) Mechanical tests 
 
(c) Thermal test 
 
(d) Radiation test 
 
 
23. Has any type of redundancy been foreseen in the design of the satellite? If yes, 
please specify (Select one option) 
 Yes 
 No 
CUBESAT HANDLING 
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24. Has it been necessary to transport the CubeSat among different facilities? (e.g. 
to perform the tests, to integrate it into the CubeSat deployer, etc.) (Select one 
option) 
 Yes   No 
 
25. If in the previous question you answered yes, what of the following 
considerations have been taken into account? 
 Protection against shocks 
 Control of humidity 
 Control of contamination 
 Other (please specify): 
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CUBESAT VERIFICATION PREPARATION 
 
26. Has an AIV plan been established for the project? (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
27. Were test specifications and written step-by-step procedures prepared for each 
test? (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
28. If step-by-step test procedures were prepared, did they include the nominally 
expected system response to each test step? (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
Please, specify the position and the number of sensors which have been placed for the 
following tests (if performed). If no sensors have been utilised in some position, leave 
the space empty 
 
 29. External 
part of the 
CubeSat 
30. Internal 
part of the 
CubeSat 
31. On the shaker 
plate (only for 
mechanical tests) 
32. On the CubeSat 
deployer (only for 
mechanical tests) 
(a) Mechanical 
tests 
    
(b) TV/TC tests     
  
 
33. Please, describe briefly the criteria adopted to decide the position of the 
sensors. 
(a) Mechanical tests 
 
(b) TV/TC tests 
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34. Did you perform a calibration of GSE, and in particular measurement systems 
(such scale, voltmeter, amperometer, callipers, ...) before performing the tests? (If 
their calibration was performed by a certified authority and was still within the 
expiry date you may answer yes) (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
35. Has any kind of dry-test been conducted on the GSE before performing the 
tests? (e.g. to verify the correct functionality of the GSE and/or the sensors) (Select 
one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
36. If in the previous question you answered yes, please explain briefly what kind 
of dry-tests you have conducted 
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CUBESAT VERIFICATION EXECUTION 
 
What verification have you performed at system level and what method have you used? 
 
 37. Select if the verification has 
been conducted 
38. If yes, please select the 
verification method(s) 
 Yes No Analysis Test 
(a) Mass measurement     
(b) Geometry measurement     
(c) Centre of Gravity measurement     
(d) Moments of Inertia measurement     
(e) Static loads     
(f) Shock     
(g) Random vibrations     
(h) Sinusoidal vibrations     
(i) Thermal Vacuum/Thermal Cycling     
(j) EMC/EMauto-Compatibility     
(k) Radiations     
(l) Functional test     
(m) Performance test     
(n) Mission test     
  
 
Please, specify the following parameters established for the TV/TC test (if performed) 
 
 39. Value of the parameters for the TV/TC tests 
  
(a) Maximum temperature [ºC]  
(b) Duration of the hot plateaux [min]  
(c) Minimum temperature [ºC]  
(d) Duration of the cold plateaux [min]  
(e) Number of cycles  
(f) Temperature rate of change [ºC/min]  
(g) Dwell time until functional test starts [min]  
(h) Were the maximum and minimum 
temperatures applied evenly to the whole satellite 
or to selected parts? 
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40. How did you establish the temperatures limits for the TV/TC tests? (e.g. based 
on previous experience, from a thermal analysis, from components/materials 
datasheet, etc.) 
 
 
41. How did you establish the number of cycles of the TV/TC tests? 
 
 
Please, specify the levels of the static loads test (if performed) 
 
 42. Longitudinal QSL [g] 43. Lateral QSL [g] 
(a) Maximum   
(b) Minimum   
  
 
44. How did you establish the static loads levels? 
 
 
Please, specify the levels of the shock test (if performed) 
 
 45. Frequency [Hz] 46. SRS Input level [g] with Q-factor of 10 
(a) First values   
(b) Second values   
(c) Third values   
(d) Fourth values   
(e) Fifth values   
  
 
47. How did you establish the shock level? 
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48. In what direction(s) and how many times has the shock been applied? 
 
 
Please, specify the levels of the random vibrations test (if performed) 
 
 49. Frequency [Hz] 50. Level [g^2/Hz] 
(a) First values   
(b) Second values   
(c) Third values   
(d) Fourth values   
(e) Fifth values   
(f) Sixth values   
(g) Seventh values   
(h) Eighth values   
(i) Ninth values   
(j) Tenth values   
  
 
51. Duration of the random vibrations test [min] 
 
 
52. How did you establish the random vibrations levels? 
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Please, specify the levels of the sinusoidal vibrations test (if performed) 
 
 53. Frequency [Hz] 54. Level [g] 
(a) First values   
(b) Second values   
(c) Third values   
(d) Fourth values   
(e) Fifth values   
(f) Sixth values   
(g) Seventh values   
(h) Eighth values   
(i) Ninth values   
(j) Tenth values   
  
 
55. Sweep rate of sinusoidal vibrations test[oct/min] 
 
 
56. How did you establish the sinusoidal vibrations levels? 
 
 
57. How did you establish the levels for the EMC/EMauto-Compatibility tests? 
 
 
58. How did you establish the radiation levels (if performed)? 
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CUBESAT VERIFICATION RESULTS 
 
 
59. Has(ve) any anomaly(ies)/failure(s) been individuated during the tests? 
 Yes   No 
 
60. Has(ve) the anomaly(ies)/failure(s) been fixed before the launch? (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
61. Please, specify which test/s has/ve been repeated after the failure(s) has(ve) been fixed 
 Physical properties     Static loads     Shock     Random vibrations     Sinusoidal vibrations 
 TV/TC                       EMC/EMAuto-Compatibility  Radiations                 Functional test 
 Performance test       Mission test     Other (please specify): 
 
Please, specify in which test(s)the anomaly(ies)/failure(s) has(ve) been individuated. For each 
one, please describe briefly the observed failure 
 
 62. Anomaly(ies)/Failure(s) 
observed 
63. Brief description of the 
anomaly(ies)/Failure(s) 
 Yes No Verification not 
conducted 
 
(a) Physical properties 
measurement 
    
(b) Static loads test     
(c) Shock     
(d) Random vibrations test     
(e) Sinusoidal vibrations test     
(f) Thermal Vacuum/Thermal 
cycling test 
    
(g) EMC/EMauto-Compatibility 
tests 
    
(h) Radiation test     
(i) Functional test     
(j) Performance test     
(k) Mission test     
  
For the observed anomaly(ies)/failure(s) (for each test) select the consequence on the project in 
terms of cost (assuming a project budget of 100k€) and schedule (assuming 2 years design life 
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cycle) 
 
 
64. Cost increasing wrt a project 
budget of 100k€ 
65. Schedule delay wrt 2 years design life cycle 
 More 
than 
15 % 
Up 
to 
15% 
Up 
to 
5% 
Up 
to 
1% 
Delay > 
6 
months 
Delay 
up to 6 
months 
Delay 
up to 3 
months 
Delay up 
to 1 
months 
(a) Anomalies during 
physical properties 
measurement 
        
(b) Failures during 
static loads test 
        
(c) Failures during 
shock tests 
        
(d) Failures during 
random vibrations test 
        
(e) Failures during 
sinusoidal vibrations 
test 
        
(f) Failures during 
thermal 
Vacuum/Thermal 
cycling test 
        
(g) Failures during 
EMC/EMauto-
Compatibility tests 
        
(h) Failures during 
radiation test 
        
(i) Failures during 
functional test 
        
(j) Failures during 
performance test 
        
(k) Failures during 
mission test 
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CUBESAT INTEGRATION INTO THE DEPLOYER 
 
 
66. How long the CubeSat has remained installed inside the deployer until the 
launch? [days] 
 
 
67. Has been possible to recharge the batteries after its integration into the 
deployer? (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
68. If in the previous question you answered yes, when was the last time the 
batteries were recharged? [days before launch date] 
 
 
CUBESAT INTEGRATION INTO THE DEPLOYER 
 
 
69. How did you verify the correct ejection of the CubeSat from the deployer? 
 Ejection confirmed by launch authority/launch provider 
 Ejection confirmed by CubeSat deployer provider 
 Ejection confirmed when first signal of the CubeSat was received 
 Other (please specify): 
 
70. How did you know that the antenna has been deployed? 
 
 
71. Has a communication link with the satellite been established within the first 
hours after its deployment? (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
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72. If in the previous question you answered no, please briefly explain the reason 
why, in your opinion, the communication link has not been established 
 
 
73. Has the intensity level of the signal been high enough to correctly decode the 
signal? (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
74. If in the previous question you answered no, please briefly explain why, in your 
opinion, the received signal power was not high enough to be decoded? 
 
 
75. Have the telemetry values been comprised in the nominal/expected ranges? 
(Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
76. If in the previous question you answered no, please briefly explain why the 
telemetry values were not in the nominal/expected ranges? 
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CUBESAT INTEGRATION INTO THE DEPLOYER 
 
 
77. Has(ve) failure(s)/malfunction(s) been observed on the CubeSat during the 
nominal mission? (Select one option) 
 Yes   No 
 
78. Please, explain briefly which is, in your opinion, the origin of the failure(s) you 
observed and the consequences on the system and mission. 
 
 
79. If any failure(s) has(ve) been observed, on which subsystem(s) occurred? 
 EPS  ADCS  Mechanisms  Payload 
 COM  OBDH  Thermal 
 
80. Have you performed corrective actions to restore the satellite into its nominal 
conditions? (Select one option) 
 Yes 
 No 
 
81. What was the nominal mission duration and the real mission duration? (if the 
mission has not been finished leave the real mission duration field empty) 
(a) Nominal duration [months] 
 
(b) Real duration [months] 
 
 
82. What is the rate of success of your mission (%) wrt your success criteria? 
(Enter a value greater than 0) 
 
 
83. How long you took to complete the questionnaire? [minutes] 
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If you would like to recommend other people to fill this questionnaire, please provide 
their names and e-mail addresses 
 
 84. Name and Surname 85. e-mail 
(a) Person #1   
(b) Person #2   
(c) Person #3   
(d) Person #4   
(e) Person #5   
(f) Person #6   
(g) Person #7   
(h) Person #8   
(i) Person #9   
(j) Person #10   
  
 
86. Please provide any comment or suggestion you have 
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